国产AV88|国产乱妇无码在线观看|国产影院精品在线观看十分钟福利|免费看橹橹网站

《國際關(guān)系前沿》2024年第5期(總第17期)

發(fā)布時(shí)間:2024-10-29 | 雜志分類:其他
免費(fèi)制作
更多內(nèi)容

《國際關(guān)系前沿》2024年第5期(總第17期)

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)95? 譯者評(píng)述本文結(jié)合心理學(xué)領(lǐng)域的恐懼管理理論,討論了暴力沖突的發(fā)生是否會(huì)對(duì)不同性別的政客產(chǎn)生不同的影響效應(yīng)。文章給出了肯定的回答,指出暴力沖突可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致女性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的影響力受到?jīng)_擊,并且會(huì)迫使不同性別的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人遵從既有的性別規(guī)范和刻板印象,限制女性政客在沖突中的能動(dòng)性。本文的推薦理由總體而言可以歸納為三個(gè)部分:首先,在理論構(gòu)建領(lǐng)域,本文綜合不同學(xué)科領(lǐng)域的知識(shí)對(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在沖突中的行為進(jìn)行分析,具有創(chuàng)新性;其次,在方法上,文章使用中斷時(shí)間序列分析,以沖突的發(fā)生為節(jié)點(diǎn)觀察女性與男性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的政治參與行為變化,具有較強(qiáng)的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性;最后,本文作者還針對(duì)“如何提升沖突期間女性政客的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力”這一問題提出了切實(shí)的建議。本文也存在一定不足。一方面,本文的理論構(gòu)建相對(duì)簡單,對(duì)于“恐懼管理理論”的介紹也略顯不足;另一方面,本文研究的資料主要源于俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中烏克蘭政客的網(wǎng)絡(luò)發(fā)言,數(shù)據(jù)來源較為單一。未來的研究可以進(jìn)一步討論沖突或暴力在何種情況下更加容易刺激不同性別的政客遵從傳統(tǒng)的性別規(guī)范。例如,“內(nèi)戰(zhàn)”是否比“國家間沖突”更容易強(qiáng)化既有的性別刻板印象?不同國家的政體類型是否會(huì)影響沖突中... [收起]
[展開]
《國際關(guān)系前沿》2024年第5期(總第17期)
粉絲: {{bookData.followerCount}}
中國國際關(guān)系學(xué)界最大的學(xué)術(shù)編譯平臺(tái),專注國內(nèi)外權(quán)威雜志前沿學(xué)術(shù)動(dòng)態(tài)。受眾定位高水平研究者,目前已覆蓋國內(nèi)本領(lǐng)域所有科研院校。聯(lián)系:guozhengxueren@163.com
文本內(nèi)容
第101頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)95

? 譯者評(píng)述本文結(jié)合心理學(xué)領(lǐng)域的恐懼管理理論,討論了暴力沖突的發(fā)生是否會(huì)對(duì)不同性別的政客產(chǎn)生不同的影響效應(yīng)。文章給出了肯定的回答,指出暴力沖突可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致女性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的影響力受到?jīng)_擊,并且會(huì)迫使不同性別的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人遵從既有的性別規(guī)范和刻板印象,限制女性政客在沖突中的能動(dòng)性。本文的推薦理由總體而言可以歸納為三個(gè)部分:首先,在理論構(gòu)建領(lǐng)域,本文綜合不同學(xué)科領(lǐng)域的知識(shí)對(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在沖突中的行為進(jìn)行分析,具有創(chuàng)新性;其次,在方法上,文章使用中斷時(shí)間序列分析,以沖突的發(fā)生為節(jié)點(diǎn)觀察女性與男性領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的政治參與行為變化,具有較強(qiáng)的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性;最后,本文作者還針對(duì)“如何提升沖突期間女性政客的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力”這一問題提出了切實(shí)的建議。本文也存在一定不足。一方面,本文的理論構(gòu)建相對(duì)簡單,對(duì)于“恐懼管理理論”的介紹也略顯不足;另一方面,本文研究的資料主要源于俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中烏克蘭政客的網(wǎng)絡(luò)發(fā)言,數(shù)據(jù)來源較為單一。

未來的研究可以進(jìn)一步討論沖突或暴力在何種情況下更加容易刺激不同性別的政客遵從傳統(tǒng)的性別規(guī)范。例如,“內(nèi)戰(zhàn)”是否比“國家間沖突”更容易強(qiáng)化既有的性別刻板印象?不同國家的政體類型是否會(huì)影響沖突中女性政客的表達(dá)空間?這些問題都可以在本文的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步討論。

【校對(duì)審核:談詩琪王逸品施榕】【責(zé)任編輯:嚴(yán)瑾怡】

第102頁

96

新刊速遞《 國 際 政 治 經(jīng) 濟(jì) 學(xué) 評(píng) 論 》 ( Review of International PoliticalEconomy)

Review of International Political Economy,Vol.31, No.4, 2024

1. 制定優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易協(xié)定中的否決權(quán)和準(zhǔn)入能力(Veto powers and access capabilities inthedesign of preferential trade agreements)

Ninfa M. Fuentes-Sosa,經(jīng)濟(jì)研究與教學(xué)中心國際研究部主任兼研究教授

【摘要】關(guān)于國內(nèi)政治行為者對(duì)制定優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易政策的影響研究主要集中在作為政策變化阻礙的否決權(quán)使用者身上,將它們的角色假定為獲取經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的準(zhǔn)入點(diǎn)或渠道。準(zhǔn)入點(diǎn)和否決權(quán)使用者理論預(yù)測(cè),多個(gè)準(zhǔn)入點(diǎn)會(huì)導(dǎo)致保護(hù)主義偏見并且許多否決權(quán)使用者會(huì)對(duì)優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易協(xié)定有制約性影響。本研究認(rèn)為,結(jié)合否決權(quán)使用者和準(zhǔn)入點(diǎn)理論,否決權(quán)使用者和準(zhǔn)入點(diǎn)數(shù)量的變化對(duì)優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易協(xié)定制度特征的影響取決于與政治行為者互動(dòng)的出口商類型(基于捐贈(zèng)基金或行業(yè)內(nèi)的出口商)。定量研究表明,當(dāng)產(chǎn)業(yè)內(nèi)出口價(jià)值提升時(shí),否決權(quán)使用者以及準(zhǔn)入點(diǎn)對(duì)優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易協(xié)定的范圍和自主性的限制性影響較小。這項(xiàng)研究采用了一種新型的數(shù)據(jù)庫來估計(jì)由 500 個(gè)貿(mào)易伙伴生產(chǎn)的 256 種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)國際貿(mào)易分類的產(chǎn)業(yè)內(nèi)價(jià)值和基于捐贈(zèng)的出口價(jià)值。這項(xiàng)發(fā)現(xiàn)強(qiáng)調(diào)了考慮政治行為者和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益對(duì)制定優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易協(xié)定的更廣泛影響的重要性。

【原文】Studies of domestic political actors’ influence on the design of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)

have focused on veto players as obstacles to policy change, assuming their roles as access points or channelsfor economic interests. Access point and veto player theories predict that multiple access points leadtoaprotectionist bias and that numerous veto players have a constraining influence over PTAs. This studyarguesthat after the veto player and access point theories are combined, the effect of variation in the number of veto《 國 際政 治 經(jīng) 濟(jì)學(xué) 評(píng) 論 》 (Review of International Political

Economy)是一份涵蓋國際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的雙月刊同行評(píng)審學(xué)術(shù)期刊。其成立于 1999 年,由 Routledge 出版。本刊是國際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)領(lǐng)域的主流期刊之一,與《新政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》(New Political Economy)并列。2024 年期刊影響因子為4.659。

第103頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)97

players and access points on the institutional features of PTAs depends on the types of exporters(endowment-based or intra-industry exporters) with whom said political actors interact. Quantitative testsshow that as the value of intra-industry exports rises, veto players and access points have a less constrainingeffect on the scope and autonomy of PTAs. This study employed a novel dataset to approximate the valuesof intra-industry and endowment-based exports of 256 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)

products manufactured by 500 trading partners. The findings highlight the importance of consideringthebroader influence of political actors and economic interests on PTA design. 2. 非洲的數(shù)字發(fā)展之路:在信息通信技術(shù)領(lǐng)域?yàn)橹袊Y(jié)構(gòu)性力量鋪平道路?(Africa’sroads to digital development: paving the way for Chinese structural power in the ICTsector?)

Stephanie Arnold,意大利博洛尼亞大學(xué)政治與社會(huì)科學(xué)系博士候選人,比利時(shí)聯(lián)合國大學(xué)CRIS數(shù)字治理集群博士研究員

【摘要】在過去的數(shù)十年里,中國已經(jīng)成為了非洲數(shù)字發(fā)展的主要伙伴。中非在信息通信技術(shù)的合作滿足了非洲對(duì)先進(jìn)技術(shù)和專有技術(shù)的需求,同時(shí)幫助了中國在全球信息通信技術(shù)領(lǐng)域占據(jù)了一席之地。盡管這在短期內(nèi)對(duì)非洲的數(shù)字發(fā)展至關(guān)重要,但本文認(rèn)為中非合作的廣度會(huì)帶來重要的長期后果,即可以使中國擁有對(duì)非洲數(shù)字發(fā)展的潛在控制。通過借鑒蘇珊·斯特蘭奇的結(jié)構(gòu)性力量支柱理論,本文探討了光纖網(wǎng)絡(luò)電纜的推出如何支撐中國對(duì)生產(chǎn)的控制,數(shù)據(jù)中心的建設(shè)可能如何影響安全以及研究伙伴如何在未來創(chuàng)新中增強(qiáng)規(guī)范與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)——知識(shí)支柱。本文認(rèn)為,中非在這三個(gè)領(lǐng)域合作的推動(dòng)力是中國金融業(yè)。為了驗(yàn)證這種說法,作者在撒哈拉以南的 42 個(gè)非洲國家組織了一次定性比較分析,表明中國的援助以及中國貸款,在較小程度上,是中非在信息通信技術(shù)領(lǐng)域關(guān)系的主要驅(qū)動(dòng)力。本文認(rèn)為中國的金融援助不僅僅促進(jìn)了非洲的數(shù)字發(fā)展,而且為中國在信息通信技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的結(jié)構(gòu)性力量鋪平了道路。

【 原 文 】 Over the past few decades, China emerged as Africa’s main partner in digital development. Sino-African cooperation in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector meets Africandemand for advanced technologies and know-how while helping China to position itself in the global ICTsector. Albeit crucial for Africa’s digital development in the short term, this paper argues that the breadthof

Sino-African cooperation carries important long-term consequences that could afford China latent control

over Africa’s digital development. Drawing on Susan Strange’s pillars of structural power, this paper

considers how the rollout of fiber-optic network cables underpins Chinese control over production, howtheconstruction of data centers might impinge on security, and how research partnerships enhance norms andstandards in future innovation—the knowledge pillar. The paper argues that the enabling forceof

Sino-African cooperation in these three realms is Chinese finance. To test this claim, I conduct a QualitativeComparative Analysis (QCA) of 42 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, showing that Chinese aid and, to a lesser

extent, Chinese loans are the main drivers of Sino-African ties in the ICT sector. The paper concludes that

Chinese financial support not only promotes Africa’s digital development but also paves the way to Chinesestructural power in the ICT sector.

第104頁

98

3. 不要追蹤資金:繪制國際稅收的微觀代理圖(Unfollow the money: mapping the microagents of international tax)

Saila Stausholm,科隆馬克斯·普朗克社會(huì)研究所博士后研究員

Javier Garcia-Bernardo,烏得勒支大學(xué)方法論和統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】金融全球化使跨國公司能夠在各個(gè)司法管轄區(qū)之間轉(zhuǎn)移利潤,以降低稅率,這損害了公共財(cái)政并使政策制定者感到擔(dān)憂。雖然已有政策成效多聚焦于能夠使稅率降低的司法管轄區(qū),但學(xué)者們?cè)絹碓揭庾R(shí)到微觀層面行為者的重要性。本文使用一種基于領(lǐng)英的新型實(shí)證方法,對(duì)公司稅務(wù)顧問們進(jìn)行地理定位,他們主要是那些具有影響力的微觀避稅行為主體。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),稅務(wù)顧問通常位于歐盟和經(jīng)濟(jì)合作組織的大城市,而不是被定位為“避稅天堂”的地方。通過使用多元回歸分析,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)稅務(wù)顧問的位置并沒有與公司盈利、財(cái)務(wù)秘密或者經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的所在地相關(guān)。相反,它與管理和金融活動(dòng)相關(guān)。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)稅務(wù)顧問不成比例地出現(xiàn)在撰寫黑名單的國家上,而不是被列入黑名單的國家。本文認(rèn)為,對(duì)避稅行為的有效監(jiān)管需要關(guān)注稅務(wù)顧問,而不僅僅只關(guān)注資金流動(dòng)的目的地?!驹摹縁inancial globalization has enabled multinational corporations to shift profits between jurisdictionsto lower their tax rate, undermining public finances and concerning policy makers. While policy efforts havefocused on the jurisdictions that enable lower taxes, scholars increasingly recognize the importanceof

micro-level actors. We geographically map corporate tax advisors, influential micro-level actors intaxavoidance, using a novel empirical approach based on LinkedIn. We show that tax advisors are generallylocated in large cities in the EU and OECD, rather than in places targeted as ‘tax havens’. Using multipleregression analysis, we find that the location of tax advisors is not correlated with the location of corporateprofits, financial secrecy, or economic activity. Rather, it correlates with managerial and financial activity. We find that tax advisors are disproportionately placed in the countries writing the blacklists rather thanthecountries blacklisted. We argue that effective regulation of tax avoidance needs to focus on tax advisors, not

only on the destination of financial flows. 4. 范式變革的過程:引導(dǎo)式創(chuàng)新在中國的興起(The process of paradigmchange: therise of guided innovation in China)

Andrew B. Kennedy,澳大利亞國立大學(xué)克勞福德公共政策學(xué)院副教授

【摘要】本文為理解科學(xué)、技術(shù)和創(chuàng)新政策背后的信念提供了一個(gè)新框架?;诮鼇硌芯克_立的科技創(chuàng)新政策中幾種不同的“政策范式”,新框架解釋了這些范式如何被理解為等級(jí)信仰體系,并確定了每個(gè)范式中的不同變體。本文緊接著闡明了各國在這一領(lǐng)域從一種范式過渡到另一種范式的可能方式,重點(diǎn)關(guān)注了 1980 年代后“創(chuàng)新體系政策”范式的國際傳播。本文強(qiáng)調(diào)了關(guān)于國家干預(yù)經(jīng)濟(jì)的本土意識(shí)形態(tài)如何塑造新范式在接受國的本地化方式。為了探究這一理論的合理性,本文提出了一深入的案例研究,重點(diǎn)關(guān)注近幾十年來中國對(duì)創(chuàng)新體系政策范式的接受和本土化。

【原文】This article offers a new framework for understanding the beliefs behind science, technologyandinnovation (STI) policy. Building on recent research that has identified several distinct ‘policy paradigms’ in

第105頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)99

STI policy, it explains how these paradigms may be understood as hierarchical belief systems, andit

identifies different variants within each paradigm. The article then illuminates one means throughwhichcountries may transition from one paradigm to another in this domain, focusing on the international diffusionof the ‘innovation systems policy’ paradigm after the 1980s. The article emphasizes howlocal ideologyregarding state intervention in the economy shapes how the new paradigm is localized in the receivingstate. To probe the plausibility of this theory, the article presents an in-depth case study focused on China’sreception and localization of the innovation systems policy paradigm in recent decades. 5. 多邊貿(mào)易體系中發(fā)展政策空間的(出人意料)回歸:世貿(mào)組織上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的封鎖對(duì)發(fā)展 中 國 家 意 味 著 什 么 ( The (surprise) return of development policy space inthemultilateral trading system: what the WTO Appellate Body blockage means forthedevelopmental state)

Kristen Hopewell,英屬哥倫比亞大學(xué)公共政策與全球事務(wù)學(xué)院教授兼加拿大全球政策研究主席【摘要】自世界貿(mào)易組織成立以來——這導(dǎo)致了全球貿(mào)易規(guī)則范圍的急劇擴(kuò)大,并使這些規(guī)則對(duì)各國具有法律約束力——學(xué)界強(qiáng)調(diào)了該組織對(duì)發(fā)展政策空間的限制。通過禁止發(fā)展中國家的許多標(biāo)準(zhǔn)手段,世貿(mào)組織的規(guī)則被視為把發(fā)展中國家“踢開梯子”,阻止它們使用必要的貿(mào)易和工業(yè)政策來趕上更發(fā)達(dá)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。然而,自 2019 年以來,美國通過阻止上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的司法任命,禁用了世貿(mào)組織的執(zhí)行機(jī)制。因此,本文認(rèn)為貿(mào)易和發(fā)展格局在現(xiàn)今已經(jīng)發(fā)生了根本性的變化:世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則——曾經(jīng)是發(fā)展政策空間的強(qiáng)大制約——將不再具有法律效力。文章分析了最近發(fā)生的兩起具有里程碑意義的爭(zhēng)端——印尼鎳出口限制和印度通過經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)提供的出口補(bǔ)貼——在這些爭(zhēng)端中,發(fā)展中國家成功地阻止了世貿(mào)組織專家組的裁決,這些裁決將迫使它們廢除發(fā)展主義政策。具有諷刺意味的是,鑒于美國最初是世貿(mào)組織反發(fā)展主義規(guī)則及其具有約束力的爭(zhēng)端解決體系背后的主導(dǎo)力量,美國上訴機(jī)構(gòu)封鎖的一個(gè)重要后果是多邊貿(mào)易體系中發(fā)展政策空間的重新出現(xiàn)。

【 原 文 】 Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – which led to a dramaticexpansion in the scope of global trade rules and made those rules legally binding on states – scholars havehighlighted the constraints it has imposed on development policy space. By prohibiting many of the standardtools of the developmental state, the WTO’s rules have been seen as ‘kicking away the ladder’ for

developing countries, preventing them from using the trade and industrial policies needed to catch upwithmore advanced economies. However, since 2019, the US has disabled the WTO’s enforcement mechanismby blocking judicial appointments to the Appellate Body. As a result, this article shows the trade anddevelopment landscape has now changed fundamentally: WTO rules – once a powerful constraint ondevelopment policy space – are no longer legally enforceable. The article analyzes two recent landmarkdisputes – Indonesian nickel export restrictions and Indian export subsidies provided through special

economic zones – in which developing countries have successfully blocked WTO panel rulings that wouldforce them to repeal developmentalist policies. Ironically, given that the US was originally the dominant

force behind the WTO’s anti-developmentalist rules and its binding dispute settlement system, one important

第106頁

100

consequence of the US Appellate Body blockage has been the re-emergence of development policy spaceinthe multilateral trading system. 6.一個(gè)古老而新穎的想法:引入 G-Pub,一個(gè)公共銀行成立的原始數(shù)據(jù)集(Anold, novel

idea: introducing G-Pub, an original dataset of public bank formation)Devin Case-Ruchala,北卡羅來納大學(xué)阿什維爾分校政治學(xué)系博士后研究員【摘要】在金融國際化進(jìn)程日益凸顯的背景下,公共銀行是一種重新崛起的金融治理模式,它可以作為反周期危機(jī)融資、積極投資(如綠色金融)或保護(hù)主義貸款的政策工具。然而,沒有系統(tǒng)的研究來探究是什么導(dǎo)致政府首先成立公共銀行,一部分原因是缺乏數(shù)據(jù)。本文通過介紹一個(gè)原始數(shù)據(jù)集、概念框架和描述性實(shí)證洞察,以作為未來研究的基礎(chǔ)。本文討論了對(duì)公共銀行的不同定義,以推進(jìn)“政府發(fā)起的公共銀行”的更有針對(duì)性的概念化,即由政府成立并通過所有權(quán)和/或管理保持在政府控制之下的銀行。該數(shù)據(jù)集包括 1,355 家銀行,涵蓋 1401 年至 2020 年期間的 195 個(gè)國家/地區(qū)。利用這些數(shù)據(jù),本文檢驗(yàn)了流行的假設(shè),即“政府發(fā)起的公共銀行(G-Pubs)”更有可能在欠發(fā)達(dá)國家或更專制的國家形成。文章表明,在 1970 年至 2020 年期間,“政府發(fā)起的公共銀行”的形成反而與發(fā)達(dá)的民主國家聯(lián)系在一起。1970 年代之前的描述性分析進(jìn)一步支持了更復(fù)雜的觀點(diǎn)。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)凸顯了重新制定公共銀行研究議程的必要性,該議程既要考慮國內(nèi)和國際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)態(tài),也要考慮國際擴(kuò)散、金融一體化和危機(jī)機(jī)制。

