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our argument, we introduce an original data set of 2,685 foreign policy deliberations between US presidentsand their advisers from 1947 to 1988. Applying a novel machine learning approach to estimatethehawkishness of 1,134 Cold War–era foreign policy decision makers, we show that adviser-level hawkishnessaffects both the counsel that advisers provide in deliberations and the decisions leaders make: conflictual

policy choices grow more likely as hawks increasingly dominate the debate, even when accountingfor

leader dispositions. The theory and findings enrich our understanding of international conflict bydemonstrating how advisers’ dispositions, which aggregate through the counsel advisers provide,

systematically shape foreign policy behavior.

2. 秩序 的底 層： 國際 秩序 建構(gòu) 中的 種族 （ The Underside of Order: Race intheConstitution of International Order）

Owen R. Brown，斯克里普斯學(xué)院政治系全球政治客座助理教授

【摘要】雖然越來越多的人認識到種族在塑造全球政治中的作用，但國際秩序的構(gòu)建和運作與種族的糾纏程度仍未得到充分探究。本文通過理論化種族和國際秩序之間的構(gòu)成聯(lián)系，展示如何將二者視為相互交織的，為理解國際秩序的構(gòu)建和運作中種族與種族化的重要性提供了理論支持。首先，本文將國際秩序和種族的概念化，其中種族的核心在于調(diào)控與規(guī)范化的過程中。其次，將二者結(jié)合起來，指出種族應(yīng)被視為一種秩序形式，其作用是在各種空間和背景下再生歷史性的等級和統(tǒng)治形式。第三，通過概念化和歷史化種族化和種族化的國際秩序的一些關(guān)鍵特征，尤其是殖民性、種族國家和種族資本主義，以此說明這一秩序的持久性。將種族置于國際秩序研究的中心位置，可以幫助我們更好地理解種族化的等級和種族化的不平等如何在現(xiàn)實中持續(xù)存在，并通過國際秩序的結(jié)構(gòu)和實踐得到再生產(chǎn)?！驹摹縒hile there is increasing recognition of the role of race in shaping global politics, the extent towhich the construction and operation of international order is entangled with race remains underexplored. Inthis article, I argue for the centrality of race and racialization in understanding the constitutionof

international order by theorizing the constitutive connections between race and international order andshowing how the two can be examined as intertwined. I do this, first, by articulating conceptualizations of

both international order and race that center on processes of regulation and regularization. Second, I bringthese together to suggest that race be understood as a form of order that functions to reproduce a historicallyemergent form of hierarchy and domination across a range of spaces and contexts. Third, I operationalizethese conceptualizations by outlining and historicizing some of the key features of this racializedandracializing international order, specifically coloniality, the racial state, and racial capitalism, and therebyillustrate important aspects of the persistence of this order. Centering race in the study of international order,

I suggest, helps us better understand how racializing hierarchies and racialized inequalities persist inthepresent and are reproduced through structures and practices of international order.

3. 移民態(tài)度的經(jīng)濟決定因素：來自歐洲的企業(yè)層面證據(jù)（Economic DeterminantsofAttitudes Toward Migration: Firm-level Evidence from Europe）

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Leonardo Baccini，麥吉爾大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

Magnus Lodefalk，厄勒布魯大學(xué)商學(xué)院副教授與高級講師

Radka Sabolová，厄勒布魯大學(xué)商學(xué)院博士后研究員

【摘要】移民的分配后果是什么？它們?nèi)绾斡绊憣σ泼竦膽B(tài)度？在本文中，我們利用了前利比亞獨裁者穆阿邁爾·卡扎菲被趕下臺后產(chǎn)生的自然實驗，這導(dǎo)致了非洲國家經(jīng)濟移民史無前例地涌入歐洲。低技能勞動力的激增使低生產(chǎn)率企業(yè)受益，因為它們降低了生產(chǎn)成本并擴大了勞動力供應(yīng)。采用三重差異設(shè)計，我們記錄了西歐地區(qū)對移民的態(tài)度變得更加積極，因為西歐地區(qū)有大量移民和低生產(chǎn)率企業(yè)。來自瑞典的證據(jù)提供了精細的地理數(shù)據(jù)，證實了這些發(fā)現(xiàn)。然后，我們測試了這種態(tài)度轉(zhuǎn)變的經(jīng)濟微觀基礎(chǔ)。我們表明，在移民流量較大的地區(qū)，低技能勞動力供應(yīng)的激增使低生產(chǎn)率企業(yè)的盈利能力提高得更多。我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何證據(jù)表明移民惡化了當(dāng)?shù)厝说膭趧恿κ袌鰻顩r?！驹摹縒hat are the distributional consequences of migration, and how do they affect attitudes towardmigration? In this paper we leverage a natural experiment generated by the ousting of former Libyan dictator

Muammar Gaddafi, which created an unprecedented influx of economic migrants from African countries toEurope. This surge of low-skilled labor benefited low-productivity firms by lowering their productioncostsand expanding their labor supply. Employing a triple difference-in-differences design, we document that

attitudes toward migration became more positive in Western European regions with large shares of migrantsand low-productivity firms. Evidence from Sweden, which provides finely grained geographical data,

confirms these findings. We then test the economic microfoundations of this attitudinal shift. We showthat

the surge in the supply of low-skilled labor increased the profitability of low-productivity firms moreinareas that experienced larger migration flows. We find no evidence that migration worsened natives’ labor

market conditions.

4. “那…又怎么說”主義外交與美國外交政策態(tài)度（The Diplomacy of Whataboutismand US Foreign Policy Attitudes）

Wilfred M. Chow，香港大學(xué)政治與公共行政學(xué)系助理教授和寧波諾丁漢大學(xué)國際研究學(xué)院助理教授Dov H. Levin，香港大學(xué)政治與公共行政學(xué)系教授

【摘要】 “那…又怎么說”主義在全球事務(wù)中有效嗎？當(dāng)國家面臨國際批評時，它們通常會以“那…又怎么說”主義作為回應(yīng)：指責(zé)批評者也犯有類似的錯誤。盡管“那…又怎么說”主義在政策討論中很普遍，但它仍然是一種研究不足的影響策略。本研究調(diào)查了國家如何利用“那…又怎么說”主義來塑造美國公眾對各種國際問題的看法。我們通過調(diào)查實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)，“那…又怎么說”主義通過減少公眾對美國立場的認可和對懲罰行動的支持來減輕批評的負面影響。引用類似、近期不當(dāng)行為的“那…又怎么說”主義批評更能塑造輿論。然而，“那…又怎么說”主義國家的身份并不顯著影響這一策略的有效性。美國的反擊信息往往無法削弱“那…又怎么說”主義的影響。這些結(jié)果表明，“那…又怎么說”主義可以成為國際關(guān)系中一種強有力的修辭工具，值得國際關(guān)系學(xué)者給予更多關(guān)注?！驹摹緿oes whataboutism work in global affairs? When states face international criticism, theyoftenrespond with whataboutism: accusing their critics of similar faults. Despite its prevalence in policy

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discussions, whataboutism remains an understudied influence strategy. This study investigates howstatesuse whataboutism to shape American public opinion across various international issues. We find, usingsurvey experiments, that whataboutism mitigates the negative impacts of criticism by reducing publicapproval of US positions and backing for punitive actions. Whataboutist critiques referencing similar, recent

misdeeds have more power to shape opinions. However, the identity of the whataboutist state does not

significantly affect effectiveness. US counter-messaging often fails to diminish the effects of whataboutism.

These results show that whataboutism can be a potent rhetorical tool in international relations andthat it

warrants greater attention from international relations scholars.