【原文】Amidst growing financial internationalization, public banks are a reemerging mode of financial

governance that can serve as a policy tool for counter-cyclical crisis financing, proactive investment (e.g. green finance), or protectionist lending. Yet no systematic studies examine what leads governments toformpublic banks in the first place, in part due to a lack of data. This paper introduces an original dataset, conceptual framework, and descriptive empirical insights to serve as the basis for future research. I discusscontending definitions of public banks to advance the more targeted conceptualizationof

‘government-initiated public banks’ (G-Pubs), or banks that are formed by governments and remainunder

government control through ownership and/or management. The dataset includes 1,355 banks and spans 195countries for the period 1401–2020. Using these data, I test prevailing assumptions suggesting G-Pubs aremore likely to form in less developed or more autocratic countries. I show that for the period 1970–2020, G-Pub formation is instead associated with developed democracies. Descriptive analysis prior to the 1970sfurther supports a more complex view. These findings underscore the need for a renewed research agendaonpublic banking that considers both domestic and international political economic dynamics, includinginternational diffusion, financial integration, and crisis mechanisms. 7. 搭上發(fā)展順風(fēng)車:世界銀行對(duì)網(wǎng)約車公司的研究(Taking development for a ride: theWorld Bank’s research with ride-hailing companies)

Kate Bedford,伯明翰大學(xué)法律和政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授

第107頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)101

【摘要】世界銀行國際金融公司與網(wǎng)約車公司合作,編寫了三份關(guān)于性別平等和網(wǎng)約車的研究報(bào)告。本文根據(jù)關(guān)于日益增長的企業(yè)聯(lián)產(chǎn)發(fā)展知識(shí)的更廣泛對(duì)話來檢驗(yàn)這些報(bào)告。重點(diǎn)關(guān)注優(yōu)步等“共享經(jīng)濟(jì)”公司的性別和發(fā)展?jié)摿Φ难芯坑^點(diǎn),它認(rèn)為女性司機(jī)的短缺已被成功地描述為性別和發(fā)展問題,而不是由網(wǎng)約車公司自己解決的勞動(dòng)力供應(yīng)問題。它提出了一個(gè)多方利益相關(guān)者解決方案,涉及許可行為者、慈善機(jī)構(gòu)、政府發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)、銀行和保險(xiǎn)提供商。性別平等研究有助于一種新的發(fā)展常識(shí),包括擴(kuò)大零工經(jīng)濟(jì)中負(fù)債累累的“獨(dú)立承包商”的數(shù)量;減輕平臺(tái)的“監(jiān)管負(fù)擔(dān)”;以及將非政府組織與企業(yè)利益更加緊密地聯(lián)系在一起。本文闡述了性別研究在世界銀行更廣泛地轉(zhuǎn)向以商業(yè)為主導(dǎo)的發(fā)展方向中的核心作用,并強(qiáng)調(diào)了在網(wǎng)約車工作方面的一些獨(dú)特教訓(xùn)。

【原文】The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation has produced three research reports on gender

equality and ride-hailing, in collaboration with ride-hailing companies. This article examines these reports inlight of wider conversations about the growing corporate co-production of development knowledge. Focusing on research claims about the gender and development potential of ‘sharing economy’ firms likeUber, it argues that the shortage of women drivers has been successfully framed as a gender anddevelopment problem, rather than a labour supply problem to be resolved by ride-hailing companiesthemselves. Multi-stakeholder solutions are proposed, involving licensing actors, charities, government

development agencies, banks, and insurance providers. Gender equality research contributes to a newdevelopment common sense involving expanding the numbers of indebted ‘independent contractors’ inthegig economy; reducing ‘regulatory burdens’ on platforms; and binding nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) ever tighter to corporate interests. This article shows the centrality of gender research to the Bank’sbroader reorientation towards business-led development, and highlights some distinctive lessons of workonride-hailing. 【編譯:林志俊】【責(zé)任編輯:封欣怡】

第108頁

102

《沖突解決雜志》(Journal of Conflict Resolution)Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.68, No.6, July 2024

1. 長臂與鐵拳:專制鎮(zhèn)壓與跨國壓迫(The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: AuthoritarianCrackdowns and Transnational Repression)

Alexander Dukalskis, 都柏林大學(xué)政治與國際關(guān)系學(xué)院副教授

Saipira Furstenberg,意大利威尼斯卡福斯卡里大學(xué)哲學(xué)與文化遺產(chǎn)系研究員Sebastian Hellmeier,WZB 柏林社會(huì)研究院博士后研究員

Redmond Scales,都柏林大學(xué)政治與國際關(guān)系學(xué)院博士研究生

【摘要】有關(guān)跨國鎮(zhèn)壓的新興文獻(xiàn)已經(jīng)確定了威權(quán)國家用來控制和脅迫其海外人口的幾種策略。本文在現(xiàn)有研究的基礎(chǔ)上,研究了跨國鎮(zhèn)壓的國內(nèi)決定因素。本文認(rèn)為,國內(nèi)鎮(zhèn)壓的增加可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致隨后的跨國鎮(zhèn)壓增加,因?yàn)閲鴥?nèi)的鎮(zhèn)壓會(huì)驅(qū)使國外的異見,并刺激國家將鎮(zhèn)壓的目光延伸到境外。為了評(píng)估本論點(diǎn),本文利用了含有約 1200 個(gè)案例的數(shù)據(jù)庫,這些案例涉及 1991 年至2019 年期間世界各地的威權(quán)國家在國外威脅、攻擊、引渡、綁架或暗殺本國公民。本文使用多元回歸分析首次定量測(cè)試了跨國鎮(zhèn)壓的國內(nèi)驅(qū)動(dòng)因素,發(fā)現(xiàn)隨著國內(nèi)鎮(zhèn)壓的加劇,該國隨后升級(jí)跨國鎮(zhèn)壓的可能性也大幅增加?!驹摹縏he emerging literature dealing with transnational repression has identified several strategies usedby authoritarian states to control and coerce their populations abroad. This article builds on existing researchby investigating the domestic determinants of transnational repression. It argues that an increase in domesticrepression is likely to lead to a subsequent increase in transnational repression because crackdowns at homedrive dissent abroad and incentivize the state to extend its repressive gaze beyond its borders. To evaluateitsarguments, the article draws on a database of approximately 1200 cases in which authoritarian states aroundthe world threatened, attacked, extradited, abducted, or assassinated their own citizens abroad between1991and 2019. Offering a first quantitative test of domestic drivers of transnational repression, using multivariateregression analysis, the paper finds that as repression intensifies domestically, the likelihood of that statesubsequently escalating its transnational repression also increases substantively.

《沖突解決雜志》(Journal of Conflict Resolution)是一份關(guān)于人類沖突的社會(huì)科學(xué)研究和理論的跨學(xué)科雜志。該雜志主要關(guān)注國際沖突,但也探討了各種國家、群體間和人際沖突。該期刊 2022 年的影響因子為 3.1,在國際關(guān)系的96 種期刊中排名第 19。

第109頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)103

2. 基于信仰的歧視和暴力宗教敵對(duì)行為:全球分析(Faith-Based DiscriminationandViolent Religious Hostilities: A Global Analysis)

Nilay Saiya,南洋理工大學(xué)人文與社會(huì)學(xué)院副教授

Stuti Manchanda, 南陽理工大學(xué)人文與社會(huì)學(xué)院博士研究生

Rahmat Wadidi,圣母大學(xué)政治學(xué)院研究生

【摘要】一些研究發(fā)現(xiàn),對(duì)少數(shù)宗教社群的限制與暴力宗教敵對(duì)行動(dòng)的發(fā)生有關(guān)。然而,這項(xiàng)研究沒有考慮到這樣一個(gè)事實(shí),即少數(shù)宗教歧視可以采取不同的形式,因此可能會(huì)以不同的方式鼓勵(lì)暴力。本文試圖通過研究不同形式的少數(shù)宗教限制及其與宗教暴力的關(guān)系來填補(bǔ)這一空白。具體來說,我們分析了三種基本類型的宗教歧視——對(duì)少數(shù)宗教活動(dòng)的限制、對(duì)少數(shù)宗教機(jī)構(gòu)的限制以及對(duì)皈依和傳教的限制——對(duì)宗教多數(shù)群體和宗教少數(shù)群體實(shí)施的暴力行為的比較強(qiáng)度。有趣的是,我們的分析表明,這三種形式的限制都鼓勵(lì)宗教多數(shù)群體的暴力行為,但不會(huì)鼓勵(lì)少數(shù)群體的暴力行為。我們用印度基于信仰的歧視和宗教暴力沖突的案例研究補(bǔ)充了統(tǒng)計(jì)分析。

【原文】Several studies have found restrictions on minority faith-based communities to be relatedtotheonset of violent religious hostilities. Absent from this work, though, is a consideration of the fact that

minority religious discrimination can take different forms, and, consequently, may encourage violenceindifferent ways. This paper seeks to fill this void by examining different forms of minority religiousrestrictions and their relationship to religious violence. Specifically, we analyze the comparative strengthof

three basic types of religious discrimination—restrictions on minority religious practices, restrictions onminority religious institutions, and restrictions on conversion and proselytizing—on violence carriedout byboth religious majority groups and religious minority groups. Interestingly, our analysis shows all threeforms of restrictions encourage violence from religious majorities, but not from minorities. We supplement

the statistical analysis with a case study of faith-based discrimination and violent religious hostilities inIndia. 3. 扭轉(zhuǎn)局勢(shì):內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中的軍事干預(yù)和談判的開始(Turning the Tables: Military

Intervention and the Onset of Negotiations in Civil War)

Rebecca Dudley,楊百翰大學(xué)政治專業(yè)助理教授

【摘要】內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中的談判何時(shí)發(fā)生?軍事干預(yù)如何改變這一過程?雖然現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)提出了談判開始的模型——包括調(diào)解和無協(xié)助的——但如果它們不考慮談判前卷入沖突的第三方國家,它們就是不完整的。筆者認(rèn)為軍事干預(yù)通過三種途徑調(diào)整談判障礙,從而影響談判的開始:軍事勝利的可能性、示弱的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及存在其他否決方。筆者使用邏輯隨機(jī)效應(yīng)模型對(duì)非洲內(nèi)戰(zhàn)數(shù)據(jù)集進(jìn)行了研究。該論點(diǎn)的延伸涉及干預(yù)預(yù)期如何影響沖突行為。支持叛軍的干預(yù)、具有獨(dú)立利益的干預(yù)和不對(duì)稱干預(yù)導(dǎo)致談判發(fā)生的可能性增加??刂聘深A(yù)預(yù)期的模型還表明,第三方可以通過預(yù)期和后續(xù)行動(dòng)影響交戰(zhàn)方的行為。【原文】When do negotiations occur in civil war? How does military intervention alter this process? Whilethe existing literature presents models of the onset of negotiations – both mediated and unassisted – theyareincomplete if they do not consider third-party states involved in the conflict prior to negotiations. I arguethat

military intervention impacts negotiation onset by adjusting barriers to negotiation through three pathways:

第110頁

104

the likelihood of military victory, the risk of signaling weakness, and the presence of additional veto players. I examine these mechanisms using logistic random effects models on a dataset of African civil wars. Anextension of the argument addresses how expectations of intervention shape conflict behavior. Rebel-supporting interventions, interventions with independent interests, and asymmetric interventions leadto an increase in the likelihood of negotiations occurring. Models controlling for expectations of interventionalso suggest that third parties can impact belligerents’ behavior through both expectations andfollow-through. 4. 暴力類型和群體認(rèn)同:西班牙內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的證據(jù)(Type of Violence and IngroupIdentity:Evidence From the Spanish Civil War)

Sergi Martínez,普林斯頓大學(xué)博士后研究員

【摘要】戰(zhàn)時(shí)暴力和專制鎮(zhèn)壓針對(duì)平民的形式多種多樣。過去的研究探討了暴力的原因和后果,但之前沒有研究同時(shí)評(píng)估不同類型的暴力對(duì)政治認(rèn)同的長期影響。本文認(rèn)為,無差別攻擊可以強(qiáng)化群體認(rèn)同,而民間機(jī)構(gòu)在選擇性暴力中的作用可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生不利影響。本研究利用原始數(shù)據(jù),記錄了西班牙內(nèi)戰(zhàn)期間(1936-1939 年)比斯開(巴斯克地區(qū))市政當(dāng)局對(duì)選擇性和無差別暴力的揭露情況,研究了其對(duì)投票行為的影響(1983-2015 年)。結(jié)果表明,法西斯空襲增強(qiáng)了巴斯克民族主義,而選擇性暴力則降低了巴斯克政黨的受歡迎程度。個(gè)人和社區(qū)層面的證據(jù)表明,空襲促進(jìn)了政治態(tài)度的代際傳遞。暴力可以增強(qiáng)民族認(rèn)同,但也可能削弱民族認(rèn)同:這取決于暴力類型。

【原文】Wartime violence and authoritarian repression against civilians take various forms. Past researchhas explored the causes and consequences of violence, but no previous work simultaneously assessedthelong-term effects of different types of violence on political identities. This paper contends that indiscriminateattacks can reinforce ingroup identity, whereas the role of civilian agency in selective violence may haveadetrimental impact. Equipped with original data capturing municipality-level exposure to both selectiveandindiscriminate violence during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) in Biscay (Basque Country), this studyexamines its legacy on voting behavior (1983–2015). Results indicate that fascist airstrikes increased Basquenationalism while selective violence diminished the popularity of Basque parties. Individual andcommunity-level evidence suggests that airstrikes fostered the intergenerational transmission of political

attitudes. Violence can boost national identities, but it can also erode them: it depends on the type. 5. 去平臺(tái)化有用嗎?(Does Deplatforming Work?)

Danny Klinenberg,加州大學(xué)圣巴巴拉分校經(jīng)濟(jì)專業(yè)博士研究生

【摘要】社交媒體已成為極端分子籌款和組織活動(dòng)的渠道。在政府考慮如何監(jiān)管的同時(shí),一些社交媒體公司已經(jīng)將攻擊性內(nèi)容的創(chuàng)作者移除——即平臺(tái)下架。筆者通過兩家視頻流媒體公司——YouTube及其極右翼競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手 Bitchute 移除平臺(tái)的時(shí)間差異,估計(jì)了平臺(tái)下架對(duì)收入和觀看人數(shù)的影響。在YouTube 上被下架會(huì)導(dǎo)致每周比特幣收入增加 30%,Bitchute 上的觀看人數(shù)增加50%。Bitchute 活動(dòng)的增幅低于 YouTube,這意味著平臺(tái)下架會(huì)降低內(nèi)容創(chuàng)作者的整體觀看次數(shù)和收入。

第111頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)105

【原文】Social media has become an outlet for extremists to fundraise and organize. While governmentsdeliberate on how to regulate, some social media companies have removed creators of offensive content —deplatforming. I estimate the effects of deplatforming on revenue and viewership, using variationinthetiming of removals across two video-streaming companies — YouTube, and its far-right competitor, Bitchute. Being deplatformed on Youtube results in a 30% increase in weekly Bitcoin revenue anda 50%increase in viewership on Bitchute. This increase in Bitchute activity is less than that on YouTube, meaningthat deplatforming works in decreasing a content creator’s overall views and revenue. 6. 經(jīng)濟(jì)脅迫的三難困境(The Economic Coercion Trilemma)Michael-David Mangini,耶魯大學(xué)萊特納比較與國際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)項(xiàng)目博士后研究員【摘要】各國經(jīng)常將市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入作為國際政治中的討價(jià)還價(jià)籌碼。如果一個(gè)國家在給予市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入之前要求其同時(shí)遵守多個(gè)問題領(lǐng)域,那么可以最大限度地提高遵守的動(dòng)力,但也會(huì)使其變得脆弱——即任何無法在一個(gè)問題領(lǐng)域遵守的目標(biāo)國家都沒有遵守任何領(lǐng)域的激勵(lì)。更一般地說,經(jīng)濟(jì)脅迫計(jì)劃最多可以實(shí)現(xiàn)以下三個(gè)目標(biāo)中的兩個(gè):1) 確保廣泛的國內(nèi)政治支持聯(lián)盟,2) 將有意義的貿(mào)易價(jià)值與每項(xiàng)政策問題聯(lián)系起來,3) 確保執(zhí)行一項(xiàng)政治問題不會(huì)降低目標(biāo)國家遵守其他政治問題的條件的動(dòng)力。該計(jì)劃的國內(nèi)選民、問題本身和國際經(jīng)濟(jì)的特點(diǎn)是決定國家如何優(yōu)先考慮這三個(gè)目標(biāo)的關(guān)鍵因素。三難困境解釋了可以與經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值掛鉤的問題的數(shù)量和類型。

【原文】States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requiressimultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives tocomply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area havenoincentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most twoof thefollowing three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the associationof

meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not

reduce the target’s incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program’sdomestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of

how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that canbe linked to economic value. 7. 邊境安全觀念的變化影響移民意愿水平(Changes in Perceptions of Border SecurityInfluence Desired Levels of Immigration)

Ryan C. Briggs,圭爾夫大學(xué)政治系助理教授

Omer Solodoch,希伯來大學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】人們對(duì)移民的安全擔(dān)憂日益增加。許多國家通過加強(qiáng)邊境來應(yīng)對(duì)。然而,人們對(duì)邊境安全措施對(duì)移民威脅的影響知之甚少。邊境可能會(huì)促進(jìn)群體認(rèn)同并傳播外來者的恐懼。相反,它們可能會(huì)增強(qiáng)公民的安全感和對(duì)移民的控制力。我們通過對(duì) 1000 多名美國人的配額樣本進(jìn)行的調(diào)查實(shí)驗(yàn)來測(cè)試這些說法。研究結(jié)果表明,將更多的政府資源用于邊境安全會(huì)提高移民的期望水平。這種效應(yīng)可能是

第112頁

106

由于邊境安全措施引起的對(duì)移民的控制感,即使移民的數(shù)量或特征保持不變,從而產(chǎn)生這種效應(yīng)。我們的研究結(jié)果表明,邊境管制被廣泛視為封閉和孤立的象征,它可以增加公眾對(duì)移民的支持?!驹摹縎ecurity concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifyingtheir

borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat fromimmigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, theymight

enhance citizens’ sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using surveyexperiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocatingmoregovernment resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likelydrivenby a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or

characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widelyconsidered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration. 【編譯:王涵婧】【責(zé)任編輯:封欣怡】

第113頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)107

《國際事務(wù)》(International Affairs)International Affairs,Vol.100, No.4, 2024

1. 抗擊下一場(chǎng)疫情?新冠肺炎疫情后衛(wèi)生緊急狀況下的民事和軍事合作(Fightingthenext pandemic? Civil–military collaboration in health emergencies after COVID–19)Colin McInnes,亞伯大學(xué)國際政治系教授

【摘要】在過去十年中,軍隊(duì)一直是應(yīng)對(duì)衛(wèi)生突發(fā)事件,特別是疾病爆發(fā)的重要力量。盡管軍民合作在衛(wèi)生領(lǐng)域有著悠久的傳統(tǒng),但在 COVID-19 事件中,軍方在全球衛(wèi)生、人道主義干預(yù)和多部門性等敘事所建立的寬松環(huán)境下,在世界范圍內(nèi)的應(yīng)用是前所未有的。這就造成了一個(gè)兩難的局面:軍隊(duì)很可能成為應(yīng)對(duì)重大突發(fā)衛(wèi)生事件的一個(gè)要素,而這不僅有可能使突發(fā)衛(wèi)生事件軍事化,而且會(huì)更普遍地影響社會(huì)與軍隊(duì)之間的平衡。此外,對(duì) COVID 大流行的應(yīng)對(duì)表明,目前的應(yīng)急計(jì)劃往往沒有為在衛(wèi)生危機(jī)中使用軍隊(duì)做好充分準(zhǔn)備,從而降低了反應(yīng)的有效性。本文探討了對(duì)衛(wèi)生安全化的擔(dān)憂如何演變?yōu)閷?duì)軍事化的擔(dān)憂,以及如何在未來的衛(wèi)生突發(fā)事件中有效使用軍隊(duì),而不冒衛(wèi)生事件軍事化的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或更廣泛地破壞軍民關(guān)系的問題。盡管衛(wèi)生領(lǐng)域有著悠久的軍民合作傳統(tǒng),但COVID-19 在全球衛(wèi)生、人道主義干預(yù)和多部門合作的敘事所建立的寬松環(huán)境中,出現(xiàn)了前所未有的全球軍隊(duì)使用。這造成了一個(gè)困境:軍隊(duì)很可能是應(yīng)對(duì)重大衛(wèi)生緊急情況的重要因素,這不僅有導(dǎo)致衛(wèi)生緊急情況軍事化的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),而且更廣泛地影響社會(huì)與軍隊(duì)之間的平衡。此外,對(duì) COVID 大流行的應(yīng)對(duì)表明,當(dāng)前的應(yīng)急計(jì)劃往往沒有為在衛(wèi)生危機(jī)中使用軍隊(duì)做好準(zhǔn)備,從而降低了應(yīng)對(duì)的有效性。本文探討了對(duì)健康安全化的擔(dān)憂如何演變?yōu)閷?duì)軍事化的擔(dān)憂,以及如何在未來的衛(wèi)生緊急情況下有效地使用軍隊(duì),而不會(huì)冒著健康軍事化的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或更廣泛地?fù)p害軍民關(guān)系。

【 原 文 】 Over the past decade, militaries have been highly visible elements in the response tohealthemergencies and in particular disease outbreaks. Although there has been a long tradition of civil–militarycollaboration in health, COVID–19 saw an unprecedented worldwide use of militaries which occurredwithina permissive environment established by narratives of global health, humanitarian interventionandmulti-sectorality. This creates a dilemma: militaries will likely be an important element in respondingtoamajor health emergency and this risks not only militarizing health emergencies, but affects the balancebetween society and the military more generally. Moreover, the response to the COVID pandemic suggested《國際事務(wù)》(International Affairs)是國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域的一流學(xué)術(shù)期刊,也是多學(xué)科綜合性學(xué)術(shù)期刊。本刊于 1992 年由倫敦皇家國際事務(wù)研究所查塔姆學(xué)院(Chatham House)創(chuàng)立,內(nèi)容來源廣泛,力圖囊括業(yè)內(nèi)專家、學(xué)術(shù)新秀對(duì)重點(diǎn)、熱點(diǎn)問題的最新思考。2022 年期刊影響因子為 4.5,在96 個(gè)國際關(guān)系類刊物中位列第 7 名。

第114頁

108

that current emergency planning is often poorly prepared for the use of militaries in health crises, therebyreducing the effectiveness of a response. This article engages with how concerns over the securitizationof

health have evolved into concerns over militarization, and the question of how militaries might be usedeffectively in future health emergencies without risking the militarization of health or damagingcivil–military relations more widely.Over the past decade, militaries have been highly visible elements intheresponse to health emergencies and in particular disease outbreaks. Although there has been a long traditionof civil–military collaboration in health, COVID–19 saw an unprecedented worldwide use of militarieswhich occurred within a permissive environment established by narratives of global health, humanitarianintervention and multi-sectorality. This creates a dilemma: militaries will likely be an important element inresponding to a major health emergency and this risks not only militarizing health emergencies, but affectsthe balance between society and the military more generally. Moreover, the response to the COVIDpandemic suggested that current emergency planning is often poorly prepared for the use of militaries inhealth crises, thereby reducing the effectiveness of a response. This article engages with howconcerns over

the securitization of health have evolved into concerns over militarization, and the question of howmilitariesmight be used effectively in future health emergencies without risking the militarization of healthor

damaging civil–military relations more widely. 2. 烏克蘭與軍事援助的機(jī)會(huì)成本(Ukraine and the opportunity costs of militaryaid)Luke Glanville,澳大利亞國立大學(xué)國際關(guān)系系教授

James Pattison,曼徹斯特大學(xué)政治系教授

【摘要】西方國家向?yàn)蹩颂m提供了數(shù)十億美元的軍事援助,以幫助其對(duì)抗俄羅斯。然而,盡管對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)引發(fā)的道德問題進(jìn)行了多次討論,但對(duì)這種軍事援助的機(jī)會(huì)成本的討論卻很少。從被迫流離失所到全球貧困,從可預(yù)防的疾病到氣候變化,烏克蘭沖突只是世界面臨的眾多挑戰(zhàn)之一,那么西方優(yōu)先考慮對(duì)烏克蘭的軍事援助是否正確?本文首次詳細(xì)探討了這個(gè)問題,認(rèn)真考慮了各國面臨的非理想可行性約束。它首先闡述了由于機(jī)會(huì)成本而反對(duì)對(duì)烏克蘭進(jìn)行軍事援助的表面理由。然后,它探討了,并在很大程度上拒絕了兩種回應(yīng):軍事援助是保護(hù)烏克蘭自決權(quán)所必需的,也是阻止獨(dú)裁主義前進(jìn)所必需的。它認(rèn)為,關(guān)于機(jī)會(huì)成本的反對(duì)意見具有很強(qiáng)的說服力,并且反對(duì)向?yàn)蹩颂m提供大部分軍事援助(盡管不是全部)。這一論點(diǎn)對(duì)各國應(yīng)在多大程度上優(yōu)先考慮軍事援助而不是其他應(yīng)對(duì)全球挑戰(zhàn)的手段具有更廣泛的影響。

【原文】Western states have provided billions of dollars of military aid to Ukraine to help it in its war

against Russia. Yet, despite numerous discussions of the ethical issues raised by the war, there has beenlittlediscussion of the opportunity costs of this military assistance. Is it right that the West has prioritized militaryassistance to Ukraine, when the conflict in Ukraine is just one of numerous challenges facing the world, from forced displacement to global poverty, preventable disease to climate change? This article offers thefirst detailed engagement with this issue, taking seriously the nonideal feasibility constraints that states face. It firsts set out the prima facie case against assisting Ukraine militarily due to the opportunity costs. It thenexplores—and largely rejects—two responses: that military assistance is required to protect Ukrainianself-determination and that it is needed to stop the march of authoritarianism. It argues that the opportunitycosts objection has serious force and counts against much of the provision of military assistance to Ukraine

第115頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)109

(although not all). This argument has broader implications for the extent to which states should prioritizemilitary aid over other means of addressing global challenges. 3. 西方在戰(zhàn)略方面為何如此糟糕(Why is the West so rotten at strategy?)M L R Smith,倫敦國王學(xué)院戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)研究系教授

【摘要】為什么西方外交政策從阿富汗到烏克蘭都呈現(xiàn)出持續(xù)的戰(zhàn)略失敗記錄?為什么盡管人們致力于尋找良好戰(zhàn)略的基礎(chǔ),但結(jié)果仍然如此糟糕?本研究旨在以嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)膶W(xué)術(shù)態(tài)度來研究這些問題。它指出,無法以適當(dāng)?shù)姆绞教幚韱栴}是導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)略結(jié)果不佳和政策制定中反戰(zhàn)略偏好增長的主要因素。這種不均衡性主要源于自由派精英對(duì)道德使命的承諾,而這種承諾破壞了退出方案和有限制的目標(biāo)。這引發(fā)了一種不斷升級(jí)的動(dòng)態(tài),并不可避免地導(dǎo)致失敗。此外,很少有人對(duì)預(yù)測(cè)上的無能或魯莽的倡導(dǎo)負(fù)責(zé),這只會(huì)加劇戰(zhàn)略表現(xiàn)不佳的傾向。該論點(diǎn)認(rèn)為,這些因素都可以在持久的全面戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)范式中得到體現(xiàn),這種范式對(duì)西方政策制定產(chǎn)生了過度決定性的影響,推動(dòng)戰(zhàn)略制定朝著抽象目標(biāo)和無限制地使用資源的方向發(fā)展。盡管西方戰(zhàn)略制定中這些根深蒂固的問題沒有簡單的解決辦法,但本文認(rèn)為,嘗試將戰(zhàn)略理念從“解決問題”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤皹?gòu)建問題”,可以為更深思熟慮的政策反思提供前景,并促進(jìn)從錯(cuò)誤中學(xué)習(xí)而不是重蹈覆轍。

【原文】Why has western foreign policy exhibited a record of sustained strategic failure, fromAfghanistanto Ukraine? Why is it that despite the intellectual attention devoted to identifying the foundations of goodstrategy, outcomes remain so poor? This study seeks to bring a process of academic rigour to these questions. It pinpoints an inability to relate to problems proportionately as the major factor that accounts for badstrategic results and the growth of an anti-strategic predilection in policy-making. This lackof

proportionality arises largely from a liberal-elite commitment to moral missions that undermine exit plansand bounded objectives. This sets in train an escalatory dynamic that inexorably spirals towards failure. Furthermore, rarely is there any accountability for predictive ineptitude or reckless advocacy, which merelyentrenches the propensity towards poor strategic performance. The argument contends that these factors canall be captured within an enduring paradigm of total war, which exerts an overdetermining influenceonwestern policy-making, pushing the formulation of strategy towards abstract goals and the unrestrainedapplication of resources. While there are no easy answers to overcome these deep-seated problems inwestern strategic formulation, this article suggests that an attempt to move the idea of strategy awayfrom‘problem-solving’ to ‘problem-framing’ can offer the prospect of more considered policy reflectionandfacilitate a process of learning from mistakes rather than repeating them. 4. 什么是種族?認(rèn)知模糊與自由國際秩序(What is race? Epistemic ambiguityandliberal international order)

Kavi Joseph Abraham,杜倫大學(xué)國際關(guān)系系助理教授

【摘要】人們?cè)絹碓疥P(guān)注反殖民主義行為者如何在本世紀(jì)中葉的自由國際秩序(LIO) 形成過程中推進(jìn)種族平等規(guī)范。然而,人們較少關(guān)注同時(shí)發(fā)生的關(guān)于“種族”科學(xué)對(duì)象的認(rèn)識(shí)論沖突及其政治影響。在戰(zhàn)后秩序建設(shè)期間以及種族平等的政治斗爭(zhēng)中,科學(xué)界對(duì)種族作為人類多樣性分類手段的分析效用進(jìn)行了廣泛而深入的辯論。我認(rèn)為,種族在認(rèn)識(shí)論上是模棱兩可的,夾在社會(huì)科學(xué)家和哲學(xué)家(他們將種族理解為類似于種族的社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu))與自然科學(xué)家(他們認(rèn)為種族是生物學(xué)基礎(chǔ))之間。這種分裂

第116頁

110

不僅限于學(xué)術(shù)辯論,還塑造了關(guān)于 LIO 種族平等制度化的政治和規(guī)范斗爭(zhēng)。采用以對(duì)象為的方法,本文認(rèn)為種族的認(rèn)識(shí)論模糊性產(chǎn)生了政治影響,既允許在 LIO 中重現(xiàn)殖民邏輯,也為抵抗策略提供了空間。筆者未采用線性因果關(guān)系,而是從經(jīng)驗(yàn)層面上來描繪認(rèn)知模糊性在本世紀(jì)中葉國際秩序的建立中所發(fā)揮的作用。

【 原 文 】 There is increasing interest in how anticolonial actors advanced a norm of racial equalityinmid-century formations of liberal international order (LIO). Less attention, however, is affordedtosimultaneous epistemic conflicts over the scientific object of ‘race’ and their political effects. Duringpostwar order-building and alongside political struggles for racial equality, there was wide anddeepscientific debate on the analytical utility of race as a means to categorize human diversity. Race, I

demonstrate, was rendered as epistemically ambiguous, caught between social scientists and philosopherswho understood it as a social construct akin to ethnicity and natural scientists who maintained a biological

basis. This split was not confined to academic debate but shaped political and normative struggles over theinstitutionalization of racial equality in LIO. Adopting an object-oriented approach, I argue that theepistemic ambiguity of race generated political effects, at once permitting the reproduction of colonial logicsin LIO as well as providing latitude for strategies of resistance. Rather than a linear causal effect, I

empirically map the work that epistemic ambiguity performed in the creation of mid-century international

order. 5. 技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的地緣政治:美國、歐盟和中國做法的歷史背景(The geopolitics of

technology standards: historical context for US, EU and Chinese approaches)Nicholas Zú?iga

【摘要】人們?cè)絹碓疥P(guān)注反殖民主義行為者如何在本世紀(jì)中葉的自由國際秩序(LIO) 形成過程中推進(jìn)種族平等規(guī)范。然而,人們較少關(guān)注同時(shí)發(fā)生的關(guān)于“種族”科學(xué)對(duì)象的認(rèn)識(shí)論沖突及其政治影響。在戰(zhàn)后秩序建設(shè)期間以及種族平等的政治斗爭(zhēng)中,科學(xué)界對(duì)種族作為人類多樣性分類手段的分析效用進(jìn)行了廣泛而深入的辯論。我認(rèn)為,種族在認(rèn)識(shí)論上是模棱兩可的,夾在社會(huì)科學(xué)家和哲學(xué)家(他們將種族理解為類似于種族的社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu))與自然科學(xué)家(他們認(rèn)為種族是生物學(xué)基礎(chǔ))之間。這種分裂不僅限于學(xué)術(shù)辯論,還塑造了關(guān)于 LIO 種族平等制度化的政治和規(guī)范斗爭(zhēng)。采用以對(duì)象為的方法,本文認(rèn)為種族的認(rèn)識(shí)論模糊性產(chǎn)生了政治影響,既允許在 LIO 中重現(xiàn)殖民邏輯,也為抵抗策略提供了空間。筆者未采用線性因果關(guān)系,而是從經(jīng)驗(yàn)層面上來描繪認(rèn)知模糊性在本世紀(jì)中葉國際秩序的建立中所發(fā)揮的作用。

【原 文】This article provides a review of the historical trends that are shaping global competitionfor

standard setting in emerging technologies. Specifically, it explores how the traditional rule-makers of

international standardization, namely the United States and Europe, are responding to the rise of Chinainstandard-setting. The article argues that three polities are adapting their standard-setting strategies to shiftingpower dynamics in the international technology order. To preserve its competitive advantage, the USisbecoming more interventionist and proactive in setting technology standards. China has developedalong-term standardization strategy to bolster its domestic industrial development, increase its influenceand

第117頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)111

reap greater profits from the process of rule-making. Finally, the EU is seeking a third way that strikesabalance between competition and cooperation to preserve values like interoperability, whichhavehistorically benefited its single market and the global economy at large. Our historical reviewshows that, while the three polities have different priorities and face distinct challenges, they all seemto convergetowards a greater role for governments in standard-setting. 6. 外交政治化:大使任命的比較研究(The politicization of diplomacy: a comparativestudy of ambassador appointments)

Birgitta Niklasson,哥德堡大學(xué)政治學(xué)系講師

Katarzyna Jezierska,哥德堡大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】外交政治化削弱了外交部門的專業(yè)性,可以說危及了國家的對(duì)外關(guān)系。然而,這種現(xiàn)象在很大程度上并未被學(xué)術(shù)界審視。公共行政對(duì)政治化的研究通常忽視了外交部門,而外交學(xué)者幾乎只關(guān)注美國。我們對(duì)大使任命的探索性研究比較了 2019 年 669 名大使的政治化水平和模式(通過有政治關(guān)系的專業(yè)人士或政治任命者),這些大使來自七個(gè)國家和三個(gè)行政傳統(tǒng)。分析以三個(gè)預(yù)期為指導(dǎo):1)總體上政治化程度更高的國家會(huì)任命更多非職業(yè)大使;2)政治任命者的贊助招募側(cè)重于低艱苦的職位;3)有政治關(guān)系的專業(yè)人士被用來控制具有政治重要性的外國使團(tuán)。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),各國以不同的程度和方式將其外交部門政治化。在本文的案例中,任命有政治關(guān)系的專業(yè)人士而不是政治任命者是最常見的政治化方式。在這方面,美國是一個(gè)例外,這也表明需要對(duì)外交政治化進(jìn)行比較研究。因此,本文通過為這一迄今尚未深入探討的話題的未來研究設(shè)定議程做出了重要貢獻(xiàn)?!驹摹緼 politicization of diplomacy weakens the professionalism of the foreign service and arguablyendangers the external relations of states. Yet, this phenomenon has largely escaped scholarly scrutiny. Public administration research on politicization usually overlooks the foreign service, whereas diplomacyscholars have focused almost exclusively on the United States. Our exploratory study of ambassador

appointments compares the levels and modes of politicization (through politically connected professionals, or political appointees) of 669 ambassadors in 2019, across seven countries and three administrativetraditions. The analysis is guided by three expectations: 1) countries that are more politicized overall appoint

more non-career ambassadors; 2) patronage recruitment of political appointees focuses on low-hardshippostings; and 3) politically connected professionals are used to control politically important foreign missions. We find that states politicize their foreign services to a varied degree and in different ways. Appointingpolitically connected professionals instead of political appointees is the most common way of politicizationamong our cases. In this regard, the US is an outlier, which also points to the need of studying politicizationof diplomacy comparatively. This article thus makes an important contribution by setting the agendafor

future research on this hitherto underexplored topic. 7. 戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)陰影下的軍事化與流行文化:2022 年歐洲歌唱大賽(Militarization andpopularculture in the shadow of war: the 2022 Eurovision Song Contest)Inbar Noy,希伯來大學(xué)國際關(guān)系系博士研究生

第118頁

112

【摘要】在持續(xù)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)背景下,文化大型活動(dòng)的政治作用是什么?本文探討了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)陰影下文化大型活動(dòng)與軍事化進(jìn)程之間的相互作用。它解決了兩個(gè)主要問題:戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間對(duì)此類活動(dòng)的政治性缺乏關(guān)注,以及流行文化學(xué)者通常對(duì)軍事化的具體理解。它研究了軍事化的物質(zhì)和象征形式的發(fā)展,并探討了大型活動(dòng)背后的商業(yè)邏輯對(duì)軍事化實(shí)踐強(qiáng)化和正?;挠绊?。從實(shí)證角度來看,本文重點(diǎn)關(guān)注了在2022年歐洲歌唱大賽中以及通過該大賽發(fā)展起來的不同軍事化進(jìn)程,以應(yīng)對(duì)俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭。它研究了這些進(jìn)程在烏克蘭(通過 Kalush 管弦樂隊(duì)的軍事化和烏克蘭歌曲“Stefania”的軍事化)、歐洲歌唱大賽本身以及整個(gè)歐洲(通過參加比賽)是如何發(fā)揮作用的。這樣做也有助于更廣泛地討論歐洲安全身份的變化以及新的軍事化自由歐洲身份的發(fā)展。本文還利用社交媒體數(shù)據(jù),強(qiáng)調(diào)了此類平臺(tái)在軍事化進(jìn)程中的作用。

【 原 文】 What is the political role of cultural mega-events in the context of ongoing war? The articleexamines the interaction between cultural mega-events and militarization processes in the shadowof war. It

addresses two main gaps: the lack of attention to the politics of such events during war, and the specificunderstanding of militarization usually adopted by popular culture scholars. It examines the development of

material and symbolic forms of militarization, and addresses the impact of the commercial logic behindmega-events on the intensification and normalization of militarized practices. Empirically, the article focuseson the different militarization processes that developed in and through the 2022 Eurovision Song Contest, inresponse to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It examines how these play out in Ukraine (throughthemilitarization of the band Kalush Orchestra and the militarization of the Ukrainian song ‘Stefania’), withinthe Eurovision contest itself and across Europe (through its participation in the competition). In doingsoit

also contributes to the broader debate about the changing security identity of Europe, and the development of

a new militarized liberal European identity. Using data from social media, the article also highlights theroleof such platforms in militarization processes. 8. 尼日爾三角洲的海盜和更廣泛的“槍支生意”(Piracy and the broader ‘gunbusiness’in the Niger Delta)

Katja Lindskov Jacobsen,哥本哈根大學(xué)政治系副教授

Amanda M?ller Rasmussen,奧胡斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)博士研究生