5. 沖突期間討好平民：來自阿富汗塔利班法官的證據(jù)（Courting Civilians DuringConflict: Evidence from Taliban Judges in Afghanistan）

Donald Grasse，芝加哥大學(xué)哈里斯公共政策學(xué)院客座講師

Renard Sexton，埃默里大學(xué)政治學(xué)系的助理教授

Austin Wright，芝加哥大學(xué)哈里斯公共政策學(xué)院助理教授

【摘要】叛軍經(jīng)常提供公共服務(wù)，尤其是法律服務(wù)，但此類服務(wù)的后果尚不清楚。我們認為，叛軍法庭可以通過增加叛亂的合法性、在叛軍統(tǒng)治中創(chuàng)造既得利益或使叛軍能夠脅迫平民，來增加平民對叛亂的支持并增強攻擊能力。我們使用軌跡平衡設(shè)計，利用跨地區(qū)和隨時間變化的與塔利班法庭接觸的差異，來研究塔利班司法系統(tǒng)的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，叛軍法庭減少了平民對政府的支持，增加了對塔利班的支持，并且與更多的襲擊和更多的聯(lián)軍傷亡有關(guān)。通過探索機制，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)法庭解決了平民之間的重大人際糾紛，但也促進了叛亂分子對平民的更多恐嚇，而且公眾輿論的變化不太可能僅僅由社會期望偏見驅(qū)動。我們的研究結(jié)果有助于解釋叛軍法庭的邏輯，并凸顯了弱國中戰(zhàn)爭與建制機構(gòu)發(fā)展之間的復(fù)雜相互作用。

【原文】Rebels regularly provide public services, especially legal services, but the consequences of suchprograms are unclear. We argue that rebel courts can boost civilian support for insurgency and augment

attack capacity by increasing the legitimacy of the rebellion, creating a vested interest in rebel rule, or

enabling rebel coercion of the civilian population. We study the impact of the Taliban's judiciarybyleveraging cross-district and over-time variation in exposure to Taliban courts using a trajectory-balancingdesign. We find that rebel courts reduced civilian support for the government and increased it for the Taliban,

and were associated with more attacks and more coalition casualties. Exploring mechanisms, we findthat

courts resolved major interpersonal disputes between civilians but also facilitated more insurgent

intimidation of civilians, and that changes in public opinion are unlikely to have been driven solely bysocial

desirability bias. Our findings help explain the logic of rebel courts and highlight the complex interactionsbetween warfare and institutional development in weak states.

6. 初步參證是否能增加公眾對歐洲法律的支持？來自德國的實驗證據(jù)（Do PreliminaryReferences Increase Public Support for European Law? Experimental Evidencefrom

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Germany）

Sivaram Cheruvu，德克薩斯大學(xué)達拉斯分校經(jīng)濟，政治與政策科學(xué)學(xué)院的政治學(xué)助理教授Jay N. Krehbiel，西弗吉尼亞大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】長期以來，關(guān)于歐盟及其法律體系成功擴張和鞏固的解釋一直強調(diào)國內(nèi)法院向歐洲法院提交初步參證的重要性。許多此類理論解釋的關(guān)鍵在于，國內(nèi)法院比歐洲法院更有能力強制各國政府遵守歐盟法律。我們將比較司法政治文獻中的見解整合到歐盟初步參證制度的背景下，為這一說法提供了理論和實證基礎(chǔ)，認為將國內(nèi)法院納入歐盟法律程序可增強公眾對歐盟法律廣泛司法解釋的支持。然而，我們繼續(xù)指出，這種合法性的轉(zhuǎn)移取決于公民對國家和歐洲法院的看法。我們用在德國進行的一項預(yù)先注冊的調(diào)查實驗的證據(jù)來支持我們的論點。

【原文】Explanations for the successful expansion and consolidation of the European Union and its legal

system have long emphasized the importance of domestic courts’ sending preliminary references totheCourt of Justice. Key to many of these theoretical accounts is the claim that domestic courts are better

equipped than the Court of Justice to compel national governments to comply with EUlaw. Integratinginsights from the comparative judicial politics literature into the context of the EU's preliminary referencessystem, we provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim by arguing that incorporatingdomestic courts into the EU legal process enhances public support for expansive judicial interpretations of

EU law. We go on to argue, however, that this transfer of legitimacy depends on citizens’ views of thenational and European courts. We support our argument with evidence from a preregistered surveyexperiment fielded in Germany.

【編譯：朱嘉成】【責(zé)任編輯：封欣怡】

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《沖突解決雜志》（Journal of Conflict Resolution）Journal of Conflict Resolution， Vol.68, No.5, May 2024

1. 失敗國家或弱國是否有利于當(dāng)?shù)乜植澜M織的生存？（Do Failed or Weak States FavorResident Terrorist Groups’ Survival?）

Khusrav Gaibulloev，沙迦美國大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院經(jīng)濟系教授

James A. Piazza，賓夕法尼亞州立大學(xué)政治學(xué)系教授

Todd Sandler，德克薩斯大學(xué)達拉斯分校經(jīng)濟、政治與政策科學(xué)學(xué)院名譽教授【摘要】通過采用兩種不同的國家失敗度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，我們研究了國家的弱點如何影響本土恐怖組織的生存。從理論上講，國家失敗有利于本土恐怖組織的生存，而國家領(lǐng)土控制則促進本土恐怖組織的消亡，直到達到某個控制閾值。從實證上講，通過考慮本土恐怖組織的生存前景，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一個國家脆弱性與其對恐怖主義的控制之間存在著穩(wěn)固的負相關(guān)關(guān)系。這種關(guān)系經(jīng)受住了一系列穩(wěn)固性測試的檢驗，例如，替代估計和樣本。我們應(yīng)用了一個旨在解決內(nèi)生性問題的工具。特別是，我們?yōu)槭〉膰以O(shè)計的新工具包括自然災(zāi)害和族群分化的交互作用。隨著一個國家的領(lǐng)土控制百分比的增加，本土恐怖組織更傾向于結(jié)束，直到達到某個控制百分比閾值。我們的分析可以通過利用這里識別的促進失敗國家中本土組織終結(jié)的細致理論決定因素來指導(dǎo)反恐政策。

【原文】Employing two alternative measures of state failure, we investigate how state weakness influencesresident terrorist groups’ survival. Theoretically, state failure favors resident terrorist groups’ survival, whilestate territorial control fosters resident groups’ termination until some control threshold. Empirically, weuncover a robust negative relationship between a country’s weakness and its control of terrorismthroughthelens of the resident terrorist groups’ survival prospects. The discovered relationship withstands a host of

robustness tests – e.g., alternative estimates and samples. We apply an instrument designed to addressendogeneity concerns. In particular, our novel instrument for failed states consists of the interaction betweennatural disasters and ethnic fractionalization. As a state’s percentage of territorial control increases, resident

terrorist groups are more prone to ending until some threshold control percent. Our analysis canguide《沖突解決雜志》（Journal of Conflict Resolution）是一份關(guān)于人類沖突的社會科學(xué)研究和理論的跨學(xué)科雜志。該雜志主要關(guān)注國際沖突，但也探討了各種國家、群體間和人際沖突。該期刊 2022 年的影響因子為 3.1，在國際關(guān)系的96 種期刊中排名第 19。

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counterterrorism policy by exploiting the nuanced theoretical determinants identified here that foster resident

groups’ termination in failing states.