【摘要】海盜行為不能脫離其他(犯罪)行為單獨(dú)理解,但我們?nèi)绾翁剿鬟@種聯(lián)系,以及為什么了解它們對(duì)海盜和反海盜的影響很重要?尼日爾三角洲的海盜活動(dòng)已降至歷史最低水平,本文探討了海盜在不靠海盜活動(dòng)維持生計(jì)時(shí)會(huì)做什么。因此,本文對(duì)海盜行為中未被充分探索的方面提供了新穎的經(jīng)驗(yàn)見解。此外,本文使用這個(gè)案例研究來證明基礎(chǔ)性啟發(fā)的概念化的重要性遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了海盜和反海盜的分析。展示海盜行為如何與干預(yù)措施未解決的更廣泛且往往暴力的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施相關(guān)聯(lián),并強(qiáng)調(diào)這種聯(lián)系的連續(xù)性和變化的關(guān)鍵影響,是理解干預(yù)參與者面臨的更廣泛困境的核心的第一步:如何概念化界定問題的必要性,同時(shí)理解未解決的問題維度的重要性?本文的建議是,基礎(chǔ)性啟發(fā)的方法提供了一個(gè)有益的起點(diǎn),本文在分析尼日爾三角洲海盜如何成為更廣泛的“槍支生意”格局的一部分時(shí)證明了這一建議,這不僅涉及不同類型的犯罪,還涉及不同類型的受害者。

【原文】Piracy cannot be understood in isolation from other (criminal) engagements, but howcanweexplore such linkages and why is it relevant to understand their implications, both for piracyandcounterpiracy? Appreciating that Niger Delta-based piracy has dropped to historically low levels, this article

第119頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)113

explores what pirates do when they do not sustain themselves by engaging in piracy. As such, the articleoffers novel empirical insights into underexplored dimensions of piracy. Moreover, we use this case-studytodemonstrate the relevance of an infrastructure-inspired conceptualization much beyond analyses of piracyand counterpiracy. Showing how piracy is linked to broader and often violent infrastructures that

interventions leave unaddressed, and stressing key implications of the continuity and change in such linkages, is a first step towards appreciating the centrality of a broader dilemma that intervention actors confront: howto conceptualize the necessity to delimit a problem, while appreciating the significanceof

problem-dimensions left unaddressed? Our suggestion is that an infrastructure-inspired approach offersahelpful starting-point, a suggestion that we demonstrate in an analysis of how Niger Delta-basedpiracyforms part of a broader ‘gun business’ landscape, which does not only entail different types of crime but alsovarious types of victims. 9. 俄羅斯因素:情感、敘事和重塑中國在國際沖突中的規(guī)范(The Russianfactor:emotions, narratives and reshaping China's norms in international conflicts)Xiaoyu Lu(呂曉宇),北京大學(xué)國際關(guān)系學(xué)院助理教授

Tinghao Zhang

【摘要】盡管俄羅斯處于弱勢(shì)地位,但它如何對(duì)中國在敘利亞和烏克蘭等國際沖突中的規(guī)范方法產(chǎn)生持續(xù)而持久的影響?本文提出了一個(gè)理論框架,將國際關(guān)系中的情感轉(zhuǎn)向和規(guī)范研究聯(lián)系起來。它將情感概念化為規(guī)范腳本的情感基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施:共同的政治感受產(chǎn)生共鳴,在此基礎(chǔ)上,有說服力的敘述有助于維持團(tuán)結(jié)并使規(guī)范變革制度化。本文利用俄羅斯和中國的主要資源,并使用過程追蹤來確定伙伴關(guān)系和俄羅斯運(yùn)動(dòng)的制度渠道中的關(guān)鍵節(jié)點(diǎn),展示了中國與俄羅斯的結(jié)盟并非完全基于地緣政治利益或建構(gòu)身份,而是一種孤立和邊緣化的情感,這種情感首先引起了俄羅斯參與者的共鳴,然后被俄羅斯參與者利用。此外,本文還確定了三種類型的有說服力的敘述,用于構(gòu)建連續(xù)性、類比和認(rèn)同,以鞏固圍繞同單一西方威脅的情感共鳴并誘導(dǎo)規(guī)范趨同。這促使中國采取與國家利益和主權(quán)與領(lǐng)土完整規(guī)范相沖突的政策,引發(fā)對(duì)俄羅斯影響力的反思,同時(shí)凸顯了情感外交日益增長的重要性?!驹摹縃ow did Russia, despite being in a weaker position, exercise a continuous and resilient influenceonChina's normative approach to international conflicts from Syria to Ukraine? This article proposes atheoretical framework that connects the affective turn and norm studies in International Relations. It

conceptualizes emotions as the affective infrastructure of norm scripts: shared political feelings createresonance, based on which persuasive narratives work to maintain solidarity and institutionalize normativechanges. Drawing on primary Russian and Chinese resources and using process tracing to identify critical

junctures in the partnership and institutional channels for Russian campaigns, this article demonstrates howChina's alignment with Russia is not solely based on geopolitical interests or constructed identities but rather

a result of feelings of isolation and marginalization that firstly resonated with and then exploited by Russianactors. Furthermore, this article identifies three types of persuasive narratives used to construct continuity, analogy and identification in consolidating emotional resonance around the threat of a homogenous West

and inducing normative convergence. This drives China to adopt policies in conflict with national interestsand norms on sovereignty and territorial integrity that trigger a reflective assessment of the Russianinfluence, while underlining the growing importance of emotion diplomacy.

第120頁

114

【編譯:王涵婧】【責(zé)任編輯:封欣怡】《國際事務(wù)》(International Affairs)International Affairs,Vol.100, No.3, May 2024

1. 氣候變化與建設(shè)和平:新興研究議題的子主題(Climate change and peacebuilding:sub-themes of an emerging research agenda)

Florian Krampe, 斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所氣候變化與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目主任

Dylan O'Driscoll, 英國考文垂大學(xué)信任、和平與社會(huì)關(guān)系中心副教授

McKenzie Johnson, 伊利諾伊大學(xué)厄巴納香檳分校助理教授

Dahlia Simangan, 廣島大學(xué)國際關(guān)系學(xué)副教授

Farah Hegazi, 斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所氣候變化與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目研究員

Cedric de Coning,挪威國際事務(wù)研究所和平、沖突與發(fā)展研究小組研究員

【摘要】氣候變化正在對(duì)全球安全與努力建設(shè)和平產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響。雖然現(xiàn)有的研究主要集中在氣候變化與沖突之間的聯(lián)系上,但它在很大程度上忽視了氣候變化、受沖突影響的國家和建設(shè)和平之間的復(fù)雜相互作用。氣候變化加劇了受沖突影響的社會(huì)中現(xiàn)有的脆弱性,增加了生活壓力,并對(duì)糧食、水和能源安全產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面影響。這尤其令人擔(dān)憂,因?yàn)樵诠矙C(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)無法滿足人口需求的情況下,氣候變化帶來的感受往往最為強(qiáng)烈。因此,氣候變化可能加劇不滿情緒,并阻礙維持、加強(qiáng)和建設(shè)和平的能力。盡管建設(shè)和平領(lǐng)域的從業(yè)人員開始對(duì)氣候變化的影響作出反應(yīng),但學(xué)術(shù)研究尚未充分解決氣候變化如何影響建設(shè)和平以及建設(shè)和平戰(zhàn)略如何有效應(yīng)對(duì)的問題。為了填補(bǔ)這一空白,需要從氣候安全、環(huán)境建設(shè)和平、環(huán)境研究以及和平與沖突研究中汲取多學(xué)科方法,以制定一個(gè)涵蓋氣候變化與建設(shè)和平交叉點(diǎn)的研究議題。通過認(rèn)識(shí)到氣候變化在建設(shè)和平努力中的重要性,該研究議題旨在提供批判性見解并指導(dǎo)未來的研究。

【原文】Climate change is having profound effects on global security and peacebuilding efforts. Whileexisting research has mainly focused on the link between climate change and conflict, it has largely《國際事務(wù)》(International Affairs)是國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域的一流學(xué)術(shù)期刊,也是多學(xué)科綜合性學(xué)術(shù)期刊。本刊于 1992 年由倫敦皇家國際事務(wù)研究所查塔姆學(xué)院(Chatham House)創(chuàng)立,內(nèi)容來源廣泛,力圖囊括業(yè)內(nèi)專家、學(xué)術(shù)新秀對(duì)重點(diǎn)、熱點(diǎn)問題的最新思考。2024 年期刊影響因子為 7.91。

第121頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)115

overlooked the complex interplay between climate change, conflict-affected states and peacebuilding. Climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities in conflict-affected societies by adding stress tolivelihoods and negatively impacting food, water and energy security. This is particularly concerningasclimate change is often felt most acutely in settings where public institutions are already failing to meet thepopulation's needs. Consequently, climate change can contribute to exacerbating grievances and hinder theability to maintain, reinforce and build peace. Although practitioners in the peacebuilding field are beginningto respond to the effects of climate change, academic research has not adequately addressed the questionof

how climate change affects peacebuilding and how peacebuilding strategies can respond effectively. Tofill

this gap, a multidisciplinary approach drawing from climate security, environmental peacebuilding, environmental studies, and peace and conflict studies is needed in order to develop a research agendathat

encompasses the intersections of climate change and peacebuilding. By recognizing the importanceof

climate change in peacebuilding efforts, this research agenda aims to provide critical insights andguidefuture studies. 2. 保護(hù)漏洞:斯里蘭卡的兒童兵康復(fù)與軍事化治理(Protection gaps: childsoldierrehabilitation and militarized governance in Sri Lanka)

Kate Macfarlane,澳大利亞查爾斯達(dá)爾文大學(xué)藝術(shù)與社會(huì)學(xué)院國際關(guān)系高級(jí)講師【摘要】兒童兵解除武裝、復(fù)員和重返社會(huì)的實(shí)踐在保護(hù)兒童免遭傷害和暴力方面有著堅(jiān)定的規(guī)范性承諾。然而,在理解如何將這些規(guī)范轉(zhuǎn)化為滿足兒童的社會(huì)和保護(hù)需要方面,存在著政策和研究知識(shí)上的差距。在斯里蘭卡,自 2009 年起,來自埃拉姆泰米爾猛虎解放組織(猛虎組織)的594 名前兒童兵接受了國家級(jí)康復(fù)計(jì)劃。在內(nèi)戰(zhàn)結(jié)束時(shí)實(shí)施的軍事化治理框架無法實(shí)現(xiàn)國家對(duì)國際兒童保護(hù)規(guī)范的參與。本文提供了基于對(duì)猛虎組織前男童和女童士兵的 45 次半結(jié)構(gòu)化訪談的主要數(shù)據(jù)來源。斯里蘭卡的個(gè)案研究表明,解除武裝、復(fù)員和重返社會(huì)方案導(dǎo)致重新調(diào)整了對(duì)兒童和成人參與者的社會(huì)和政治控制。因此,前兒童兵們的社會(huì)和保護(hù)需求仍然復(fù)雜且未得到解決,因?yàn)閲抑圃炝伺c貧困和軍事化有關(guān)的結(jié)構(gòu)性暴力。本文提出了一個(gè)框架,以解釋成人與兒童關(guān)系的代際權(quán)力動(dòng)態(tài),以及制度化保護(hù)的政治,以解釋兒童的正式康復(fù)和回歸經(jīng)歷。

【原文】Child soldier disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practice has a strong normativecommitment to protect children from harm and violence. However, there exist policy and researchknowledge gaps in comprehending the translation of such norms in meeting the social and protective needsof children. In Sri Lanka from 2009, 594 former child soldiers from the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam(LTTE) underwent a national rehabilitation programme. National engagement with international childprotection norms could not materialize from a militarized governance framework implemented at the endof

the civil war. This article provides a primary source of data based on 45 semi-structured interviews withformer boy and girl child soldiers from the LTTE. The Sri Lankan case-study demonstrates that the DDRprogramme resulted in the re-calibration of social and political control over child and adult participants. Former child soldiers' social and protective needs therefore remain complex and unresolved because of stategenerated structural violence related to poverty and militarization. The article advances a frameworkto

第122頁

116

account for a generational power dynamic of adult–child relations, and the politics of institutionalizedprotection to account for children's formal rehabilitation and return experiences. 3. 做出彌補(bǔ):情緒和西方對(duì)俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭的反應(yīng)(Making amends: emotions andthe western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine)

Rita Floyd, 伯明翰大學(xué)沖突與安全副教授

Mark Webber, 伯明翰大學(xué)國際政治學(xué)教授,羅馬北約防務(wù)學(xué)院非常駐副研究員【摘要】西方對(duì)俄羅斯 2022 年 2 月全面入侵烏克蘭的反應(yīng)是前所未有的。歐盟、七國集團(tuán)和北約國家對(duì)俄羅斯實(shí)施制裁和外交孤立,并向?yàn)蹩颂m提供足以確保澤連斯基政權(quán)生存的軍事援助。事實(shí)證明,這些努力不足以將俄羅斯從其對(duì)烏克蘭領(lǐng)土的占領(lǐng)中驅(qū)逐出去。盡管如此,當(dāng)這些反應(yīng)在入侵之后開展時(shí),它們被視為(并且經(jīng)常被證明為)大膽的、創(chuàng)新的和堅(jiān)定的——一種對(duì)嚴(yán)重行為的必要回應(yīng)。是什么解釋了這種反應(yīng)?在這篇文章中,我們認(rèn)為答案在于西方對(duì)過去處理俄羅斯和烏克蘭關(guān)系中的行動(dòng)和錯(cuò)誤而感到的內(nèi)疚和羞恥感。通過對(duì)關(guān)鍵演講、聲明和對(duì)西方主要政策制定者(過去和現(xiàn)在)的采訪的定性話語分析,我們認(rèn)為這兩種情緒——表現(xiàn)為道歉和承認(rèn)錯(cuò)誤——是政策的重要驅(qū)動(dòng)因素。本文為關(guān)于世界政治中情感的新興文獻(xiàn)做出了貢獻(xiàn)。除了對(duì)西方史無前例的反應(yīng)提供連貫的解釋外,我們的論點(diǎn)還具有政策意義。雖然承認(rèn)不法行為是值得稱贊的,但它可能導(dǎo)致行為者過度補(bǔ)償,從而導(dǎo)致進(jìn)一步的錯(cuò)誤和政策失敗。讓烏克蘭快速加入歐盟就是這樣一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。【 原 文 】 The western response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022wasunprecedented. The states of the European Union, the G7 and NATO have targeted Russia with sanctionsand diplomatic isolation, and furnished Ukraine with military assistance sufficient to ensure the Zelenskyregime's survival. These efforts have proven insufficient to dislodge Russia from its occupation of Ukrainianterritory. Nonetheless, when launched in the aftermath of the invasion, they were seen (and often justifiedas)

as bold, innovative, and steadfast—a necessary response to a grievous act. What explains this response?Inthis article we argue that the answer lies in the emotions of guilt and shame for past actions and mistakes inthe West's dealings with Russia and Ukraine. Informed by a qualitative discourse analysis of key speeches, statements and interviews with leading western policy-makers (past and present), we regard these twoemotions—expressed as apologies and the acknowledgment of mistakes—as important drivers of policy. This article contributes to the bourgeoning literature on emotions in world politics. In addition to offeringacoherent explanation of the West's unprecedented response our argument has policy implications. Whiletheadmission of wrongdoing is laudable, it can lead to actors overcompensating, resulting in further mistakesand policy failures. Fast-tracking Ukraine into the European Union would be one such error. 4. 打開修昔底德陷阱:興衰論的譜系(Opening the Thucydides trap: a genealogyof

rise-and-fall theory)

Matthew David Hamilton, 喬治城大學(xué)政府系博士候選人

Mark Fisher, 喬治城大學(xué)政府系助理教授

第123頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)117

【摘要】在過去十年中,格雷厄姆·艾利森的“修昔底德陷阱”已成為分析中美之間大國沖突前景的主要框架。圍繞這種崛起的爭(zhēng)議重新激發(fā)了一種思考權(quán)力相當(dāng)對(duì)全球秩序影響的傳統(tǒng),這種傳統(tǒng)以前在冷戰(zhàn)期間蓬勃發(fā)展。然而,這種再度關(guān)注付出了高昂的代價(jià)。通過重構(gòu)修昔底德陷阱產(chǎn)生的傳統(tǒng),這一傳統(tǒng)我們稱之為興衰理論,本文展示了修昔底德陷阱作為一種分析框架的崛起如何掩蓋了關(guān)于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)大國的興衰與沖突開始之間關(guān)系的批判性辯論。這些辯論使一些基本問題變得棘手,這些問題涉及如何概念化權(quán)力,要分析哪些類型的國家間關(guān)系,以及哪些因果機(jī)制在解釋修正主義和沖突時(shí)最為重要。本文展示了修昔底德陷阱如何在很大程度上忽視了這些辯論,從而為分析人員提供了不那么精確的啟發(fā)式方法來思考全球沖突的前景。我們開發(fā)了一種更加多元化的方法來應(yīng)用興衰理論,利用其多樣化的觀點(diǎn)和實(shí)質(zhì)性的分歧來提供更細(xì)致和全面的分析。

【原文】Over the last decade, Graham Allison's ‘Thucydides trap’ has become a predominant frameworkfor

analysing the prospect of great power conflict between the United States and China. The controversysurrounding this rise to prominence has reinvigorated a tradition of thinking about the effects of power parityon global order that previously flourished during the Cold War. This renewed attention has neverthelesscome at a significant cost. By reconstructing the tradition from which the Thucydides trap emerges, atradition that we call rise-and-fall theory, this article demonstrates how the ascendance of the Thucydidestrap as a framework of analysis has obscured critical debates about the relationship between the rise andfall

of competing powers and the onset of conflict. These debates problematize fundamental questionsconcerning how to conceptualize power, what types of interstate relations are to be analysed, andwhichcausal mechanism(s) matter most in explaining revisionism and conflict. This article demonstrates howtheThucydides trap largely overlooks these debates, thereby providing analysts with less precise heuristics for

thinking about the prospect of global conflict than they might otherwise have. We develop a more pluralisticapproach to the application of rise-and-fall theory that makes use of its diverse perspectives and substantivedivergences to provide more nuanced and holistic analyses. 5. 相互合法化的嘗試:聯(lián)合國與中國的一帶一路倡議(Mutual legitimation attempts: theUnited Nations and China's Belt and Road Initiative)

Sebastian Haug, 德國發(fā)展與可持續(xù)發(fā)展研究所高級(jí)研究員

【摘要】“一帶一路”倡議已成為中國全球崛起的標(biāo)志。雖然“一帶一路”倡議已經(jīng)成為一個(gè)專注于雙邊關(guān)系的全球平臺(tái),但中國政府也試圖擴(kuò)大“一帶一路”倡議與國際組織,特別是和聯(lián)合國之間的聯(lián)系。然而,關(guān)于聯(lián)合國與“一帶一路”關(guān)系的現(xiàn)有證據(jù)表明,在最初的蜜月期,項(xiàng)目如雨后春筍般涌現(xiàn);而在公眾認(rèn)可之后,參與度急劇下降。本文認(rèn)為,關(guān)注治理者之間的合法性嘗試有助于理解聯(lián)合國與“一帶一路”關(guān)系的起伏。根據(jù)公開的證據(jù)、內(nèi)部文件和利益相關(guān)者訪談,報(bào)告揭示了合法性如何激發(fā)了雙方投資聯(lián)合國與“一帶一路”關(guān)系的動(dòng)機(jī),以及西方的反對(duì)在之后如何導(dǎo)致聯(lián)合國實(shí)體減少參與。從實(shí)證上講,這篇文章為有關(guān)中國的全球角色、聯(lián)合國不斷發(fā)展的權(quán)力關(guān)系以及聯(lián)合國成員國之間地緣政治驅(qū)動(dòng)的主打倡議的激增的文獻(xiàn)做出了貢獻(xiàn)。從概念上講,它通過更系統(tǒng)地參與關(guān)系合法性動(dòng)態(tài),闡述了關(guān)于世界政治中合法性的不斷擴(kuò)大的爭(zhēng)論。關(guān)注片面或相互合法化的嘗試提供了

第124頁

118

一種概念工具,用于分析全球治理者及其受眾之間的互動(dòng)如何展開,以及國際組織如何在成員日益兩極分化的情況下試圖(和失?。┘訌?qiáng)其復(fù)原力。

【原文】The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI hasunfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expandlinks between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about

UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects andpublic endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus oninter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Basedonpublicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows howlegitimationinformed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequentlyled to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China'sglobal role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagshipinitiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimationinworld politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. Afocus onone-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions amongglobal governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthentheir resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership. 6. 對(duì)國際和平實(shí)踐及其人類和非人類成分的唯物主義重估(A materialist

reconsideration of international peace practice and its human and non-human

constituents)

Maximilian Lakitsch, 格拉茨大學(xué)法律基礎(chǔ)研究所全球治理系博士后講師

【摘要】國際社會(huì)在可持續(xù)減少全球武裝沖突數(shù)量方面的發(fā)人深省的記錄,以及非人類復(fù)雜性在氣候危機(jī)時(shí)期的日益參與都表明,目前促進(jìn)和平的方法過于狹隘和缺乏靈活性。到目前為止,政策制定者和研究人員對(duì)更靈活和適應(yīng)性更強(qiáng)的和平實(shí)踐的要求以及呼吁并沒有導(dǎo)致相關(guān)的范式轉(zhuǎn)變。為了促進(jìn)這種實(shí)踐的改變,本文提出了一種推測(cè)性的分析嘗試,試圖從概念上揭示以和平為目的與世界接觸的新模式。它建立在巴魯克·斯賓諾莎的唯物主義之上,并將和平描述為與政治共同體問題密切相關(guān)。繼斯賓諾莎之后,本文重新考慮了政治共同體的想象,認(rèn)為政治共同體的復(fù)雜性不斷被人類和非人類行為者的偶然復(fù)雜性重新調(diào)整,從而超越了其正式邊界的地理范圍以及其跨越權(quán)力等級(jí)的認(rèn)識(shí)范圍。最后,本文將人類-非人類群體作為政治主體引入,他們能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)和解釋政治共同體的組成部分,從而維護(hù)和維持和平。

【原文】The international community's sobering track record of sustainably reducing the number of armedconflicts worldwide, as well as the increasing involvement of non-human complexities in times of climatecrisis suggest that current approaches to foster peace are too narrow and inflexible. So far, demands andcallsfor more flexible and adaptive peace practice made by policy-makers and researchers have not ledtoarelated paradigm shift. In order to contribute to such a change of practice, this article advances a speculativeanalytical attempt that seeks to conceptually uncover new modes of engaging with the world for the purpose

第125頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)119

of peace. It builds on Baruch Spinoza's materialism and describes peace as intimately interrelated withtheissue of political community. Following Spinoza, the article reconsiders the imaginary of political

community as something that is constantly being rearticulated by a contingent complexity of humanandnon-human actors, and thus transcends the geographic scope of its formal borders as well as its epistemicscope across power hierarchies. Finally, the article introduces the human–non-human multitude as political

subject that is able to detect and interpret the constituents of a political community, and therefore to maintainand sustain peace. 【編譯:林志俊】【責(zé)任編輯:封欣怡】

第126頁

120

《外交政策分析》(Foreign Policy Analysis)Foreign Policy Analysis,Vol.20, No.3, July 2024

1. 安全化中的個(gè)體:解釋美國總統(tǒng)(去)朝鮮安全化的選擇(Individuals in Securitization:Explaining US Presidents’ Choice to (De)Securitize North Korea)Alexander Schotth?fer,愛丁堡大學(xué)社會(huì)和政治科學(xué)學(xué)院博士

【摘要】安全化和去安全化展示了威脅的建構(gòu)(解構(gòu))如何導(dǎo)致沖突性或合作性的外交政策。然而,由于安全化理論側(cè)重于集體,它無法告訴人們?yōu)槭裁搭I(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會(huì)選擇安全化或去安全化。理解這種選擇至關(guān)重要,因?yàn)椋ㄈィ┌踩^程可以指示可能的外交政策選擇,從而影響沖突與合作的可能性。為了解釋領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的選擇,本文借鑒了政治心理學(xué),并通過解釋兩位美國總統(tǒng)對(duì)朝鮮(去)安全化的偏好來證明該方法的實(shí)用性。利用領(lǐng)導(dǎo)特質(zhì)和行為代碼分析(operational code analysis),本文表明心理變量影響了克林頓和布什的偏好,因?yàn)檫@些變量影響了他們對(duì)威脅的感知以及對(duì)沖突或合作行動(dòng)的傾向。這些偏好產(chǎn)生了重大影響:克林頓的去安全化嘗試改善了美朝關(guān)系,而布什的安全化嘗試則事實(shí)上逆轉(zhuǎn)了這一進(jìn)展。

【原文】Securitization and desecuritization demonstrate how threat (de)constructions can lead to conflictual

or cooperative foreign policies. However, due to its focus on collectivities, securitization theory cannot tell

us why leaders choose either securitization or desecuritization. Understanding this choice is crucial because(de)securitization processes can prescribe possible foreign policy options and thus affect the likelihoodof

conflict and cooperation. To account for leaders’ choices, I draw on political psychology and demonstratethe utility of my approach through an explanation of two US presidents’ preferences for (de)securitizingNorth Korea. Using leadership trait and operational code analysis, I show that psychological variablesshaped Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s preferences because they affected their threat perceptionandinclination toward conflictual or cooperative actions. These preferences had substantial consequences: WhileClinton’s desecuritization attempt led to improvements in US–North Korean relations, Bush’s effort toresecuritize North Korea effectively reversed this progress.

《外交政策分析》(Foreign Policy Analysis)雜志是由牛津大學(xué)出版社代表國際研究協(xié)會(huì)出版的季刊。該期刊旨在以比較或具體案例的方式研究外交政策決策的過程、效果、原因或結(jié)果。其 2021 年的影響因子為 2.646,在 96 種國際關(guān)系期刊中排名第 26。

第127頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)121

2. 反恐戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與勝利陷阱(The War on Terror and the Victory Trap)Jonny Hall,倫敦政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院國際關(guān)系部研究員

【摘要】盡管反恐戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)果模棱兩可,但布什總統(tǒng)、奧巴馬總統(tǒng)和特朗普總統(tǒng)在反恐戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中都使用了“勝利”和“失敗”的語言。本文提出了“勝利陷阱”的概念來解釋這一現(xiàn)象及其政治后果。一方面,戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)“失敗”會(huì)引起的選舉后果導(dǎo)致總統(tǒng)們宣稱戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)“勝利”和最終“全勝”。另一方面,戰(zhàn)略現(xiàn)實(shí)和公眾不愿承擔(dān)全勝的代價(jià),導(dǎo)致決策者因無法取得與其言論相稱的成果而受到批評(píng)。因此,雖然學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)“輸?shù)簟焙汀摆A下”戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的影響都有明確的認(rèn)識(shí),但本文首次探討了這些雙重動(dòng)力在實(shí)踐中是如何發(fā)揮作用的。本文在論證政策制定者往往在政治上“受困”的同時(shí),指出了一系列關(guān)于有效的(外交)政策相關(guān)信息傳遞的學(xué)術(shù)研究局限,即指向模糊或準(zhǔn)確。

【原文】Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have all used the language of “victory” and “defeat” intheWar on Terror despite its ambiguous outcomes. This paper develops the concept of a “victory trap”toexplain this phenomenon and its political consequences. On the one hand, the electoral consequences of “l(fā)osing” wars lead presidents to make claims about “winning” and eventual “victory.” On the other hand, strategic realities and public reluctance to bear the costs of total victory result in policymakers facingcriticism for being unable to produce results proportionate to their rhetoric. As such, whilst scholarshipisclear on the effects of both “l(fā)osing” and “winning” wars, this paper provides the first exploration of howthese dual dynamics play out in practice. In arguing that policymakers are oftentimes politically “trapped,”this paper suggests the limits of a range of scholarship on effective (foreign) policy-related messagingthat

points toward ambiguity or accuracy. 3. 政治解決與中國的海外行動(dòng):以埃塞俄比亞為例(Political Settlement andChina’sOverseas Operation: The Case of Ethiopia)

Ruixing Cao,杜伊斯堡-埃森大學(xué)的博士后研究員

Nele Noesselt,杜伊斯堡-埃森大學(xué)擔(dān)任東亞、中國政治科學(xué)與政治主席

【摘要】政治解決分析(PSA)已成為學(xué)者們研究非洲國家社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)差異的常用方法。然而,人們較少關(guān)注政治解決如何影響非洲國家與外國的互動(dòng)。本文通過分析埃塞俄比亞與中國的互動(dòng)來說明政治解決對(duì)外交政策的影響。作為中國在非洲最密切的經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴之一,埃塞俄比亞長期存在種族分裂,且過去幾年政局不穩(wěn),是本課題的理想案例。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),埃塞俄比亞不斷演變的政治解決方案在很大程度上影響了兩國之間的官方交往。隨著時(shí)間的推移,中國各方面也對(duì)埃塞俄比亞的政治動(dòng)態(tài)以及在該國投資的相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有了更細(xì)致的了解。本文的研究提供了一個(gè)強(qiáng)調(diào)地方機(jī)構(gòu)在影響中非關(guān)系方面的權(quán)力的新文獻(xiàn)。

【 原 文 】 Political settlement analysis (PSA) has become a common approach scholars use tostudysocioeconomic differences among African countries. However, less attention has been given to howpolitical

settlement influences how African countries interact with their foreign counterparts. In this article, weillustrate the impact of political settlement on foreign policy by analyzing Ethiopia’s interactions withChina. As one of China’s closest economic partners in Africa, Ethiopia, with its long-standing ethnic cleavages and

第128頁

122

political instability in the last few years, represents an ideal case for this topic. We find that the evolvingpolitical settlement in Ethiopia has greatly influenced the official engagements between the two countries. Over time, various Chinese actors have also developed a more nuanced understanding of the political

dynamics of Ethiopia and the associated risks of investing in the country. Our study contributes toanemerging literature that emphasizes the power of local agencies in influencing China–Africa relations. 4. 戰(zhàn)略只是部分幻象:“相對(duì)預(yù)見力”作為評(píng)估外交政策能力的客觀標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(StrategyIsOnly Partly an Illusion: “Relative Foresight” as an Objective Standard for EvaluatingForeign Policy Competence)

Jeffrey A Friedman,達(dá)特茅斯學(xué)院副教授

Richard Zeckhauser,哈佛大學(xué)肯尼迪學(xué)院政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授

【摘要】外交決策者必須應(yīng)對(duì)復(fù)雜性、不確定性和主觀性。這些挑戰(zhàn)提出了“戰(zhàn)略是一種幻覺”的可能性,即沒有可靠的方法來評(píng)估管理國際政治的技能。與此相反,本文的研究表明,研究人員可以使用一種稱之為“相對(duì)預(yù)見力”的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來客觀地評(píng)估外交政策能力的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵組成部分?!跋鄬?duì)預(yù)見力”的定義是,與基于類似信息的其他觀點(diǎn)相比,決策者預(yù)測(cè)其選擇后果的能力。相對(duì)預(yù)見能力的衡量無需依賴價(jià)值判斷或主觀概率。相比之下,其他衡量外交政策能力的常見框架,如將領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的行為與理性行為者模型進(jìn)行比較或評(píng)估程序合理性,幾乎總是為合理的分歧留有余地。本文通過對(duì)奧巴馬在阿富汗增兵和突襲本·拉登駐地行動(dòng)中的決策進(jìn)行案例研究,證明相對(duì)預(yù)見性為評(píng)估重大外交政策選擇提供了有用的工具。本文的框架對(duì)外交政策分析的規(guī)范性、指導(dǎo)性和描述性方面的研究具有廣泛的意義。

【原文】Foreign policymakers must grapple with complexity, uncertainty, and subjectivity. These challengesraise the possibility that “strategy is an illusion”: that there is no reliable method for assessing skill at

managing international politics. By contrast, we show that researchers can objectively evaluate a critical

component of foreign policy competence using a standard we call “relative foresight,” definedasdecision-makers’ ability to anticipate consequences of their choices as compared to alternative views basedon similar information. Relative foresight can be measured without relying on value judgments or subjectiveprobabilities. By contrast, other common frameworks for gauging foreign policy competence, suchascomparing leaders’ behavior to the rational actor model or assessing procedural rationality, almost alwaysleave room for reasonable disagreement. We demonstrate that relative foresight provides a useful tool for

evaluating major foreign policy choices through case studies of Barack Obama’s decisions regardingtheAfghan Surge and the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound. Our framework has broad implications for

research on normative, prescriptive, and descriptive dimensions of foreign policy analysis. 5. 最高階的辯論:作為二階角色競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的英國脫歐公投(A Debate of the Highest Order:The Brexit Referendum as Second-Order Role Contestation)Benjamin Martill,愛丁堡大學(xué)歐洲研究所政治和國際關(guān)系高級(jí)講師和副主任Adrian Rogstad,荷蘭格羅寧根大學(xué)博士

第129頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)123

【摘要】2016 年英國脫歐公投再次引發(fā)了關(guān)于英國國際角色的辯論。然而利害關(guān)系錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜,因?yàn)槊摎W與否都沒有挑戰(zhàn)英國的全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)角色或其與非歐洲伙伴的緊密聯(lián)系。因此,有關(guān)角色爭(zhēng)論的研究很難解釋英國脫歐的政治原因,而是將重點(diǎn)放在了非角色沖突上。本文認(rèn)為,英國脫歐的辯論可以通過二階角色爭(zhēng)奪來理解,在二階角色爭(zhēng)奪中,角色兼容性本身就是政治分歧的主題,而角色理論的學(xué)術(shù)研究由于孤立地研究角色沖突和角色爭(zhēng)奪而忽略了這一現(xiàn)象。本文將二階概念區(qū)分為包容性概念和排他性概念,它們反映了脫歐運(yùn)動(dòng)和留歐運(yùn)動(dòng)各自對(duì)英國的歐洲角色及其與其他(共同)角色的關(guān)系所持的立場(chǎng)。本文的論證表明,角色沖突往往在政治上是有爭(zhēng)議的,而角色爭(zhēng)議的抽象程度要高于傳統(tǒng)認(rèn)識(shí)。

【原文】The 2016 Brexit referendum reignited debate on the UK’s international role. Yet the stakes werecomplex, since neither side challenged Britain’s global leadership role or its strong ties with non-Europeanpartners. Research on role contestation has thus struggled to account for the politics of Brexit, focusinginstead on non-role-based conflict. We argue that Brexit debates can be understood by referencetosecond-order role contestation where role compatibility itself is the subject of political disagreements, aphenomenon role theory scholarship has missed by studying role conflict and role contestation in isolation. We distinguish between inclusive and exclusive second-order conceptions, which capture the respectivepositions of the Leave and Remain campaigns regarding Britain’s European role and its relation toother

(shared) roles. Our argument shows that role conflict is often contested politically and that role contestationoperates at higher levels of abstraction than conventionally acknowledged. 6. 個(gè)人對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)方略態(tài)度的背景分析(Contextualizing Individual Attitudes onEconomicStatecraft)

Timothy M Peterson,美國亞利桑那州立大學(xué)政治與全球研究學(xué)院副教授

Susan M Miller,美國亞利桑那州立大學(xué)副教授

【摘要】美國公民在什么情況下更支持針對(duì)違反國際準(zhǔn)則的海外經(jīng)濟(jì)干預(yù)?在什么情況下,他們更支持懲罰性制裁或積極誘導(dǎo)?人們對(duì)公民是否以及在多大程度上更支持制裁而非積極誘導(dǎo),以及環(huán)境因素如何改變對(duì)每種因素的支持知之甚少。本文設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)聯(lián)合調(diào)查實(shí)驗(yàn),利用可比的反事實(shí)來衡量干預(yù)措施(即制裁或誘導(dǎo))的支持率。本文將長期的不良行為與近期的沖擊、不作為的不同后果以及政策建議者的不同專業(yè)水平進(jìn)行了比較。本文還考慮了人們對(duì)目標(biāo)國家的已有態(tài)度。在美國樣本中,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)政策建議涉及制裁而不是誘導(dǎo)時(shí),會(huì)得到更多的支持,但對(duì)象國已有的親和力有很大的調(diào)節(jié)作用。

【原文】When do US citizens express greater support for economic intervention abroad in responsetoviolations of international norms? Under what conditions do they express greater support for punitivesanctions or positive inducements? We know little about whether and to what extent citizens offer greater

support for sanctions compared to positive inducements and how contextual factors might alter support for

each. We design a conjoint survey experiment to gauge support for an intervention—i.e., sanctions or

inducements—using comparable counterfactuals. We compare long-enduring bad behavior to recent shocks, differently framed consequences of inaction, as well as varying expertise levels among policy proposal

第130頁

124

authors. We also consider preexisting attitudes about the target country. In a US sample, we find that policyproposals are supported to a greater extent when they involve sanctions as opposed to inducements, but that

preexisting affinity toward the country has a strong conditioning impact. 7. 角色理論、非脅迫性影響力和目標(biāo)國的自主性:以哈薩克斯坦大使團(tuán)和俄羅斯外交學(xué)院為例(Role Theory, Non-Coercive Influence, and the Agency of Target States: TheCase of Kazakhstan’s Ambassadorial Corps and the Russian Diplomatic Academy)John C Stanko,印第安納大學(xué)第一代政治學(xué)博士候選人

【摘要】本文將角色理論應(yīng)用于軟實(shí)力研究,評(píng)估國家選擇的國際角色與易受非脅迫性影響之間的關(guān)系,從而為外交政策分析做出貢獻(xiàn)。本文認(rèn)為,如果一個(gè)國家所扮演的角色涉及與各種具有影響力國家的承諾參與,那么精英們就會(huì)從不同的合作伙伴那里獲得利益,從而在不違反自主權(quán)最大化原則的情況下遵守如俄羅斯外交學(xué)院(RDA)的軟實(shí)力基準(zhǔn)。本文采用了混合方法,將logistic 回歸作為哈薩克斯坦定性案例研究的一部分。利用哈薩克斯坦大使自 1992 年以來的原始數(shù)據(jù)集,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)外交政策的作用比傳統(tǒng)的安全論點(diǎn)更能解釋接受過俄羅斯外交學(xué)院培訓(xùn)的外交官在哈薩克斯坦大使隊(duì)伍中的持續(xù)存在。這一結(jié)果表明,通過角色理論的視角審視軟實(shí)力,強(qiáng)調(diào)潛在影響對(duì)象的作用,是具有前景的。

【原文】This article contributes to foreign policy analysis by applying role theory to the study of soft power, evaluating the relationship between a state’s chosen international role(s) and susceptibility to non-coerciveinfluence. I argue that in countries where said role involves committed engagement with varied power poles, elites derive benefits from their various partners and thus abide soft power bases such as the RussianDiplomatic Academy (RDA) without violating the principle of autonomy maximization. I utilize a mixedmethods approach, using logistic regression as part of a qualitative case study of Kazakhstan. Drawingonanoriginal dataset of Kazakhstani ambassadors since 1992, I find that foreign policy role better explains thecontinued presence of RDA-trained diplomats within the Kazakhstani ambassadorial corps than traditional

security arguments. This outcome demonstrates the promise of examining soft power through the lens of roletheory, with an emphasis on the agency of potential targets of influence. 【編譯:宋欣蔚】【責(zé)任編輯:封欣怡】

第131頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)125

《華盛頓季刊》(The Washington Quarterly)The Washington Quarterly,Vol. 47, No. 2, 2024

1. 美國核政策的下一章(The Next Chapter in US Nuclear Policy)Brad Roberts,勞倫斯利弗莫爾國家實(shí)驗(yàn)室全球安全研究中心主任,曾任美國國防部核與導(dǎo)彈防御政策副助理部長

【摘要】三十年前,國際體系的重大變化推動(dòng)了美國核政策和核態(tài)勢(shì)的重大變革。冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束和蘇聯(lián)解體結(jié)束了軍備競(jìng)賽,開創(chuàng)了一個(gè)注重降低武器作用和數(shù)量的時(shí)代。如今,國際體系再次經(jīng)歷劇變,這很可能對(duì)美國的核政策和態(tài)勢(shì)產(chǎn)生重大影響。美國核政策的一個(gè)篇章即將結(jié)束,而另一個(gè)篇章即將開始,這將帶來新的挑戰(zhàn)和政策選擇。遺憾的是,20 世紀(jì) 90 年代有充分的理由慶祝,而今天卻沒有?,F(xiàn)在擺在我們面前的政策選擇并不受歡迎,許多人對(duì)此表示抵制。但是,如果不能適應(yīng)新的環(huán)境,后果可能會(huì)很嚴(yán)重。