2. 不對稱時代的核先發(fā)制人：博弈論方法（Deliberate Nuclear First Use in anEraof

Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach）

Even Hellan Larsen，奧胡斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士研究員

【摘要】大多數(shù)核二元組都具有一定程度的核武器與常規(guī)武器不對稱特征。本文認為，這些不對稱創(chuàng)造了一種環(huán)境，在這種環(huán)境中，蓄意首先使用核武器 (DNFU) 可能是合理的。由于普遍依賴相互保證毀滅 (MAD) 的假設(shè)，這種可能性在核升級的正式文獻中已被拋棄。本文建立了一個正式模型，用于追蹤兩種類型的 DNFU 如何以及在何種情況下是合理的。首先，核不平衡和反擊技術(shù)的進步為強勢參與者創(chuàng)造了限制損害的動機。其次，常規(guī)不對稱為較弱的參與者強制使用核武器創(chuàng)造了動機。此外，本文還指出，這些不對稱條件是重要且非常不同的核二元組的一個相關(guān)特征：朝鮮-美國、巴基斯坦-印度和俄羅斯-美國。因此，該模型展示了當(dāng)今核格局中 DNFU 的潛在核心驅(qū)動因素。【原文】Most nuclear dyads are characterized by some degree of nuclear and conventional asymmetry. Thispaper argues that these asymmetries create an environment in which deliberate nuclear first use (DNFU) canbe rational. This possibility has been discarded in the formal literature on nuclear escalation because of thecommon reliance on the assumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD). This paper develops a formal

model that traces how and under what circumstances two types of DNFU are rational. First, nuclear

imbalances and advancements in counterforce technologies create a damage limitation incentive for a strongactor. Second, conventional asymmetry creates an incentive for the coercive use of nuclear weapons bytheweaker player. Moreover, this paper illustrates that these asymmetric conditions are a relevant characteristicin important and very different nuclear dyads: DPRK–US, Pakistan–India, and Russia–US. Thus, the model

demonstrates the potential core drivers of DNFU in today’s nuclear landscape.

3. 安全合作何時增加對外援助分配？（When Does Security Cooperation IncreaseForeign Aid Allocation?）

Qi Zhang，喬治城大學(xué)政治管理系博士候選人

【摘要】許多學(xué)者發(fā)現(xiàn)安全合作會增加盟國從大國獲得的外援，但其他研究表明，聯(lián)盟也存在負面影響，并且其條款會隨著時間而變化。本文認為，捐助國的安全環(huán)境影響其參與安全合作，并在隨后影響對盟國的外援分配。當(dāng)安全環(huán)境具有競爭性時，捐助國將集中資源加強與盟國的聯(lián)系。相反，當(dāng)環(huán)境對捐助國有利時，捐助國可以利用安全合作作為籌碼，從盟國獲得政策讓步，從而減少自身的外援支出。本文分析了三大捐助國的援助分配以及 72 個正式防務(wù)條約和 70 個雙邊防務(wù)合作協(xié)議，發(fā)現(xiàn)有利的安全環(huán)境可使捐助國對其盟國的經(jīng)濟貢獻減少 19％。

【原文】While many scholars find that security cooperation increases the foreign aid that allies receive froma major power, other studies show that an alliance also has negative effect and its terms can change over

time. This article argues that a donor’s security environment impacts its participation in security cooperation

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and, subsequently, foreign aid allocation to allies. When the security environment is competitive, a donor

will concentrate its resources on strengthening its ties with allies. In contrast, when the environment isfavorable to a donor, it can use security cooperation as leverage to obtain policy concessions fromallies,

thus reducing its own foreign aid expenditures. This paper analyzes the aid allocation of three major power

donors as well as 72 formal defense pacts and 70 bilateral defense cooperation agreements, and it finds that afavorable security environment allows a donor to reduce its economic contribution to its allies by 19 percent.

4. 暴力與兒童教育：來自行政數(shù)據(jù)的證據(jù)（Violence and Children’s Education: EvidenceFrom Administrative Data）

Valentina Duque，美國大學(xué)公共事務(wù)與政策學(xué)院助理教授

【摘要】本文利用 1980 年代哥倫比亞暴力升級的現(xiàn)象，這種暴力升級與毒品集團的出現(xiàn)有關(guān)，并且使用行政數(shù)據(jù)以研究關(guān)于暴力事件對兒童的教育成就和學(xué)術(shù)成績的影響。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，早年童年時期較高的兇殺率與較高的輟學(xué)概率有關(guān)，而在完成高中教育的條件下，國家高中畢業(yè)考試的成績較低。結(jié)果在幾個偽造測試中均穩(wěn)健，且對潛在的選擇偏差來源進行了分析。作者提供了支持性證據(jù)，表明胎兒期、兒童期和青少年期的健康結(jié)果變化是重要的潛在機制。

【原文】This paper exploits the sharp escalation of violence in Colombia in the 1980s associated withtheemergence of drug cartels to provide novel evidence on the long-run effects of violence exposure throughout

the life-course, on children’s educational attainment and academic achievement using administrative data. I

find that, a higher homicide rate in early-childhood is associated with a higher probability of school dropout

and conditional on completing high school, lower scores on a national end-of-high school exam. Results arerobust to several falsification tests, and analyses of potential sources of selection bias. I provide supportiveevidence that changes in fetal, child, and adolescent health outcomes are important potential mechanisms.

5. 反叛、留守還是辭職？美國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)時軍事精英的決策（Rebel, Remain, or Resign?Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War）Peter B. White，奧本大學(xué)政治學(xué)系的助理教授

【摘要】內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的一個關(guān)鍵因素是軍事分裂。然而，我們對軍事精英為何參加內(nèi)戰(zhàn)以及為哪一方而戰(zhàn)的理解有限。在本文中，作者提出了一種有關(guān)軍事精英經(jīng)濟和職業(yè)動機的理論。作者以美國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中西點軍校畢業(yè)生為例來檢驗這一理論。作者認為，除了家鄉(xiāng)之外，經(jīng)濟和職業(yè)利益也是西點軍校畢業(yè)生的主要影響因素。與南方經(jīng)濟作物有聯(lián)系的畢業(yè)生不太可能為聯(lián)邦而戰(zhàn)，而更有可能為邦聯(lián)而戰(zhàn)。排名較高的畢業(yè)生更有可能為雙方而戰(zhàn)，因為他們更有能力競爭晉升。作者用一個包含1000 多名西點軍校畢業(yè)生戰(zhàn)時效忠和內(nèi)戰(zhàn)前職業(yè)生涯的新數(shù)據(jù)集來檢驗這一論點，并找到了支持我預(yù)期的有力證據(jù)?！驹摹緼 critical element in civil wars is military fragmentation. Yet, we have a limited understandingof

why military elites fight in civil wars and on what side. In this article I develop a theory of the economicandprofessional motivations of military elites. I test this theory using the case of West Point graduates intheAmerican Civil War. I argue that in addition to home state, economic and professional interests were a major

influence on West Pointers. Graduates with connections to Southern cash crops were less likely to fight for

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the Union and more likely to fight for the Confederacy. Higher ranking graduates were more likely tofight

for both sides, as they were better positioned to compete for promotion. I test this argument usinga newdataset of more than 1000 West Point graduates’ wartime allegiances and antebellum careers and findstrongevidence in support of my expectations.

6. 警察軍事化是否會增加鎮(zhèn)壓？（Does Police Militarization Increase Repression?）Martin Stavro，坦帕大學(xué)政治學(xué)系本科生

Ryan M. Welch，坦帕大學(xué)政治學(xué)系助理教授。

【摘要】警察的軍事化是否影響政府使用鎮(zhèn)壓手段？盡管比較研究檢查了警察的軍事化、暴力、人權(quán)侵犯和酷刑，但它并沒有將軍事化的警察納入現(xiàn)有的鎮(zhèn)壓理論中。本文將警察軍事化與鎮(zhèn)壓聯(lián)系起來，認為警察軍事化增加了警察對威脅的感知以及他們的強制能力，從而增加了他們鎮(zhèn)壓的意愿。因此，我們假設(shè)警察的軍事化會增加鎮(zhèn)壓。為了評估這一理論，我們使用現(xiàn)有的涵蓋1994 年到2010 年102個國家的數(shù)據(jù)集進行了一項國際分析。通過運用幾種統(tǒng)計模型，數(shù)據(jù)支持了警察軍事化增加了政府鎮(zhèn)壓的可能性的結(jié)論，特別是通過非法殺害和酷刑。除了強調(diào)警察軍事化政策的一個后果外，這些發(fā)現(xiàn)還指出警察軍事化是跨國模型中鎮(zhèn)壓和人權(quán)研究中一個重要的遺漏變量?！?原 文 】 Does police militarization influence government use of repression? While comparative workexamines police militarization, violence, human rights abuses, and torture, it does not integrate militarizedpolice within existing theories of repression. Connecting police militarization and repression, this articleargues that police militarization increases the police’s perception of threat as well as their coercive capacity,

thereby increasing their willingness to repress. As such, we hypothesize police militarization increasesrepression. To evaluate the theory, we conduct an international analysis using existing datasets covering102countries from 1994 to 2010. Employing several statistical models, the data supports the conclusionthat

police militarization increases the likelihood of government repression, specifically through extrajudicial

killing and torture. Aside from highlighting a consequence of police militarization policy, the findings point

to police militarization as an important omitted variable in cross-national models of repression and humanrights.

7. 秘密警察組織和國家鎮(zhèn)壓（Secret Police Organizations and State Repression）Marius Mehrl，利茲大學(xué)政治與國際研究學(xué)院講師

Ioannis Choulis，埃塞克斯大學(xué)政府系博士候選人

【摘要】秘密警察通常被視為獨裁者鎮(zhèn)壓機制中的關(guān)鍵機構(gòu)。然而，我們?nèi)狈﹃P(guān)于秘密警察與鎮(zhèn)壓之間聯(lián)系的明確實證證據(jù)。相反，最近的研究表明，秘密警察提供的監(jiān)視減少了人身人權(quán)侵犯行為。本文重新審視了秘密警察與國家人身鎮(zhèn)壓之間的關(guān)系。我們確定了四種將這些變量聯(lián)系起來的機制，即威懾、目標(biāo)定位、組織實踐和機構(gòu)自我保護。這些機制對整體關(guān)系提供了截然不同的期望，但也對秘密警察何時可能（不）增加鎮(zhèn)壓提供了背景期望。為了檢驗這些期望，我們收集了有關(guān)秘密警察全球存在的數(shù)據(jù)。結(jié)果表明，秘密警察與人身鎮(zhèn)壓的增加有關(guān)，特別是當(dāng)他們必須樹立聲譽以威懾異見人

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士或存在多個競爭安全組織時。相比之下，歷史更悠久、更成熟的秘密警察或沒有機構(gòu)對手的秘密警察與人身鎮(zhèn)壓無關(guān)。

【原文】Secret police are generally viewed as key institutions in autocrats’ repression apparatus. However,

we lack clear empirical evidence on the link between secret police and repression. Instead, recent studiesindicate that the surveillance provided by secret police reduces physical human rights abuses. This paper

re-examines the relationship between secret police and physical state repression. We identifyfour

mechanisms linking these variables, deterrence, targeting, organizational practices, and institutional

self-preservation. These mechanisms provide contrasting expectations for the overall relationship but alsocontextual expectations on when secret police may (not) increase repression. To test these expectations, wecollect data on the global existence of secret police. Results indicate that secret police are associatedwithincreased physical repression, particularly when they must develop a reputation to deter dissidents or whenmultiple rival security organizations exist. In contrast, older, more established secret police or ones without

institutional rivals are not associated with physical repression.

8. 實現(xiàn)最低限度的威懾：戰(zhàn)略核武器運載能力的新二元數(shù)據(jù)集（Achieving MinimumDeterrence: A New Dyadic Dataset on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities）Kyungwon Suh，澳大利亞國立大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與國防研究中心講師，加州大學(xué)全球沖突與合作研究所技術(shù)與國際安全博士后研究員

【摘要】本文認為，現(xiàn)有的定量研究錯誤地認為，所有核國家都可以通過簡單地區(qū)分核國家和非核國家來對對手實施核毀滅。然而，這種做法并沒有捕捉到 1) 核國家擁有的運載能力、2) 部署的核運載系統(tǒng)的范圍以及 3) 核國家與其二元對應(yīng)方（對手）之間的地理距離的變化。與這種單一的核國家方法不同，作者提出了二元核射程方法，該方法使用一種新的二元特定國家戰(zhàn)略核運載能力測量方法。它使用有關(guān)每個核國家戰(zhàn)略核運載平臺、核作戰(zhàn)基地和國家首都的估計射程的信息來編碼核國家是否可以對特定對手發(fā)動核打擊。實證應(yīng)用表明，使用適當(dāng)?shù)暮四芰y量方法確實會顯著改變現(xiàn)有的核武器和國際沖突的經(jīng)驗知識。

【原文】This paper argues that existing quantitative studies mistakenly assume that all nuclear states canimpose nuclear destruction on opponents by simply distinguishing nuclear states fromnon-nuclear states.

This practice, however, does not capture variation in 1) nuclear states’ possession of delivery capabilities, 2)

the range of deployed nuclear delivery systems, and 3) the geographic distance between nuclear states andtheir dyadic counterparts. Instead of this monadic nuclear statehood approach, I propose the dyadic nuclear

reach approach, which uses a new dyad-specific measure of states’ strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It

codes whether a nuclear state can launch a nuclear strike against a given opponent by using the informationabout the estimated range of each nuclear state’s strategic nuclear delivery platforms, nuclear operationbases,

and states’ capital cities. An empirical application shows that using an appropriate measure of nuclear

capabilities does significantly alter existing empirical knowledge of nuclear weapons and international

conflict.

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【編譯：朱嘉成】【責(zé)任編輯：封欣怡】《世界政治》（World Politics）

World Politics，Vol.76, No.1, 2024

1. 移交權(quán)力以維持控制：權(quán)力下放作為西歐國家級選舉策略（Transferring PowertoMaintain Control: Decentralization as a National-Level Electoral Strategy in WesternEurope）

Bonnie M. Meguid，美國羅切斯特大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授

【摘要】為什么國家政府選擇將一些行政、政治和財政權(quán)力移交給地方當(dāng)局？本文提出并檢驗了一個以國家為中心的策略解釋：權(quán)力下放是一種有針對性的手段，通過在國家議會選舉中安撫具有威脅性的族群區(qū)域政黨的選民，來增強執(zhí)政黨在國家一級的選舉實力。對西歐國家次國家區(qū)域權(quán)力下放的統(tǒng)計分析證實，當(dāng)政府在立法過程中處于脆弱狀態(tài)時，執(zhí)政黨將額外的權(quán)力轉(zhuǎn)移到存在族群區(qū)域政黨威脅的地區(qū)。相反，如果一個政府不依賴于一個地區(qū)來維持對國家議會的控制，那么一個強大的族群區(qū)域?qū)κ值拇嬖诰筒粫偈拐ブ行幕?。本文的發(fā)現(xiàn)有助于解釋一個國家內(nèi)部不同地區(qū)不對稱的權(quán)力下放模式，以及為什么執(zhí)政黨將權(quán)力下放給不期望控制的次國家政府。