【原文】Three decades ago, major changes in the international system drove major changes in USnuclear

policy and posture. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the armsrace and ushered in an era focused on reducing the role and number of weapons. Today, the international

system is again passing through a period of dramatic change, one likely to have a significant impact onUSnuclear policy and posture. One chapter in US nuclear policy is now ending as another begins, bringingnewchallenges and policy choices. Alas, whereas there was good cause for celebration in the 1990s, todaythereis not. The policy choices now in front of us are unwelcome and resisted by many. But the consequences of

failing to adapt to the new context would likely be severe. 2. 睜大雙眼:戰(zhàn)略精英對(duì)韓國核選擇的看法(Eyes Wide Open: Strategic Elite ViewsofSouth Korea’s Nuclear Options)

Victor D. Cha,喬治城大學(xué)政府和國際事務(wù)特聘教授

《華盛頓季刊》(The Washington Quarterly)由喬治·華盛頓 大 學(xué) 的 埃 利 奧 特 國 際 事 務(wù) 學(xué) 院 主 辦 , 并 由 Taylor &

Francis 出版,是一本全球安全事務(wù)期刊,提供關(guān)于全球戰(zhàn)略變化、趨勢(shì)和關(guān)系及其公共政策影響的不同觀點(diǎn)。其撰稿人來自全球,反映了不同的政治、地區(qū)和專業(yè)觀點(diǎn)。其2021 年的影響因子為 2.013,在 96 種國際關(guān)系期刊中排名第 47。

第132頁

126

【摘要】2023 年 1 月 11 日,韓國總統(tǒng)尹錫悅做出了這樣的評(píng)價(jià):“當(dāng)然,如果問題變得更加嚴(yán)重,大韓民國(ROK)可以在這里部署戰(zhàn)術(shù)核武器,或者我們也可以獲得自己的核武器。如果出現(xiàn)這種情況,利用我們的科學(xué)技術(shù),未來在短時(shí)間內(nèi)(研制)一枚自己的核武器也不會(huì)花太長時(shí)間?!边@些話是韓國國家元首首次公開談?wù)摵宋淦骰瘑栴},打破了美韓同盟長期以來禁止討論這一安全選項(xiàng)的禁忌。近半個(gè)世紀(jì)前,韓國曾推行秘密核計(jì)劃,但被美國禁止。這一次,尹錫悅的講話正值人們紛紛猜測(cè)歷史可能面臨重演。

【原文】On January 11, 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea offered this assessment: “Of course, if problems become more serious, the Republic of Korea (ROK) could deploy tactical nuclear weapons here, or we could acquire our own nuke as well. If that happens, it would not take long to [develop] onefor

ourselves in a short period of time using our science and technology in the future.” These words werethefirst ever public remarks by a South Korean head of state on nuclear weaponization, breaking longstandingtaboos in the US-ROK alliance against discussing this security option. Nearly half a century ago, SouthKorea pursued a covert nuclear program, which the United States shut down. This time, Yoon’s remarkscame amid rampant speculation that history might repeat itself. 3. 關(guān)于定點(diǎn)清除和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)(On Targeted Killing and Warfare)Kenneth M. Pollack,美國企業(yè)研究所高級(jí)研究員

Daniel L. Byman,喬治城大學(xué)政府系教授和安全研究項(xiàng)目主任

【摘要】不久的某一天,你很可能會(huì)聽說,美國在也門某地暗殺了胡塞武裝領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,或殺死了伊朗抵抗軸心的另一位主要人物。當(dāng)然,美國官員不會(huì)稱其為暗殺。這個(gè)詞有過深的含義。過去,美國政府的律師們?cè)粎捚錈┑芈暶?,美國?duì)外國恐怖分子和敵方指揮官的殺戮不符合這一定義。當(dāng)這種情況發(fā)生時(shí),華盛頓會(huì)將其稱為“定點(diǎn)清除”,這是一種委婉的說法,聽起來不那么邪惡。但實(shí)際上并非如此。不同的政府都發(fā)現(xiàn),定點(diǎn)清除是對(duì)付棘手對(duì)手的一種非常有用的方法。911 事件后,對(duì)那些未知其地址,也沒有他們可能關(guān)心的任何其他目標(biāo)的恐怖分子采取了這一策略。威懾恐怖分子似乎是不可能的,但可以選擇簡單地消滅他們,防止他們繼續(xù)殺人。信息時(shí)代的新技術(shù)使暗殺方法變得更加巧妙——使用地獄火導(dǎo)彈和飛行銀彈彈頭,從更遠(yuǎn)的距離在更廣泛的情況下進(jìn)行暗殺。這使得定點(diǎn)清除似乎成為解決反恐戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)棘手挑戰(zhàn)的靈丹妙藥。

【原文】Someday soon, you are likely to hear that the United States has assassinated a Houthi leader

somewhere in Yemen or killed another leading figure in Iran’s Axis of Resistance. US officials won’t call it

an assassination, of course. That’s too loaded a term. In the past, US government lawyers have gone togreat

pains to declare that US killings of foreign terrorists and enemy commanders did not fit that definition. When it happens, Washington will instead term it a “targeted killing,” the preferred euphemism, whichsounds like something less sinister. In practice, it isn’t. Different administrations have found that targetedkillings were a wonderfully useful way of going after difficult adversaries. After 9/11, this tack was takenwith terrorists who had no known permanent address, nor anything else they might care about that couldbetargeted. Deterring terrorists seemed impossible, but we could simply eliminate themto keep themfromfurther killing. The new technology of the information age enabled ever more ingenious methods of

第133頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)127

assassination-with Hellfire missiles and flying Ginsu warheads, from longer distances, in a wider rangeof

circumstances. It made targeted killing a seeming panacea for the vexing challenges of the War on Terror. 4. 印度、俄羅斯和烏克蘭危機(jī)(India, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis)Sumit Ganguly,印第安納大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】作為一個(gè)后殖民地國家,印度長期以來一直竭力維護(hù)其在本地區(qū)和世界上的主權(quán)及影響力。事實(shí)上,在 1971 年第三次印巴戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間,印度是經(jīng)過一番內(nèi)部辯論后才決定對(duì)東巴基斯坦進(jìn)行干預(yù)的,因?yàn)檫@需要侵犯鄰國巴基斯坦的主權(quán)。毫不奇怪,印度對(duì)于全心全意地接受聯(lián)合國的“保護(hù)責(zé)任”(R2P)理論也相當(dāng)謹(jǐn)慎,因?yàn)檫@可能會(huì)破壞印度對(duì)國家主權(quán)原則的承諾。這種反對(duì)的背后是一種難以言表的恐懼:由于印度在保護(hù)人權(quán)方面的諸多失誤,特別是在處理國內(nèi)叛亂時(shí),“保護(hù)責(zé)任”在某些時(shí)候可能會(huì)適用于印度自身。

【原文】As a post-colonial state, India has long zealously guarded is sovereignty, both in the regionandinthe world. Indeed, it was only after much internal debate that it decided to intervene in East Pakistanduringthe 1971 crisis, as this required violating the sovereignty of its neighbor, Pakistan. Not surprisingly, it hasalso been quite circumspect about wholeheartedly embracing the UN’s doctrine of the “responsibilitytoprotect” (R2P) on the grounds that that it could undermine India’s devotion to the principle of statesovereignty. Underlying this opposition is an unspoken fear: that the R2P could at some point be appliedtoIndia itself, thanks to its many lapses in protecting human rights, especially when dealing with domesticinsurgencies. 5. 美國的保護(hù)主義和與中國的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)(US Protectionism and Competition withChina)Dong Jung Kim,高麗大學(xué)國際研究系副教授

【摘要】冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后,華盛頓倡導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)開放、減少政府干預(yù)和私有化,從而加速了超級(jí)全球化,而現(xiàn)在白宮和國會(huì)則大肆宣揚(yáng)公平貿(mào)易而非自由貿(mào)易。美國經(jīng)濟(jì)總體取向中“美國優(yōu)先”的共識(shí)已轉(zhuǎn)化為具體措施,不僅包括特朗普政府恢復(fù)《購買美國貨法案》,還包括拜登政府的對(duì)內(nèi)投資政策——即《美國救援計(jì)劃法案》、《基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資與就業(yè)法案》、《芯片與科學(xué)法案》和《通脹削減法案》,以及對(duì)包括電動(dòng)汽車、電池、太陽能電池和醫(yī)療產(chǎn)品在內(nèi)的一系列中國進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品征收關(guān)稅。如果保護(hù)主義可以被廣義地定義為實(shí)施幫助國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)對(duì)抗外國競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的政策,那么今天的美國已經(jīng)明顯轉(zhuǎn)向了保護(hù)主義。

【原文】A profound change is underway in US foreign economic policy. Whereas after the ColdWar, Washington advocated economic openness, minimal governmental intervention, and privatization-therebyaccelerating hyper-globalization-the White House and Congress now trumpet fair trade over free trade. Theconsensus on “America First” in overall US economic orientation has translated into tangible measures, not

only the reinstatement of the Buy American Act during the Trump administration but also the Bidenadministration’s inward investment policies - namely the American Rescue Plan Act, the InfrastructureInvestment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act-and tariffs against an

第134頁

128

array of Chinese imports including electric vehicles, batteries, solar cells, and medical products. If

protectionism can be broadly defined as the implementation of policies to help domestic industries against

foreign competitors, then the United States today has taken a decidedly protectionist turn. 6. 氣候變化可能破壞中俄關(guān)系(Climate Change Could Rupture Sino-RussianRelations)Matthew F. Calabria,華盛頓大學(xué)埃利奧特國際事務(wù)學(xué)院安全政策研究項(xiàng)目兼職教授,美國能源部的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全顧問

William Morrissey,約翰·霍普金斯大學(xué)保羅·尼采高級(jí)國際研究學(xué)院(SAIS)博士【摘要】1676 年開始,沙俄沿著阿穆爾河(黑龍江)及其支流修建了一系列防御工事。中國清政府感受到了威脅,于是在河對(duì)岸的黑龍江省集結(jié)了一支一萬人的軍隊(duì),這為沙俄和中國在接下來的歲月里發(fā)生的第一次沖突埋下了伏筆,也預(yù)示著此后數(shù)百年的邊境沖突和敵意。1683 年,康熙帝要求俄國人放棄前哨站,但沒有得到回應(yīng),于是下令軍隊(duì)將他們趕出阿穆爾河。清軍將俄軍偏遠(yuǎn)的阿爾巴津前哨夷為平地后,幸免的俄軍士兵返回并重建了阿爾巴津,這反過來又激怒了康熙帝,清軍對(duì)沙俄駐點(diǎn)發(fā)動(dòng)了長達(dá)數(shù)月的殘酷圍攻戰(zhàn)。阿爾巴津的守軍飽受戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和壞血病的摧殘,如果不是中俄兩國通過巧妙的外交手段逐步解除圍困,他們很可能已經(jīng)被迫投降。

【原文】Beginning in 1676, sarist Russia constructed a series of fortifications along the Amur River anditstributaries in a backcountry stretch of what was then Manchuria. Sensing a dire threat, the Chinese QingDynasty’s Manchu government concentrated a 10,000-man army on the opposite bank of the river in what isnow Heilongjiang Province, setting the stage for the first clash between Russia and dynastic China intheyears to follow and presaging border conflicts and centuries of enmity thereafter. In 1683, the ChineseEmperor Kangxi, receiving no response to peace terms that requested the Russians abandon the outposts, ordered his forces to dislodge them from the Amur. After Kangxi’s soldiers razed the remote Russianoutpost of Albazin to the ground, Russian soldiers fortunate enough to have been spared the Kangxi forces’ cannon fire returned and rebuilt Albazin, which in turn incited Kangxi to prosecute a brutal, months-longsiege warfare on the garrison. Devastated by war and scurvy, the Albazin holdouts would most probablyhave been forced to surrender had wily Sino-Russian diplomacy not lifted the siege over time. 7. “武裝建政”能夠在烏克蘭、加沙或臺(tái)灣地區(qū)取得成功嗎?(Can ArmedStatebuilding Succeed in Ukraine, Gaza or Taiwan?)

Adam Wunische,艾略特國際事務(wù)學(xué)院高級(jí)分析師和研究員

【摘要】在過去 20 年里,世界陷入了一個(gè)高度不確定和混亂的時(shí)期。美國參與或考慮參與的沖突不勝枚舉,其中包括海地、烏克蘭、加沙和約旦河西岸、也門和曼德海峽、緬甸、臺(tái)灣問題和與伊朗日益緊張的關(guān)系,以及與拉美緝毒人員的沖突等等。在這一時(shí)期,像美國這樣的國家很想動(dòng)用海外軍事力量來塑造對(duì)自己有利的沖突結(jié)果。然而,隨著這些行動(dòng)的進(jìn)行,各國往往意識(shí)到這只是暫時(shí)的、脆弱的權(quán)宜之計(jì)。例如,西方向?yàn)蹩颂m運(yùn)送援助物資的時(shí)間只推遲了幾個(gè)月,這使得俄羅斯越來越多地利用烏克蘭的短缺,在前線取得進(jìn)展。

第135頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)129

【原文】Over at least the last 20 years, the world has plunged into a period of heightened uncertaintyandchaos. The long list of conflicts in which the US has played—or has considered playing—a part includesHaiti, Ukraine, Gaza and the West Bank, Yemen and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, Myanmar, rising tensionsover Taiwan and with Iran, as well as with narco-gangs in Latin America, to name only a few. Duringsuchperiods, states like the US are tempted to apply military force abroad to shape the outcomes of theseconflicts in their favor. As these operations go on, however, states often realize that these are temporaryandfragile stopgaps. For example, delaying Western aid shipments to Ukraine by only a couple of monthsallowed Russia to increasingly take advantage of Ukrainian shortages and make advances alongthefrontline. 8. 如何結(jié)束軍事干預(yù)(How to End a Military Intervention)David Kampf,塔夫茨大學(xué)弗萊徹學(xué)院博士生

【摘要】這是一場(chǎng)失敗戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的失敗結(jié)局。當(dāng)美國爭(zhēng)先恐后地將最后一批美國人撤離阿富汗時(shí),現(xiàn)場(chǎng)一片混亂。退役軍人、前官員、記者和非營利組織雇員瘋狂地試圖協(xié)調(diào)曾幫助過美國戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和建國努力的阿富汗同事、翻譯、倡導(dǎo)者和朋友的安全撤離。正如 1975 年匆忙撤離西貢標(biāo)志著失敗的越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)束一樣,2021 年在喀布爾的絕望結(jié)局也為美國在阿富汗的存在畫上了灰暗的句號(hào)。盡管撤軍過程一團(tuán)糟,但計(jì)劃和執(zhí)行不力并不是美國未能在喀布爾建立穩(wěn)定、民主和友好政府并阻止塔利班卷土重來的原因。早在美國決定撤軍之前,戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)就已經(jīng)輸了,即使經(jīng)過多年的戰(zhàn)斗,美國仍然不知道何時(shí)或如何結(jié)束外國干預(yù)。

【原文】It was a failed ending to a failed war. Chaos and confusion reigned as the United States scrambledto get the last Americans out of Afghanistan. Former troops, ex-officials, journalists and non-profit

employees frantically tried to coordinate the safe evacuations of Afghan colleagues, translators, advocatesand friends who had helped the US war and nation-building efforts. Just as the hasty exit fromSaigonin1975 marked the end of a failed war in Vietnam, the desperate 2021 endgame in Kabul served as a grimcodato America's presence in Afghanistan. But despite the messy withdrawal, the poorly planned and executedexit was not the reason the United States failed to install a stable, democratic and friendly government inKabul and prevent the Taliban's return. The war was lost long before the United States decided to leave, andeven after years of fighting, it still did not know when or how to end a foreign intervention. 9. 保障烏克蘭長期安全:加入北約的替代方案(Backstopping Ukraine’s Long-TermSecurity: An Alternative to NATO Membership)

Lise Morjé Howard,喬治城大學(xué)終身教授

Michael O’Hanlon,布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)高級(jí)研究員兼外交政策研究主任

【摘要】如今,烏克蘭在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上面臨著嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn);5 月中旬,普京宣布俄羅斯軍隊(duì)“每天都在按計(jì)劃改善各條戰(zhàn)線上的陣地”。俄羅斯的戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)正在蓄勢(shì)待發(fā),而西方的決心仍不明朗。烏克蘭人將

第136頁

130

繼續(xù)進(jìn)行激烈的戰(zhàn)斗,但俄羅斯的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)機(jī)器正在付出代價(jià)。因此,烏克蘭的首要任務(wù)是保衛(wèi)自己及其領(lǐng)土和人民。

【原文】Ukraine faces serious immediate challenges on the battlefield today; in-mid May, Putin declaredthat Russian forces are \"improving their positions each day, on all fronts, according to plan.\" The Russianwartime economy is gathering steam while Western resolve remains uncertain. Ukrainians will continuetofight fiercely, but Russia’s war machine is taking its toll. Thus, Ukraine's first order of business is to defenditself and its territory and people. 【編譯:鄒梓軒周杼樾】【責(zé)任編輯:嚴(yán)瑾怡】

第137頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)131

《亞太國際關(guān)系》(International Relations of the Asia-Pacific)International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,Vol. 24, No. 2,2024

1. 評(píng)估日本的防務(wù)合作協(xié)議及其變革潛力:升級(jí)與澳大利亞和英國的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系(Evaluating Japan’s defense cooperation agreements and their transformative potential:upgrading strategic partnerships with Australia and the UK)Nanae Baldauff ,比利時(shí)布魯日聯(lián)合國大學(xué)地區(qū)比較研究副研究員,日本慶應(yīng)義塾大學(xué)湘南藤澤校區(qū)高級(jí)研究員

Yee-Kuang Heng,東京大學(xué)公共政策研究生院國際安全教授

【摘要】近年來,日本的防衛(wèi)合作協(xié)定(DCA)不斷增多。盡管日本面臨嚴(yán)峻的安全環(huán)境,但防衛(wèi)合作協(xié)定并沒有將正式的軍事同盟擴(kuò)大到唯一的盟友美國之外,而是成為日本加強(qiáng)與不同伙伴的雙邊和多邊防衛(wèi)關(guān)系的重要工具。我們?cè)撊绾卫斫馊毡驹诮⒌貐^(qū)防衛(wèi)協(xié)定方面日益增長的積極性?然而,目前還沒有一個(gè)框架來系統(tǒng)地評(píng)估這些發(fā)展中戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系,也沒有對(duì)這些發(fā)展中戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系在改變?nèi)毡九c志同道合國家的伙伴關(guān)系方面的效用的詳細(xì)評(píng)估。本文從幾個(gè)關(guān)鍵績效指標(biāo)出發(fā),提出了一個(gè)分析矩陣,并將其應(yīng)用于評(píng)估日本如何利用發(fā)展中戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系來改變其與澳大利亞和英國這兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵戰(zhàn)略伙伴的防務(wù)關(guān)系。

【原文】Japan’s defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) have been proliferating in recent years. DespiteJapan’s harsh security environment, rather than expanding formal military alliances beyond its sole USally, DCAs have emerged as a crucial instrument deployed by Japan to strengthen bilateral and minilateral

defense relations with various partners. How do we make sense of Japan’s growing activismin forgingDCAs? Yet, there does not currently exist a framework to systematically evaluate these DCAs, nor is therea《亞太國際關(guān)系》是在該領(lǐng)域出版最佳原創(chuàng)研究的重要國際期刊。該刊于 2001 年創(chuàng)刊,每年一月、五月和九月共出版三期。該刊目標(biāo)有二:為亞太地區(qū)的讀者帶來國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域杰出的綜合學(xué)術(shù)研究,和為研究該地區(qū)國際關(guān)系的學(xué)者提供專門的發(fā)表渠道。該刊的發(fā)行涵蓋了日本國際關(guān)系協(xié)會(huì)(Japan Association of International Relations)的所有成員,從而保證了該地區(qū)的讀者數(shù)量?!秮喬珖H關(guān)系》的內(nèi)容側(cè)重于:亞太地區(qū)國家間的關(guān)系;亞太地區(qū)與世界其他地區(qū)的關(guān)系;與亞太一國或多國有關(guān)的國際關(guān)系一般性問題和理論。