【原文】Why do national governments choose to transfer some of their administrative, political, andfiscal

powers to regional authorities? This article develops and tests a nationally focused strategic account:

decentralization is a targeted means to bolster a governing party's national-level electoral strengthbyappeasing the voters of threatening ethnoterritorial parties in national parliamentary elections. Statistical

analyses of decentralization across the subnational regions of Western European countries confirmthat

governing parties transfer additional competencies to regions in which an ethnoterritorial party threat exists,

when the government is legislatively vulnerable. In contrast, if a government is not dependent on a regionfor maintaining national parliamentary control, the presence of a strong ethnoterritorial opponent will not

motivate the government to decentralize. These findings help to explain patterns of asymmetrical

《世界政治》（World Politics）創(chuàng)刊于 1948 年，是享譽國際的政治科學(xué)季刊，內(nèi)容涵蓋國際關(guān)系和政治科學(xué)的各個領(lǐng)域，其主編是 Deborah J. Yashar。該期刊歡迎的投稿類型有具有理論和實證貢獻的研究類文章，以及有關(guān)國際關(guān)系和 比 較 政 治 問 題 的 評 論 性 文 章 。 2020 年 期 刊 影 響 因 子為3.444，在 94 種國際關(guān)系類期刊中位列第 18 名，在182 種政治科學(xué)類期刊中位列第 44 名。

2024 年第4 期（總第16期）105

decentralization across regions within a country and why governing parties decentralize competencies tosubnational governments that they do not expect to control.

2. 不平衡的國家：塑造泰國國家能力的中心和邊緣（The Uneven State: Center andPeriphery in Shaping State Capacity in Thailand）

Illan Nam，美國科爾蓋特大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授，蘭伯特研究所所長

【摘要】本文考察了國家向邊緣地區(qū)提供公共社會產(chǎn)品的不均衡能力。本文比較分析了泰國的公共衛(wèi)生部和教育部，這兩個機構(gòu)在過去 25 年中在服務(wù)農(nóng)村公民方面表現(xiàn)出明顯差異。本文將這些結(jié)果歸因于各機構(gòu)如何看待其農(nóng)村政策在應(yīng)對泰國安全威脅和經(jīng)濟增長戰(zhàn)略方面的重要性。這種看法在中央和地方官僚之間產(chǎn)生了截然不同的組織規(guī)范，激勵了能力建設(shè)。當(dāng)一個機構(gòu)的中央辦公室認為農(nóng)村政策對國家目標(biāo)至關(guān)重要時，就會制定規(guī)范，鼓勵地方機構(gòu)投資于滿足農(nóng)村需求。但是，當(dāng)一個機構(gòu)認為農(nóng)村政策在實現(xiàn)關(guān)鍵的國家目標(biāo)方面不那么緊迫時，情況就會相反。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，一個機構(gòu)在戰(zhàn)略上考慮農(nóng)村部門的方式會影響其在邊緣地區(qū)投資的決策，對國家能力和城鄉(xiāng)差距產(chǎn)生持久的影響?！驹摹縏his article examines the state's uneven capacity to deliver public social goods to the periphery. It

does so through a comparative analysis of two agencies in Thailand, the Ministry of Public Health andtheMinistry of Education, which have exhibited a marked disparity in serving rural citizens over the past

twenty-five years. The author traces these outcomes to a divergence in how the agencies perceivethesignificance of their rural policies in meeting Thailand's security threats and economic growth strategy. Thisperception produces contrasting organizational norms between central and local bureaucrats, which informsincentives for capacity-building. When an agency's central office believes that rural policy matterssignificantly for national goals, norms develop that encourage local agents to invest in serving rural needs.

But when an agency deems rural policy to be less urgent in meeting key national objectives, the converseensues. The article finds that how an agency strategically considers the rural sector influences its decisions toinvest in the periphery, with lasting consequences for state capacity and the rural-urban divide.

3. 政府支出和投票行為（Government Spending and Voting Behavior）Anselm Hager，德國柏林洪堡大學(xué)社會科學(xué)學(xué)院助理教授

Hanno Hilbig，美國加州大學(xué)戴維斯分校政治科學(xué)系助理教授

【摘要】政府在公共產(chǎn)品上的支出會影響公民的投票選擇嗎？一方面，先前的研究將選民定性為財政保守派，當(dāng)政府支出增加時，他們可能會轉(zhuǎn)向保守派政黨。另一方面，增加開支可能表明經(jīng)濟運行良好，這使得進步政黨成為一個更可行的選擇。為了在這兩種假設(shè)之間做出判斷，本文借鑒了一個自然實驗，該實驗產(chǎn)生了政府支出的外生變化。2011 年德國人口普查的中斷意味著一些城市的預(yù)算出現(xiàn)了意想不到的增長。通過使用斷點回歸設(shè)計，本文表明預(yù)算的增加和隨后的公共產(chǎn)品支出有利于左傾政黨，但對現(xiàn)任支持者沒有明顯的影響。為了分解因果關(guān)系，本文依靠面板證據(jù)，證明接受實驗的居民比沒有接受實驗的居民更看好他們的經(jīng)濟狀況，這導(dǎo)致前者支持進步政黨。

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【原文】Does government spending on public goods affect the vote choice of citizens? On one hand, prior

research has characterized voters as fiscal conservatives who may turn toward conservative parties whengovernment spending goes up. On the other hand, increased spending may signal that the economy is doingwell, which makes progressive parties a more viable option. To adjudicate between both hypotheses, thisarticle draws on a natural experiment, which created exogenous variation in government spending. Adiscontinuity in the 2011 German census meant that some municipalities saw an unforeseen increaseinbudgets. Using a regression discontinuity design, the authors show that the increase in budgets andsubsequent spending on public goods benefited left-leaning parties but had no detectable effect on incumbent

support. To parse out the causal channel, the authors rely on panel evidence and demonstrate that treatedresidents viewed their economic situation more favorably than did untreated residents, which led the former

to espouse progressive parties.

4. 當(dāng)民主帶來不安全時：政權(quán)更迭的政治遺產(chǎn)（When Democracy Brings Insecurity:The Political Legacies of Regime Change）

Hans Lueders，美國斯坦福大學(xué)胡佛研究所胡佛研究員，瑞典哥德堡大學(xué)治理和地方發(fā)展研究所研究員，斯坦福大學(xué)移民政策實驗室博士后

【摘要】一個國家民主化的環(huán)境可能對公民的政治態(tài)度產(chǎn)生持久的影響。為了闡述這一論點，本文將東德人對今天民主運作的滿意度與他們在德國統(tǒng)一期間的經(jīng)歷聯(lián)系起來：東德在經(jīng)濟極度不確定的條件下實現(xiàn)了民主化，這對經(jīng)濟評估如何與民主滿意度聯(lián)系起來產(chǎn)生了持久的影響。一項原創(chuàng)的調(diào)查實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)，對當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟不安全感的類似的經(jīng)歷對東德人的民主滿意度的影響要強于西德人。家庭面板數(shù)據(jù)顯示，這種影響在那些在轉(zhuǎn)型期間經(jīng)歷了更多經(jīng)濟困難的東德人中更為明顯。統(tǒng)一前對東德人的調(diào)查表明，在過渡之前，類似的模式并不存在。最后，跨國調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)更廣泛地證明了東歐人的類似模式。本文的發(fā)現(xiàn)通過強調(diào)權(quán)威主義崩潰的持久態(tài)度性影響，補充了現(xiàn)有的關(guān)于威權(quán)統(tǒng)治遺產(chǎn)的工作。【原文】The circumstances under which a country democratizes can have long-lasting consequences for

citizens' political attitudes. To develop this argument, the author links East Germans' satisfaction withthefunctioning of democracy today to their experiences during German reunification: East Germanydemocratized under conditions of extreme economic uncertainty, which has had enduring effects onhoweconomic evaluations are linked to democracy satisfaction. An original survey experiment finds that

qualitatively similar experiences of current economic insecurity have stronger effects on East thanWest

Germans' democracy satisfaction. Household panel data show that this effect is stronger among those East

Germans who experienced more economic hardship during the transition. Surveys of East Germans prior toreunification demonstrate that a similar pattern did not exist before the transition. Finally, cross-national

survey data document similar patterns among Eastern Europeans more broadly. These findings complement

existing work on the legacies of authoritarian rule by emphasizing the lasting attitudinal effects of

authoritarian breakdown.

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5. 制定原則：地方社會主義成就如何激發(fā)國家資產(chǎn)階級對非繳費型養(yǎng)老金的支持（ Laying Down The Principles: How Local Socialist Achievements SpurredNational

Bourgeois Support for Noncontributory Pensions）

Magnus B. Rasmussen，挪威東南大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授

Carl Henrik Knutsen，挪威奧斯陸大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】本文提出了一個地方嵌入福利國家發(fā)展的視角，以解釋相對弱小的國家政治行為體如何通過追求地方改革逐步塑造國家政策。本文通過使用市級代表份額、非繳費養(yǎng)老金改革數(shù)據(jù)、議會唱名投票和 20 世紀(jì)初挪威的檔案材料等實證材料來檢驗其論點。這些材料表明，在挪威采用國家計劃之前，幾個地方政府引入了非繳費養(yǎng)老金制度。本文首先展示了國家代表性不足但高度制度化的社會主義政黨是如何在地理上集中支持的情況下引入地方養(yǎng)老金制度的。隨著時間的推移，這些政黨因此塑造了國家改革的可能性空間，有效地將國家政策議程鎖定在社會主義者偏好的非繳費養(yǎng)老金制度當(dāng)中。來自擁有地方養(yǎng)老金地區(qū)的資產(chǎn)階級政客們以其選區(qū)的高額市政債務(wù)壓力為理由，最終支持并推動了國家層面的養(yǎng)老金改革。這種支持反過來又刺激了建立國家非繳費養(yǎng)老金制度所需的跨階層聯(lián)盟。【原文】The authors develop a perspective of locally embedded welfare state development to explainhowrelatively weak national political actors can, nonetheless, shape national policy over time by pursuinglocal

reforms. Empirically, the authors assess their argument by using municipality-level representative shares,

data on noncontributory pension reforms, roll-call votes from parliament, and archival material fromearlytwentieth-century Norway, in which several local governments introduced noncontributory old-age pensionsbefore Norway adopted a national scheme. The authors show, first, how nationally underrepresentedbut

highly institutionalized socialist parties with geographically concentrated support introduced local pensions.

Over time, these parties thus shaped the possibility space for national reform, effectively locking the national

policy agenda into a pension system preferred by the socialists—namely, noncontributory pensions. Citinghigh municipality-debt pressures in their constituencies, bourgeois politicians from districts withlocal

pensions eventually supported and promoted national-level pension reform. This support, in turn, spurredthecross-class alliance required to establish a national noncontributory pension system.

【編譯：林怡娉】【責(zé)任編輯：封欣怡】

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《國際關(guān)系》（International Relations）International Relations，Vol. 38, No. 2, 2024

1. 將國家利益與民粹主義機遇相結(jié)合：對歐洲極右翼的干預(yù)政治（Fitting national

interests with populist opportunities: intervention politics on the European radical right）Toby Greene，巴伊蘭大學(xué)政治研究系講師

【摘要】隨著歐洲極右翼政黨的影響力不斷擴大，外交和安全政策也越來越政治化，這些政黨越來越有可能影響各國關(guān)于國際事務(wù)的辯論。本文展示了極右翼反對黨如何根據(jù)這些困境在特定國家環(huán)境中所帶來的政治機遇的性質(zhì)，尋求利用圍繞軍事干預(yù)的政策困境。研究結(jié)果基于對法國、德國和英國的敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)干預(yù)辯論中國民陣線、德國選擇黨和英國獨立黨所做反應(yīng)的定性比較案例研究。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，不干預(yù)并不是極右翼政黨的絕對價值。雖然自由人道主義干預(yù)遭到一致反對，但以國家安全為由的干預(yù)，無論是打擊“圣戰(zhàn)”威脅還是防止失控的移民，都會引發(fā)一系列受國內(nèi)政治背景影響的反應(yīng)。然而，即使這些政黨支持干預(yù)選舉，他們的言論也側(cè)重于將問題納入其政治議程的民粹主義層面，尤其是攻擊主流對手的無能、口是心非或前后矛盾，以及未能保護國家主權(quán)和民族完整。【原文】As European radical right parties grow in influence, and as foreign and security policy becomesmore politicised, these parties have increasing potential to shape national debates on international affairs.

This paper shows how radical right opposition parties seek to exploit policy dilemmas surrounding militaryintervention according to the nature of the political opportunity these dilemmas present in specific national

settings. Its findings are based on qualitative comparative case studies of Front National, AfD and UKIPresponses to intervention debates surrounding the Syrian civil war in France, Germany and the UK. I findthat non-intervention is not an absolute value for radical right parties. Whilst liberal-humanitarianinterventions are uniformly rejected, interventions on national security grounds, whether to combat Jihadist

threats or prevent uncontrolled migration, prompt a range of responses shaped by the domestic political

context. Yet even where these parties back intervention in votes, their discourse focuses on fitting the issueto the populist dimensions of their political agenda, especially attacking mainstream rivals for incompetence,

duplicity or incoherence, and failing to protect the sovereignty and ethnic integrity of the nation.

《國際關(guān)系》（International Relations）是國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域的

頂尖期刊之一，由 SAGE 出版社與大衛(wèi)·戴維斯紀(jì)念研究所

（ David Davies Memorial Institute ） 聯(lián) 合 出 版 編 輯 ，

2021-2023 年影響因子為 1.6，SSCI 排名為 56/96。

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2. 歐盟對俄戰(zhàn)略的戰(zhàn)略文化與競爭愿景：靈活適應(yīng)、合作威懾和精準(zhǔn)對抗（Strategicculture and competing visions for the EU’s Russia strategy: flexible accommodation,

cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation）

Paul Silva II，賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)政治學(xué)博士

【摘要】本文分析了 2009 年至 2018 年期間歐盟成員國的國家安全戰(zhàn)略，并提出了歐盟成員國對俄羅斯采取的三種安全戰(zhàn)略——靈活適應(yīng)、合作威懾和有針對性的對抗。本文將戰(zhàn)略文化假設(shè)與現(xiàn)實主義和商業(yè)自由主義假設(shè)進行對比，以解釋歐盟成員國對俄羅斯安全戰(zhàn)略的變化。雖然現(xiàn)實主義的解釋會預(yù)測地理位置上靠近俄羅斯的歐盟成員國將擁有更多的對抗性安全戰(zhàn)略，但地理位置接近和對俄羅斯的對抗性安全戰(zhàn)略并不呈正相關(guān)。與俄羅斯的雙邊經(jīng)濟相互依存關(guān)系、歐盟成員國執(zhí)政聯(lián)盟中民粹主義政黨的存在以及歐盟成員國在冷戰(zhàn)期間的結(jié)盟或被占領(lǐng)國家地位也無法解釋歐盟成員國對俄羅斯的安全戰(zhàn)略。歐盟成員國對俄政策的差異，一種更為一致的解釋是圍繞相關(guān)國家的戰(zhàn)略文化。與更具歐洲主義觀念的國家相比，更具大西洋主義觀念的國家往往與俄羅斯發(fā)生更多對抗，無論它們與俄羅斯在地理上接近還是經(jīng)濟上相互依存。

【原文】This article analyzes the national security strategies of EU member states in the 2009–2018 period,

and conceptualizes three security strategies EU member states have adopted toward Russia – flexibleaccommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation. It tests strategic culture hypothesesagainst those of realism and commercial liberalism to explain the variation of EU member states’ securitystrategies toward Russia. While a realist explanation would predict EU member states geographicallyproximate to Russia would possess more confrontational security strategies, geographic proximityandconfrontational security strategies toward Russia are not positively correlated. Bilateral economicinterdependence with Russia, the presence of populist parties in EU member states governing coalitions, andEU member states’ alignment or status as an occupied state during the Cold War also do not explainEUmember states’ security strategies toward Russia. A more consistent explanation of the variance inEUmember states’ policy on Russia revolves around the strategic culture of the state in question. States withamore Atlanticist perspective tend to be more confrontation with Russia than their more Europeanist

counterparts, regardless of geographic proximity or economic interdependence with Russia.