第138頁

132

detailed assessment of the utility of these DCAs in transforming Japan’s partnerships with like-mindedstates. This article proposes an analytical matrix derived from several key performance indicators and applies it toevaluate how Japan’s use of DCAs has transformed its defense relationships with two key strategic partners, Australia and the UK. 2. 認(rèn)真對(duì)待想法和言辭:瀾滄江-湄公河合作制度化的解釋(Taking ideas andwordsseriously: explaining the institutionalization of the Lancang-Mekong cooperation)龔雪,新加坡南洋理工大學(xué)拉惹勒南國際關(guān)系學(xué)院中國項(xiàng)目助理教授

李明江 ,新加坡南洋理工大學(xué)拉惹勒南國際關(guān)系學(xué)院副教授兼教務(wù)長,國際關(guān)系講座教授【摘要】本文探討了中國的觀念性權(quán)力和話語權(quán)在塑造目標(biāo)國的利益觀念和決定新機(jī)構(gòu)的形成方面所起的作用。本文以瀾滄江-湄公河合作(LMC)為案例,闡述了中國如何構(gòu)建制度化的理念,以及這一理念在與伙伴國的互動(dòng)中是如何被提出、闡述、討論和接受的。通過對(duì)700 多份有關(guān)瀾湄合作機(jī)制的中國官方文字進(jìn)行收集和編碼,以及大量的訪談,本文分析了中國政府如何利用理念和話語來爭(zhēng)取湄公河地區(qū)國家對(duì)建立該機(jī)制的支持。本文論證了中國的觀念性權(quán)力和話語權(quán)有助于產(chǎn)生三種結(jié)果:否認(rèn)偏好、培養(yǎng)偏好和增強(qiáng)偏好。這種中國力量通過三種方式使湄公河國家的利益認(rèn)知與中國的期望相一致:將水安全問題轉(zhuǎn)化為發(fā)展問題,通過策略性說服使其接受中國的建議,以及對(duì)替代政策進(jìn)行限制。

【原文】This article explores the role of China’s ideational and discursive power in shaping the interest

perceptions of target states and in determining the formation of a new institution. UsingtheLancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) as a case study, this article illustrates how China framed the ideaof

institutionalization, and how such idea was proposed, articulated, deliberated, and accepted intheinteractions with partner countries. Relying on a collection and coding of over 700 Chinese official texts onthe LMC and extensive interviews, we analyze how the Chinese authorities have used ideas and discoursesto garner support from states in the Mekong region for the establishment of the institution. This articledemonstrates that China’s ideational and discursive power helps generate three outcomes: preferencedenying, preference cultivating, and preference empowering. Such Chinese power has helped align Mekongcountries’ interest perceptions with China’s expectations in three ways: transforming water securityintodevelopmental issues, accepting Chinese proposals through tactical persuasion, and constraining alternativepolicies. 3. 重新審視蘆田備忘錄:緊急派駐計(jì)劃與警察改革之間的關(guān)系(ReconsideringtheAshida memorandum: the relations between the emergency stationing plan andpolicereform)

Goro Fujita,早稻田大學(xué)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院助理教授

【摘要】本文探討了太平洋戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)后日本安全政策的起源。在占領(lǐng)期間,日本政府決定在《日本和平條約》簽訂后繼續(xù)保留駐日美軍。為了解釋其背后的原因,現(xiàn)有研究強(qiáng)調(diào)了日本政府的外部安全考慮。

第139頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)133

本文則強(qiáng)調(diào)日本外交政策與國內(nèi)政策之間的相互作用,認(rèn)為日本政府的決定受到了國內(nèi)安全考量的強(qiáng)烈影響,從而對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究提出了挑戰(zhàn)。隨著 1947 年 9 月《蘆田備忘錄》的制定以及關(guān)于盟軍司令部(GHQ)將允許強(qiáng)化警察部隊(duì)的期望,日本外相蘆田仁及其幕僚試圖將駐日美軍的駐扎限制在國家緊急狀態(tài)下。然而,與這種期望相反,總司令部的警察改革大大削弱了日本的國內(nèi)安全保障能力,迫使東京依靠美軍來應(yīng)對(duì)國內(nèi)的共產(chǎn)主義威脅。

【原文】This article explores the origins of Japan’s security policy after the Asia-Pacific War. Duringtheoccupation, the Japanese government decided on the maintenance of US forces in the country after theJapanese Peace Treaty. To explain the rationale behind this, existing studies emphasize the Japanesegovernment’s external security calculations. Highlighting the interaction between Japanese foreignanddomestic policies, this article challenges this conventional claim by arguing that internal securitycalculations strongly influenced the Japanese government’s decision. With the creation of the Ashidamemorandum in September 1947 and the expectation that the General Headquarters (GHQ) would allowfor

stronger police forces, Japanese Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi and his staff sought to restrict thestationing of US forces in Japan only to national emergencies. As opposed to such expectation, however, GHQ’s police reform significantly weakened Japan’s internal security capabilities, forcing Tokyo to dependon US forces for dealing with internal communist threats. 4. 分散經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn):日本對(duì)中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)沖(Diversifying economic risks: Japan’seconomic hedging toward China)

Lluc Vidal López,加泰羅尼亞大學(xué)(UOC)政治與國際關(guān)系教授

àngels Pelegrín Solé,公共經(jīng)濟(jì)系應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)副教授

Ivan Gonzalez-Pujol ,馬德里自治大學(xué)東亞研究中心日本經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)助理教授【摘要】國際關(guān)系傳統(tǒng)上認(rèn)為,制衡或追隨是國家在面對(duì)威脅現(xiàn)狀的崛起大國時(shí)采取的兩種主要戰(zhàn)略。然而,最近的學(xué)術(shù)討論突出強(qiáng)調(diào)了對(duì)沖策略的出現(xiàn),它是國家在面對(duì)意圖模糊的崛起大國時(shí),尤其是在利害關(guān)系重大時(shí)采取的一種中間策略。經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)沖是這一戰(zhàn)略的關(guān)鍵要素,因?yàn)樗试S國家在通過貿(mào)易和投資將依賴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降至最低的同時(shí),實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益最大化。本文提出了一個(gè)基于庫克模型(Kuik’smodel)的分析框架,其重點(diǎn)是貿(mào)易和投資中的經(jīng)濟(jì)多樣化概念。本文通過分析安倍政府的多元化舉措來檢驗(yàn)其有效性,本文核心論點(diǎn)是,日本的多元化努力旨在通過與中國的貿(mào)易和投資來降低經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),避免在特定領(lǐng)域的過度依賴。

【 原 文 】 International Relations has traditionally identified balancing and bandwagoning as the twopredominant strategies adopted by states in response to a rising power that threatens the status quo. However, recent academic debates have highlighted the emergence of hedging as a middle-ground approach adoptedby states facing a rising power with ambiguous intentions, particularly when the stakes are high. Economichedging forms a critical element of this strategy, as it allows states to maximize economic benefits whileminimizing the risks of dependency through trade and investment. We present an analytical frameworkbased on Kuik’s model, which focuses on the concept of economic diversification in trade and investment. We test its validity through an analysis of the diversification initiatives of the Abe administration andour

第140頁

134

central argument is that Japan’s diversification efforts are aimed at reducing economic risks and avoidingexcessive dependency in specific sectors through trade and investment with China. 【編譯:王詩涵馬欣茹】【責(zé)任編輯:嚴(yán)瑾怡】

第141頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)135

《當(dāng)代亞洲》(Journal of Contemporary Asia)Journal of Contemporary Asia,Vol. 54, No. 4, 2024

1. 知識(shí)政治與社會(huì)現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移:印度尼西亞扶貧制度的構(gòu)成效應(yīng)(The Politics of

Knowledge and Social Cash Transfers: The Constitutive Effects of an Anti-PovertyRegime in Indonesia)

John McCarthy,克勞福德公共政策學(xué)院副教授

Gerben Nooteboom,阿姆斯特丹大學(xué)人類學(xué)系副教授

Shaummil Hadi,印度尼西亞阿爾穆斯林大學(xué)研究與社區(qū)服務(wù)學(xué)院

Pande Made Kutanegara,加札馬達(dá)大學(xué)人文學(xué)院人類學(xué)系講師

Nulwita Muliati,印度尼西亞馬利庫薩萊大學(xué)

【摘要】近幾十年來,促進(jìn)社會(huì)現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移的政策逐漸全球化,被作為減貧的重要手段。在各種方法中,世界銀行推廣的有條件現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移模式(CCT)在一些國家占據(jù)了話語主導(dǎo)地位,因?yàn)樵谶@些國家,這一戰(zhàn)略及其實(shí)施技術(shù)模式似乎比其他方案更具吸引力。雖然拉丁美洲的研究已經(jīng)對(duì)CCT 項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行了評(píng)估,并對(duì)其所代表的發(fā)展政治進(jìn)行了思考,但在亞洲農(nóng)村社會(huì),研究人員尚未探索CCT認(rèn)識(shí)和衡量貧困的方式所產(chǎn)生的構(gòu)成性影響。本文探討了印度尼西亞農(nóng)村地區(qū)的 CCT 知識(shí)政治的后果。本文認(rèn)為,CCT 的認(rèn)識(shí)和衡量方式具有自相矛盾的效果。該計(jì)劃向數(shù)百萬貧困家庭直接付款,產(chǎn)生了有據(jù)可查的包容和進(jìn)步模式。然而,CCT 的知識(shí)實(shí)踐涉及簡化,產(chǎn)生了嚴(yán)重的目標(biāo)錯(cuò)誤,引發(fā)了國家行為者、地方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人和社區(qū)之間永無休止的修復(fù)過程。這種度量化的知識(shí)體系使分配的政治問題非政治化。它掩蓋了認(rèn)識(shí)和解決貧困問題的其他方法,產(chǎn)生了一種與既定的社區(qū)包容邏輯有些相悖的權(quán)利秩序,同時(shí)引發(fā)了地方的分配政治。

【原文】Recent decades have witnessed the globalisation of policies promoting social cash transfers asacritical instrument for poverty reduction. Among various approaches, the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)

model promoted by the World Bank has gained discursive dominance in countries where this strategy, andits technical model for implementation, appear more attractive than competing alternatives. While researchhas evaluated CCT programmes and considered the politics of development that they represent inLatin《當(dāng)代亞洲》(Journal of Contemporary Asia)是一份1970

年起出版的學(xué)術(shù)期刊。該期刊每年出版 4 次,內(nèi)容涵蓋亞洲的經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治和社會(huì)發(fā)展。目前,期刊的主編為其創(chuàng)辦人 Peter Limqueco 以及 Kevin Hewison。據(jù) 2020 年的期刊引證報(bào)告,《當(dāng)代亞洲》的影響因子為 3.261。

第142頁

136

America, researchers are yet to explore the constitutive effects of CCT ways of knowing and measuringpoverty in the societies of rural Asia. This paper explores the consequences of CCT knowledge politics inrural Indonesia. It argues that CCT practices of knowing and measuring have paradoxical effects. Theprogramme makes direct payments to millions of impoverished households, producing well-documentedpatterns of inclusion and advancement. Yet, CCT knowledge practices involve simplifications and generatesignificant mis-targeting, eliciting a never-ending repair process among state actors, local leaders, andcommunities. This metricised knowledge system depoliticises political questions of distribution. It concealsalternative ways of knowing and addressing poverty, producing an order of entitlements somewhat at oddswith established community logics of inclusion, while provoking a local politics of distribution. 2. 為抵抗群眾抗議而挑起民眾阻撓:緬甸軍方的反動(dòng)員戰(zhàn)略(Provoking CivilianDisruption against Popular Protests: The Myanmar Military’s Counter-MobilisationStrategies)

Mai Van Tran,哥本哈根大學(xué)北歐亞洲研究所和政治學(xué)系博士后研究員

【摘要】雖然群眾性爭(zhēng)議運(yùn)動(dòng)面臨著一系列由國家主導(dǎo)的反動(dòng)員策略,但現(xiàn)有研究主要集中在安全部隊(duì)和暴力承包商的鎮(zhèn)壓方面。人們對(duì)政府在公眾中采取更具欺騙性的策略(包括將抗議者貼上罪犯標(biāo)簽和制造廣泛的暴力犯罪)來激起反抗議者敵意的影響了解甚少。本文將緬甸軍政府統(tǒng)治下發(fā)生的兩起類似的民眾抗議活動(dòng)并列分析:1988 年的“四-八起義”和 2007 年的“袈裟革命”,從而探討這兩種策略的有效性。分析利用了一個(gè)新穎的定性數(shù)據(jù)集,該數(shù)據(jù)集包括來自國家媒體、權(quán)威二手資料來源的內(nèi)容,以及目擊或參與抗議活動(dòng)的 109 名平民的原始訪談和書面陳述。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),雖然反對(duì)抗議者的敘事沒有效果,但大規(guī)模針對(duì)平民的犯罪活動(dòng)的策劃加劇了平民對(duì)陌生人的不信任,導(dǎo)致成年男性阻撓陌生活動(dòng)分子的抗議活動(dòng)。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)既強(qiáng)調(diào)了培養(yǎng)群體間信任對(duì)于發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)廣泛的爭(zhēng)議陣線的關(guān)鍵作用,也強(qiáng)調(diào)了當(dāng)一個(gè)政權(quán)堅(jiān)定地致力于鎮(zhèn)壓異見時(shí)面對(duì)的具有挑戰(zhàn)性的條件?!驹摹縒hile mass contentious movements face a wide range of state-led counter-mobilisation strategies, existing studies have mainly focused on repression by the security forces and violence contractors. Muchless is understood about the impact of governments’ more deceptive strategies to provoke anti-protester

hostility among the public, including labelling protesters as criminals and engineering widespread violent

crimes. This article examines the effectiveness of these two types of strategy by juxtaposing two similar

cases of popular protests under military-ruled Myanmar: the 1988 Four-eight Uprising and 2007 SaffronRevolution. The analysis leverages a novel qualitative dataset consisting of content fromstate media, authoritative secondary sources, as well as original interviews and written accounts by 109 civilians whowitnessed or participated in the protest events. It is found that while anti-protester narratives were ineffective, orchestration of criminal activities targeting civilians on a large scale fuelled civilian distrust towardstrangers, leading adult men to disrupt protest events by unfamiliar activists. This finding underscores boththe crucial role of nurturing inter-group trust in order to grow a broad-based contentious front as well as thechallenging conditions for doing so when a regime is steadfastly committed to crushing dissent.

第143頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)137

3. 越南的反對(duì)派勞工運(yùn)動(dòng)(Dissident Labour Activism in Vietnam)Anh-Susann Pham Thi,土耳其安卡拉比爾肯特大學(xué)政治學(xué)與公共管理系研究員【摘要】越南的學(xué)者們研究了不同形式的勞工反抗,如非法罷工、請(qǐng)?jiān)?、投訴、停工和抵制,工人們通過這些形式要求提高工資和養(yǎng)老金,改善整體工作條件,落實(shí)工人權(quán)利。與工作場(chǎng)所內(nèi)外的勞工反抗活動(dòng)相比,反對(duì)派勞工活動(dòng)家受到的國家鎮(zhèn)壓要嚴(yán)厲得多,而這也是本文關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)。本文的問題是:是什么使得反對(duì)派勞工活動(dòng)家對(duì)國家構(gòu)成(實(shí)際或感知的)威脅?一種常見且廣為接受的解釋是異見人士的訴求性質(zhì),包括獨(dú)立工會(huì)、民主化和政權(quán)更迭。本文深入探討后發(fā)現(xiàn),反對(duì)派勞工活動(dòng)家推動(dòng)了新興認(rèn)識(shí)論的第三空間,他們能夠重振有關(guān)勞工權(quán)利的隱藏知識(shí),重新喚起被壓抑的獨(dú)立工會(huì)理念,使對(duì)現(xiàn)狀的批判與對(duì)另一種未來的想象并存,這些因素共同威脅著越南共產(chǎn)黨的政治合法性,進(jìn)而威脅著資本的利用。

【原文】Scholars of Vietnam have studied different forms of labour resistance such as wildcat strikes, petitions, complaints, work stoppages, and boycotts, with which workers demand higher wages and pensions, overall better working conditions, and the implementation of workers’ rights. This article pays attentiontothe small, yet not negligible group of dissident labour activists, who are subjected to much harsher staterepression compared to labour resistance in and around the workplace. This article asks: What makesdissident labour activism a (real or perceived) threat to the state? A common and widely acceptedexplanation refers to the nature of the demands of dissidents, which includes independent trade unions, democratisation, and regime change. This article digs deeper and finds that dissident labour activists functionas agents of an emerging epistemological third space, which permits the revitalisation of hidden knowledgesabout labour rights, the reclamation of the silenced idea of independent trade unions and the co-existenceof

critique of the status quo and imagination of an alternative future, which together threaten to endanger theCommunist Party of Vietnam’s political legitimacy and, by implication, capital utilisation. 4. 完美的借口:印度和菲律賓民粹專制主義奪取大流行病應(yīng)急權(quán)力(Perfect Pretext:Populist Authoritarian Seizure of Pandemic Emergency Powers in India andthePhilippines)

Leonora C. Angeles,不列顛哥倫比亞大學(xué)社區(qū)與區(qū)域規(guī)劃學(xué)院副教授

Wajiha Mehdi,不列顛哥倫比亞大學(xué)性別、種族、性和社會(huì)正義研究所博士生【摘要】本文運(yùn)用法蘭克福學(xué)派的批判理論,研究了亞洲民粹主義專制政權(quán)如何利用COVID-19大流行的背景來維護(hù)政權(quán)和鞏固權(quán)力的政治結(jié)果。這次疫情揭示了印度與菲律賓之間有趣的相似之處,凸顯了三種相互關(guān)聯(lián)的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展模式,使得國家對(duì) COVID-19 的反應(yīng)具有相似性。首先,通過新舊統(tǒng)治技術(shù)推行的新自由主義經(jīng)濟(jì)政策如何伴隨著驚人的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率,卻沒有解決結(jié)構(gòu)性的社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等問題。其次,在受限制的新自由主義民主政體下,政治承諾失敗、尋租機(jī)會(huì)增加和腐敗等并行的先決條件如何催生了民粹主義專制領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。第三,新自由主義和民粹專制主義的結(jié)合如何制約了政府應(yīng)對(duì)大流行病的沖突和競(jìng)爭(zhēng),其一方面加強(qiáng)了權(quán)力鞏固和政權(quán)維護(hù),另一方面又引發(fā)了政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。民粹專制主義通過大眾傳媒、異質(zhì)父權(quán)制家庭和教育系統(tǒng)傳播的意識(shí)形態(tài)統(tǒng)治這三個(gè)重要的關(guān)聯(lián)要素,在大流行病期間持續(xù)存在。