3. “反恐戰(zhàn)爭”全球化？對 36 個國家的分析（Globalising the ‘war on terror’?Ananalysis of 36 countries）

Tobias Ide，默多克大學(xué)政治與國際關(guān)系高級講師

【摘要】反恐戰(zhàn)爭作為一種話語，認為恐怖主義是全球范圍內(nèi)的重大威脅，主要由伊斯蘭網(wǎng)絡(luò)所助長，需要國際社會作出強有力的回應(yīng)。這種話語對國內(nèi)和國際政治都產(chǎn)生了巨大影響。因此，大量研究分析了反恐戰(zhàn)爭話語所依據(jù)的假設(shè)和合法化政策。然而，現(xiàn)有的研究大多集中在一個或幾個案例上，主要是在全球北部。本文介紹了一個新數(shù)據(jù)集，其中包含 2003 年至 2014 年期間36 個國家（占世界人口的約 64%）學(xué)校教科書中的反恐戰(zhàn)爭話語信息?；诖藬?shù)據(jù)集，作者首次全面分析了反恐戰(zhàn)爭話語的全球傳播。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，反恐話語并沒有全球化，而主要局限于歐洲和北美的發(fā)達國家。因此，美國

110

的軟實力和恐怖主義話語的超全球化存在明顯的局限性?？植乐髁x強度、武裝沖突和獨裁政權(quán)等因素幾乎沒有預(yù)測能力。盡管受到挑戰(zhàn)的（獨裁）政權(quán)有明顯的動機去適應(yīng)反恐戰(zhàn)爭的話語，但情況仍然如此。與批判性安全和恐怖主義研究中的普遍假設(shè)相反，反恐戰(zhàn)爭話語幾乎與強調(diào)恐怖分子的非理性和仇恨或社會政治不滿的邊緣化無關(guān)。

【原文】The rise of populism in Western democracies creates presumed threats on liberal international order.

Although a number of scholarly works are dedicated to the populist challenge on liberal democracy, theanalysis of populism’s implications on the liberal order is limited. This paper deliberates on a concise reviewof the consequences of populism on the Western liberal order. In order to delineate the study, the articleisdevoted to the Western populism and its implications on liberal order. The paper, while analyzingthecomponents of liberal international order by drawing on the analytical framework of structural liberalism,

intends to claim that populism has adverse consequences on certain elements of the order than others.

However, the implication is not an inflection point for the Western liberal order. Furthermore, this paper alsoprovides some explanations behind the limitations of the populist threats to the Western liberal order. Themain argument to highlight is that populism is detrimental more to liberal democracy than to the liberal order

itself, and the Western liberal order has the capacity to withstand the tide of populism.

4. 選擇性人道主義者：區(qū)域和沖突認知如何推動國內(nèi)危機的軍事干預(yù)（Selectivehumanitarians: how region and conflict perception drive military interventionsinintrastate crises）

Sidita Kushi，布里奇沃特州立大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】為什么一些國內(nèi)暴力危機比其他危機更有可能引發(fā)人道主義軍事干預(yù)？各國似乎對一些國內(nèi)沖突（如科索沃）進行了強有力的干預(yù)，但在達爾富爾等更激烈的沖突中卻沒有采取類似的選擇。關(guān)于這種“選擇性差距”的研究大部分都集中在普遍規(guī)范或地緣政治利益上。然而，本文認為這些干預(yù)的選擇性是區(qū)域差異與沖突認知相互作用的產(chǎn)物。本文介紹了 1989 年至 2014 年期間近1000 次國內(nèi)武裝沖突的觀察結(jié)果，國際軍事反應(yīng)和其他方面反應(yīng)，以及反映軍事干預(yù)強度的干預(yù)指數(shù)。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，一旦國內(nèi)武裝沖突達到了人類苦難的臨界點，強國就會進行干預(yù)，這取決于沖突是否發(fā)生在西方勢力范圍內(nèi)，以及是否被稱為身份認同戰(zhàn)爭。西方國家沒有基于身份的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)認知，因此最有可能引發(fā)人道主義軍事干預(yù)。這些結(jié)論對于國際政治中規(guī)范和利益所起的作用（受地區(qū)影響）以及軍事干預(yù)作為一種政策選擇具有重要意義。

【原文】Why are some violent intrastate crises more likely to prompt humanitarian military interventionsthan others? States appear to intervene robustly in reaction to some internal conflicts, such as Kosovo, but

withhold similar options in more intense conflict, as in Darfur. Much of the research on this ‘selectivitygap’

focuses on universal norms or geopolitical interests. I, however, argue that the selectivity of theseinterventions is a product of regional variations interacting with conflict perceptions. This paper introducesadataset of almost 1000 observations of intrastate armed conflict between 1989 and 2014, pairedwithinternational military responses and non-responses, as well as an Intervention Index that accounts for theintensity of military interventions. I find that once a threshold of human suffering is met via the existenceof

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an internal armed conflict, powerful states will intervene depending on whether the conflict occurs intheWestern sphere of influence and whether it is denoted as an identity war. A Western region coupled withnoperceptions of identity-based civil war prompts the greatest odds of humanitarian military intervention. Suchconclusions carry implications on the role of norms and interests in international politics, as biased byregion,

and for military intervention as a policy choice.

5. 處理國際政治中的內(nèi)疚和恥辱（Dealing with guilt and shame in international politics）Lotem Bassan-Nygate，威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校政治學(xué)博士

Gadi Heimann，耶路撒冷希伯來大學(xué)國際關(guān)系教授

【摘要】國家和非國家行為者經(jīng)常試圖激起罪惡感和羞恥感等道德情感，以動員政治變革。然而，“點名羞辱”等策略往往效果不佳，這表明決策者介入違反規(guī)范時會采取盡量減少使用道德情感的方式。作者認為，在違反規(guī)范時，決策者通過應(yīng)對機制來處理罪惡感和羞恥感，這些機制使他們能夠推行與其道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)相悖的政策。本文將罪惡感和羞恥感概念化為兩種不同的現(xiàn)象，它們會引發(fā)不同的反應(yīng)。羞恥感更有可能引發(fā)否認和歪曲等不成熟的防御，而罪惡感則會激起更成熟的補償性反應(yīng)。通過研究以色列建國后第一個十年政治議程上的兩個關(guān)鍵問題，為這一理論提供了實證證據(jù)。本文使用來自三個不同政治論壇的一系列主要資料，分析了關(guān)于巴勒斯坦難民返回和以色列與西德賠償協(xié)議的政治辯論。

【原文】State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilizepolitical change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming’ are often ineffective, suggesting that policymakers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violatingnorms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allowthemto pursuepolicies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomenathat provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion,

while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theoryby examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel’s political agenda during the first decade of itsexistence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparationagreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political

forums.