第144頁

138

【原文】Using Frankfurt School Critical Theory, we examine the political outcomes of howAsian populist

authoritarian regimes seized the COVID-19 pandemic context for regime maintenance and power

consolidation. The pandemic revealed interesting India-Philippines parallels highlighting threeinter-connected political-economic development patterns contextualising analogous state responses toCOVID-19. First, how neo-liberal economic policies pursued through old and newtechnologies of

domination accompanied phenomenal economic growth rates without addressing structural socio-economicinequalities. Second, how parallel predisposing conditions of failed political promises, increasedrent-seeking opportunities, and corruption under constricted neo-liberal democracies, gave rise to populist

authoritarian leaders. Third, how combined neo-liberalism and populist authoritarianismconditionedconflictual and contested government responses to the pandemic, bolstering power consolidation and regimemaintenance, on the one hand, and ensuing political contestations on the other. Populist authoritarianismpersists during pandemics through three significant connected elements of ideological dominationpropagated through mass media, the hetero-patriarchal family, and educational system. 5. 市場(chǎng)中的政治反抗:奶茶聯(lián)盟中的消費(fèi)激進(jìn)主義(Political Resistance intheMarketplace: Consumer Activism in the Milk Tea Alliance)Debby Sze Wan Chan,澳大利亞國立大學(xué)中國與世界研究中心和克勞福德公共政策學(xué)院講師【摘要】2019-2021 年間,香港、泰國和緬甸經(jīng)歷了一波又一波的民主運(yùn)動(dòng)。相似的政治軌跡和民主訴求將三地緊密聯(lián)系在一起,有人稱之為“奶茶聯(lián)盟”。除了街頭抗議,三地的民主派公民還參與了政治驅(qū)動(dòng)型消費(fèi)。這一經(jīng)濟(jì)策略將市場(chǎng)變成了一個(gè)反抗場(chǎng)所,并使反抗得以持續(xù)。在香港和泰國,聯(lián)合抵制和抵制消費(fèi)在運(yùn)動(dòng)中并存,前者的消費(fèi)激進(jìn)主義比后者更為廣泛。在緬甸,反軍政權(quán)的公民主要采取聯(lián)合抵制策略。在政治驅(qū)動(dòng)消費(fèi)主義的類似目標(biāo)下,香港、泰國和緬甸在采取聯(lián)合抵制和抵制購買行動(dòng)方面的差異又該如何解釋的呢?根據(jù)對(duì)這三個(gè)地區(qū)的深入訪談和二手資料,這項(xiàng)比較研究發(fā)現(xiàn),政治驅(qū)動(dòng)型消費(fèi)主義與政治環(huán)境相互作用。在封閉的政治體制下,例如緬甸,政治消費(fèi)者只能進(jìn)行隱蔽的抵抗。在混合體制下,如香港和泰國,政治消費(fèi)者可以利用聯(lián)合抵制和抵制購買這兩種方式進(jìn)行公開抵抗,政治消費(fèi)者的參與程度因是否有其他政治途徑而異。

【 原 文 】 Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar experienced waves of pro-democracy movements from2019–2021. Similar political trajectories and democratic aspirations bound the three territories together

under what some called the Milk Tea Alliance. Alongside street protests, pro-democracy citizens in the threeterritories engaged in politics-driven consumption. The economic strategy turned the market into a resistancesite and sustained defiance. In Hong Kong and Thailand, boycotts and buycotts co-existed in the movementswith the consumer activism of the former more widespread than for the latter. In Myanmar, anti-militaryregime citizens primarily adopted the boycott tactic. With a similar objective of politics-driven consumerism, what explains the variations in the adoption of boycotts and buycotts in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar?Based on in-depth interviews and secondary information from the three territories, this comparative studyfinds that politics-driven consumerism interacts with political environments. In a closed political system, for

instance Myanmar, political consumers can only engage in covert resistance. In hybrid regimes, suchas

第145頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)139

Hong Kong and Thailand, political consumers can leverage both boycotts and buycotts as overt resistance, with the level of political consumer engagement varying according to the availability of alternative political

avenues. 6. 中國全球化的環(huán)境倡議:非政府組織參與“綠色一帶一路”倡議(Environmental

Advocacy in a Globalising China: Non-Governmental Organisation Engagement withtheGreen Belt and Road Initiative)

夏穎,香港大學(xué)法學(xué)院助理教授

【摘要】盡管“一帶一路”倡議為欠發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)帶來了發(fā)展機(jī)遇,但也引發(fā)了對(duì)負(fù)面環(huán)境影響和可持續(xù)性的擔(dān)憂。盡管學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)中國綠化“一帶一路”倡議的努力興趣濃厚,但對(duì)非政府組織參與政策制定的情況研究不足。本研究首次以實(shí)證研究的方式,考察了非政府環(huán)保組織與中國政府在綠色“一帶一路”倡議下的互動(dòng)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),非政府組織采用了四種策略來參與國家主導(dǎo)的倡議-民間外交、發(fā)展伙伴關(guān)系、提供服務(wù)和外部改革-并且發(fā)展伙伴和服務(wù)提供者在影響中國“一帶一路”倡議相關(guān)環(huán)境政策方面比其他策略更為積極。本文闡釋了民間社會(huì)行動(dòng)者在綠化“一帶一路”倡議中的機(jī)遇與制約,以及非民主背景下非政府組織與政府之間的動(dòng)態(tài)關(guān)系。

【原文】Although the Belt and Road Initiative presents growth opportunities for less developed regions, it

also raises concerns about negative environmental impacts and sustainability. Despite proliferating academicinterest in China’s efforts to green the Belt and Road Initiative, the engagement of non-governmental

organisations in policymaking has been understudied. This research marks the first empirical effort toexamine the interactions between environmental non-governmental organisations and the Chinesegovernment under the banner of a green Belt and Road Initiative. It finds that non-governmental

organisations have employed four strategies to engage with the state-led initiative – civil diplomacy, development partnership, service provision, and outside reform – and that development partners and serviceproviders have been more active than the others in shaping China’s Belt and Road Initiative-relatedenvironmental policies. This article elucidates civil society actors’ opportunities and constraints in greeningthe Belt and Road Initiative and non-governmental organisations–government dynamics in a non-democraticcontext. 7. 韓國和臺(tái)灣地區(qū)最低工資政策的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué):黨派力量強(qiáng)弱下的決策制定(ThePolitical Economy of Minimum Wage Policies in South Korea and Taiwan:

Decision-Making under Strong versus Weak Partisanship)Ray Dongryul Kim,羅徹斯特理工學(xué)院政治學(xué)系系主任

Chin-En Wu,臺(tái)灣中央研究院政治研究所(IPSAS)研究員

【摘要】本研究對(duì)韓國和臺(tái)灣地區(qū)的最低工資決策進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)比較。研究結(jié)果表明,韓國以大企業(yè)為主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)為各政黨所利用,建立了被政黨剝削的對(duì)立勞資關(guān)系,導(dǎo)致在最低工資問題上的黨派決策,且其程度高于經(jīng)濟(jì)較為混合的臺(tái)灣?;诮?jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的巨大社會(huì)鴻溝轉(zhuǎn)化為最低工資政策的巨大黨派差

第146頁

140

異,這一點(diǎn)通過最低工資問題的獨(dú)特性的可見,且通過三方委員會(huì)的代理人得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。從結(jié)果來看,韓國和臺(tái)灣地區(qū)之間存在著明顯的差異:韓國每年的最低工資增幅波動(dòng)很大,而臺(tái)灣地區(qū)在不同政府執(zhí)政期間的增幅保持穩(wěn)定。韓國政府積極回應(yīng)其核心選民(無論是勞工還是企業(yè)),而臺(tái)灣當(dāng)局則尋求平衡。

【原文】This study conducts a systemic comparison of minimum wage decision-making in KoreaandTaiwan. It demonstrates that Korea’s big-business-dominated economy builds confrontational

labour–business relations to be exploited by political parties, resulting in partisan decisions on the minimumwage, to a greater extent than Taiwan’s more mixed economy. A large social divide based on the economicstructure translates into a substantial partisan difference in minimum wage policies, when endorsedbytheunique features of the minimum wage issue and carried out through the agents of the tripartite commission. As seen from the outcomes, a marked difference exists between Korea and Taiwan: Korea shows a dramaticfluctuation in annual minimum-wage increases, whereas Taiwan’s increases remain stable across different

governments. Korean governments actively respond to their core constituencies, whether labour or business, while Taiwan governments seek to strike a balance. 8. 韓國協(xié)同治理的起源:民主化后頭十年的分析(The Origins of Collaborative

Governance in South Korea: An Analysis of the First Ten Years after Democratisation)Sunhyuk Kim,高麗大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)教授

Chonghee Han,韓國首爾光云大學(xué)公共管理系教授

【摘要】1987 年,韓國在社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)的推動(dòng)下向民主過渡。大民主聯(lián)盟包括反對(duì)黨和各種民間團(tuán)體,包括學(xué)生團(tuán)體、工會(huì)和宗教組織。民間社會(huì)繼續(xù)向過渡后的政府施壓,要求其解散專制結(jié)構(gòu),廢除不民主的做法。1961-1987 年間,韓國的政治威權(quán)主義與發(fā)展型國家密不可分,發(fā)展型國家?guī)砹肆钊瞬毮康慕?jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。民主化之后的政府改革需要削弱(如果不是瓦解)發(fā)展型國家,使公共治理和政策制定更加透明、反應(yīng)更快、參與性更強(qiáng)。本文將以民主化后的頭十年為重點(diǎn),探討韓國的政府改革。盧泰愚政府于 1988 年成立了行政改革委員會(huì),金泳三政府于 1993 年成立了行政改革總統(tǒng)委員會(huì)。雖然這兩個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)都有平民參與改革進(jìn)程,但政府行政部和財(cái)政經(jīng)濟(jì)部在改革的設(shè)計(jì)和實(shí)施中占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位,這表明韓國引入和實(shí)施協(xié)同治理是由國家主導(dǎo)的。本文可從韓國的案例中可以得出比較意義?!?原 文 】 South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987 was driven by social movements. The granddemocracy coalition included the opposition party and various civic associations, including student groups, labour unions, and religious organisations. Civil society continued to pressure the post-transitional

governments to dismantle authoritarian structures and remove undemocratic practices. Political

authoritarianism in South Korea in 1961–1987 was inseparable from the developmental state that deliveredthe country’s impressive economic development. Government reform after the democratisation entailedtheweakening, if not dismantling, of the developmental state, to make public governance and policymakingmore transparent, responsive, and participatory. In this paper we examine government reformin SouthKorea, focusing on the first ten years following democratisation. The Roh Tae Woo government createdtheAdministrative Reform Committee in 1988, and the Kim Young Sam government launched the Presidential

第147頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)141

Commission for Administrative Reform in 1993. Although both agencies engaged civilians in the reformprocess, it was the Ministry of Government Administration and the Ministry of Finance and Economythat

dominated the designing and implementing of the reforms, which demonstrates that the introductionandimplementation of collaborative governance in South Korea was state led. Comparative implications aredrawn from the South Korean case. 【編譯:王詩涵張瀟文】【責(zé)任編輯:嚴(yán)瑾怡】

第148頁

142

《歐亞研究》(Europe-Asia Studies)Europe-Asia Studies,Vol. 76, No.6, 2024

1. 同情還是批評(píng)?俄羅斯極左派與極右派對(duì)烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的反應(yīng)(Sympathy or Criticism?The European Far Left and Far Right React to Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine)Andreas Fagerholm,埃博學(xué)術(shù)大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)、商業(yè)與經(jīng)濟(jì)和法學(xué)院講師

【摘要】本研究旨在增進(jìn)我們對(duì)歐洲“同情俄羅斯”傾向的了解。通過內(nèi)容分析,研究了極左派(26個(gè))和極右派(33 個(gè))——對(duì)俄羅斯持正面看法最常見的兩個(gè)黨派——對(duì)俄羅斯2022 年對(duì)烏克蘭的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的反應(yīng)。研究結(jié)果為了解當(dāng)代歐洲政黨政治中“同情俄羅斯”趨勢(shì)的普遍性和性質(zhì)提供了見解?!驹摹縏his study seeks to contribute to our knowledge on ‘Russia-sympathising’ tendencies in Europe. Bymeans of content analysis, it examines how the far left (N=26) and the far right (N=33)—namely, thetwoparty families where benign views on Russia are expected to occur most commonly—have reactedtoRussia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The findings provide insights into the prevalence and natureof

‘Russia-sympathising’ trends in contemporary European party politics. 2. 后蘇聯(lián)空間俄羅斯霸權(quán)的終結(jié)?烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與歐亞大陸解體進(jìn)程(The endof

Russian Hegemony in the Post-Soviet Space? War in Ukraine and DisintegrationProcesses in Eurasia)

Ruslan Zaporozhchenko,哈爾科夫國立大學(xué)政治社會(huì)學(xué)系

【摘要】文章探討了俄羅斯霸權(quán)秩序在后蘇聯(lián)空間崩潰后的解體過程。俄羅斯對(duì)既有國際秩序體系和美國霸權(quán)的不滿是其于 2022 年 2 月對(duì)烏克蘭軍事行動(dòng)的原因之一。一方面,對(duì)烏克蘭的軍事行動(dòng)是俄羅斯堅(jiān)守霸權(quán)秩序、與包括中國、伊朗、印度在內(nèi)的反對(duì)美國霸權(quán)的潛在盟友形成地緣政治集團(tuán)的嘗試。另一方面,對(duì)烏克蘭的軍事行動(dòng)是俄羅斯對(duì)自身地緣政治野心的重新定義,其借此在全球范圍內(nèi)建立另一種霸權(quán)秩序。

《歐亞研究》(Europe-Asia Studies)為每年出刊 10 期的學(xué)術(shù) 期刊 , 由 Routledge 代 表格 拉 斯格 大 學(xué)中 東 歐 研究部門(University of Glasgow)出版。主要關(guān)注前蘇聯(lián)地區(qū)國家的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)議題及其 20 世紀(jì)的歷史。

第149頁

2024 年第5 期(總第17期)143

【原文】The article examines the disintegration processes that are a consequence of the collapse of theRussian hegemonic order in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s disagreement with the established systemof

international order and US hegemony was one of the reasons for Russia’s military invasion of UkraineinFebruary 2022. On the one hand, the invasion in Ukraine is Russia’s attempt to hold on to the hegemonicorder and to form a geopolitical bloc with potential allies, including China, Iran and India, which also opposethe global hegemony of the United States. On the other, the invasion in Ukraine is a redefinition of its owngeopolitical ambitions, which Russia uses to constitute an alternative hegemonic order of the global level. 3. 三海倡議的地緣政治作用:麥金德“中間層”戰(zhàn)略的重演(The Geopolitical Roleof theThree Seas Initiative: Mackinder’s ‘Middle Tier’ Strategy Redux)Paolo Pizzolo,雅蓋隆大學(xué)國際關(guān)系學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】三海倡議(TSI)是波羅的海、黑海和亞得里亞海國家組成的論壇。1919 年,英國地緣政治理論先驅(qū)哈爾福德·麥金德(Halford J. Mackinder)提出“中間層”戰(zhàn)略,與兩次世界大戰(zhàn)期間波蘭的Intermarium 項(xiàng)目相呼應(yīng)。如今,美國視三海倡議為“新歐洲”的資產(chǎn),親大西洋主義的中東歐國家則將其視為建立跨大西洋聯(lián)系的工具。本文認(rèn)為,三海倡議復(fù)興了麥金德“中間層”戰(zhàn)略。與一個(gè)世紀(jì)前英法與“中間層”國家結(jié)盟以抗衡德國和俄羅斯的方式類似,如今美國與“新歐洲”在三海倡議中更緊密的聯(lián)系強(qiáng)化了北約相對(duì)于歐盟的地位,重新平衡了歐盟西部的行為體并制衡了俄羅斯的利益。【原文】The Three Seas Initiative(TSI)is a forum of Baltic, Black and Adriatic sea countries. In1919, pioneering British geopolitical theorist Halford J. Mackinder promoted a ‘Middle Tier’ strategy, that

paralleled the Polish interwar ‘Intermarium’ project. Today, the United States views the TSI as an asset inthe ‘New Europe’, while pro-Atlanticist Central and Eastern European states see it as a tool tobuildtransatlantic connections. This article suggests that the TSI revives Mackinder’s ‘Middle Tier’ strategy. Similar to how the Franco–British bonds with the ‘Middle Tier’ states sought to offset Germany andRussiaa century ago, today stronger ties between the US and the ‘New Europe’ within the TSI strengthentheposition of NATO vis-à-vis the EU, rebalance Western EU actors and counter Russian interests. 4. “氣候在變化,總統(tǒng)卻沒有變化”:俄羅斯的“非政治性”氣候行動(dòng)主義(‘The ClimateIs Changing and the President Is Not’:‘Non-Political’ Climate Activismin Russia)Svetlana Erpyleva,不來梅大學(xué)東歐研究中心、公共社會(huì)學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)室研究員

Eeva Luhtakallio,赫爾辛基大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)學(xué)院教授

【摘要】本文以俄羅斯的“未來星期五”運(yùn)動(dòng)為例,探討在日益增長的威權(quán)主義下,當(dāng)“政治”問題不可避免時(shí),“公民”社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)如何“避開政治”。雖然活動(dòng)人士避免表達(dá)“政治”要求以免遭到政權(quán)鎮(zhèn)壓,但他們逐漸認(rèn)識(shí)到,如果不解決更廣泛的“政治”問題,他們的目標(biāo)就無法實(shí)現(xiàn)。通過對(duì)氣候活動(dòng)人士的深入訪談分析,本文確定了三種“避免政治”的框架,每種框架都以特定的方式將氣候變化與更廣泛的政治問題相聯(lián)系。

第150頁

144

【原文】Using the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement in Russia as a case study, this article asks how‘civil’ society movements ‘a(chǎn)void politics’ under growing authoritarianism when dealing with ‘politics’ becomesunavoidable. While activists refrain from voicing ‘political’ demands to avoid repression by the regime, theycome to understand that their goals are unachievable unless they address broader ‘political’ issues. Basedonan analysis of in-depth interviews with climate activists, we identify three frames of ‘a(chǎn)voiding politics’. Eachframe relates climate change with broader political issues in a specific way. 5. 同意的剖析:俄羅斯國家與曾被驅(qū)逐出境的民族(An Anatomy of Consent: TheStateand Formerly Deported Peoples in Russia)

Alexander Osipov,捷克國際種族和語言多樣性研究中心

【摘要】本文探討了 20 世紀(jì) 90 年代俄羅斯代表被驅(qū)逐民族的組織的衰落。盡管政治和法律條件有利,且全國上下對(duì)需要為斯大林時(shí)代種族驅(qū)逐的受害者提供補(bǔ)償達(dá)成了廣泛共識(shí),這些組織大多停止或改變了其活動(dòng),既沒有實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo),也沒有受到政府的壓力或恐嚇。我們通過研究這些組織面臨的機(jī)會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)以及國家和非國家行為者共同的議程設(shè)置特征來解釋這一矛盾現(xiàn)象。

【原文】The article considers the decline of the organisations representing formerly deported ethnicities inRussia in the 1990s. Despite the favourable political and legal conditions and the broad national consensuson the need to provide redress to the victims of ethnic deportations in the Stalinist era, these organisationslargely ceased or changed their activities without having achieved their goals and without experiencinggovernmental pressure or intimidation. This paradox will be explained by an examination of the structureof

opportunities faced by these organisations and the features of agenda-setting shared by state and non-stateactors. 6. 抗議恰怕耶夫斯克的破壞:蘇聯(lián)末期城市的綠色政治(Protesting DestructioninChapaevsk: Green Politics in a Late Soviet City)

Alexander Herbert,伍斯特理工學(xué)院文理學(xué)部助理教授

【摘要】本項(xiàng)省級(jí)案例研究展示了蘇聯(lián)末期因環(huán)境焦慮而動(dòng)員起來的政治運(yùn)動(dòng)的多樣性,尤其是在莫斯科以外的地區(qū)。通過關(guān)注倡導(dǎo)生態(tài)社會(huì)主義的綠色政治的興起,該分析響應(yīng)了人類世學(xué)者的呼吁,探索充滿政治可能性的蘇聯(lián)末期的俄羅斯。在那里,環(huán)境主義政治成為一股變革的力量。鑒于綠色運(yùn)動(dòng)在蘇聯(lián)解體前取得的成功,1990 年后綠色運(yùn)動(dòng)的失敗為了解蘇聯(lián)解體前俄羅斯各省綠色政治的有效性提供了新的視角。

【 原 文 】 This provincial case study demonstrates the diversity of political movements mobilisedbyenvironmental anxieties, particularly outside of Moscow, in the final years of Soviet Russia. By focusingonthe emergence of green politics that promoted ecosocialism, the analysis takes up the call proposedbyscholars of the Anthropocene by exploring late Soviet Russia as a place of political possibilities, whereenvironmentalism-as-politics became a force for change. The failure of the green movement after 1990, in

百萬用戶使用云展網(wǎng)進(jìn)行翻頁的電子書制作,只要您有文檔,即可一鍵上傳,自動(dòng)生成鏈接和二維碼(獨(dú)立電子書),支持分享到微信和網(wǎng)站!
收藏
轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)
下載
免費(fèi)制作
其他案例
更多案例
免費(fèi)制作
x
{{item.desc}}
下載
{{item.title}}
{{toast}}