【編譯：鄒梓軒】【責(zé)任編輯：封欣怡】

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《國際評論研究》（Review of International Studies）Review of International Studies， Vol. 50, No. 3, 2024

1. 展望：國際關(guān)系學(xué)的未來（On the horizon: The futures of IR）Martin Coward，英國倫敦瑪麗女王大學(xué)政治與國際關(guān)系學(xué)院教授、院長

Matthew Paterson，曼徹斯特大學(xué)國際政治學(xué)教授、主任

Richard Devetak，昆士蘭大學(xué)政治學(xué)與國際研究學(xué)院教授

Carolina Moulin，巴西米納斯聯(lián)邦大學(xué)經(jīng)濟科學(xué)系

Nisha Shah，渥太華大學(xué)政治研究系副教授

Maja Zehfuss，哥本哈根大學(xué)政治學(xué)系教授

Andreja Zevnik，曼徹斯特大學(xué)國際政治系講師

【摘要】本期特刊旨在紀(jì)念《國際研究評論》創(chuàng)刊 50 周年。自 1975 年以來，《國際研究評論》已出版了 200 多期，發(fā)表了 1300 多篇文章，并且在塑造國際關(guān)系（IR）學(xué)科方面發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用，引領(lǐng)或批判性地介入了許多重要辯論。為紀(jì)念創(chuàng)刊 50 周年，本期特刊將探討在未來50 年全球政治或?qū)⒚媾R的挑戰(zhàn)。不同于國際關(guān)系學(xué)常將目光轉(zhuǎn)向歷史根源，此次我們著眼于未來。在本導(dǎo)言中，我們首先概述了著眼未來的四種思維傳統(tǒng)：實證主義、現(xiàn)實主義預(yù)測；規(guī)劃、預(yù)測和情景構(gòu)建；對理想政治未來的烏托邦式夢想；以及積極政治中的前瞻性思維。從這些傳統(tǒng)中，我們了解到對未來的思考始終是對現(xiàn)在的反思。然后，我們在特刊文章中概述了四個主題：我們?nèi)绾嗡伎嘉磥恚咳绾嗡伎嫉蹏倪^去以及當(dāng)前持續(xù)存在的殖民化和種族化問題？技術(shù)變革將如何調(diào)解和產(chǎn)生地緣政治變革？社會生態(tài)危機，尤其是氣候變化，如何日益影響我們對全球政治未來的思考？總之，本次特刊提供了一組關(guān)于全球政治未來的多樣化、激勵性和發(fā)人深省的文章，既包括學(xué)科討論，也包括實證問題。【原文】This Special Issue celebrates the 50th anniversary of Review of International Studies. Since 1975,

the Review has published over 200 issues and over 1300 articles. The journal has played a key role inshaping the discipline of International Relations (IR), leading, or critically intervening in, key debates. Tocelebrate 50 years of Review of International Studies, we have curated a Special Issue examining thechallenges facing global politics for the next 50 years. IR has regularly turned its attention backwards《國際 研究評論》 （Review of International Studies）是由劍橋大學(xué)出版社代表英國國際研究協(xié)會出版且同行評審的國際關(guān)系學(xué)術(shù)期刊，其前身為 British Journal of International

Studies (1975 - 1980)。該期刊致力于反映全球政治的性質(zhì)變化和新興的政治挑戰(zhàn)，旨在為國際社會搭建一個可供辯論的平臺用以討論當(dāng)下緊迫的全球議題。過去五年綜合影響因子為 3。

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towards its historical origins. Instead, we look to the future. In this Introduction, we start by outliningfour

traditions of future-oriented thinking: positivist, realist prediction; planning, forecasting, andscenario-building; utopian dreams of an ideal political future; and prefigurative thinking in activist politics.

From these traditions, we learn that thinking about the future is always thinking about the present. We thenoutline four themes in the Special Issue articles: How do we think about the future at all? Howdo we thinkabout imperial pasts and the ongoing questions of colonization and racialization in the present? Howwill

technological change mediate and generates geopolitical change? How are socioecological crises, andinparticular climate change, increasingly shaping how we think about the future of global politics? Overall,

these provide us with a diverse, stimulating, and thought-provoking set of essays about the future of global

politics, as both discipline and set of empirical problems.

2. 未來只是另一個過去（The future is just another past）Oliver Kessler，埃爾福特大學(xué)國際關(guān)系教授

Halvard Leira，挪威國際事務(wù)研究所教授

【摘要】在面對未來前，國際研究需先深入了解自身的過去與現(xiàn)在。這一領(lǐng)域不僅在名稱上缺乏共識，更重要的是描述現(xiàn)象的關(guān)鍵概念在不斷變化：19 世紀(jì)（以來）產(chǎn)生的概念都有過改變，也沒有過去所設(shè)想的未來能真正預(yù)見當(dāng)下。舊概念被拋棄，新概念被采用，現(xiàn)有概念被修改。這意味著任何“未來學(xué)”研究都必須對概念變革保持開放態(tài)度，國際研究今后將面臨的主要挑戰(zhàn)之一是確保我們的概念工具箱與日新月異的世界保持一致。然而，直到最近，全球政治研究對概念變革的重要性都未給予足夠重視。因此，本文首先通過闡明國際領(lǐng)域過去與現(xiàn)在的主要概念變化，為納入概念變革提供了實證案例。接著，本文介紹了概念史及其為我們提供的分析工具，以更好理解概念變革，最后討論在思考全球政治的未來時如何應(yīng)對概念的發(fā)展。

【原文】Before International Studies can confront the future, it needs to get a better grip on its past andpresent. The discipline lacks agreement on both its own name and the name of its object of study. Moreimportantly, key concepts used to describe phenomena have changed continuously: no concept emerginginthe 19th century has remained untouched, no envisioned future of the past could have prepared us for thepresent. Old concepts have been discarded, new ones adopted, and existing ones modified. This implies that

any exercise in ‘futurology’ must necessarily come with an openness towards conceptual change, andthat akey challenge for International Studies going forward will consist in matching our conceptual toolboxtoanever-changing world. The importance of conceptual change has until recently been neglected in the studyof

global politics. Thus, in this paper we start by presenting the empirical case for incorporating conceptual

change by laying out key past and present conceptual changes in the international realm. We then moveonto a presentation of conceptual history and the tools it provides us for grasping conceptual change, beforediscussing how to tackle conceptual developments when thinking about the future of global politics.

3. 在“自我解體”中走向成熟（Coming of age within ‘implosion’）

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Luise Bendfeldt，烏普薩拉大學(xué)政府學(xué)系博士生

Emily Clifford，英國倫敦大學(xué)皇家霍洛威學(xué)院講師

Hannah Richards，卡迪夫大學(xué)政治與國際關(guān)系博士生

【摘要】在最近一篇文章中，瑪麗亞·埃里克森·巴茲與斯瓦蒂·帕拉夏探討了歐洲中心主義在批判性國際關(guān)系學(xué)中依然盛行的現(xiàn)象，揭示了“操控者視點”（master’s outlook）如何繼續(xù)阻礙全球政治的研究，最終助長了學(xué)科的紊亂甚至自我解體。本文基于對批判性國際關(guān)系學(xué)“自我解體”的設(shè)想，反思了本文作者——兩名全球政治學(xué)博士生和一名早期職業(yè)研究者對未來教學(xué)的期望。本文首先審視了作者自身在再現(xiàn)這門學(xué)科的西方中心主義時的共謀行為，并探討如何有效地利用這種不適感。進而考察了課堂激進性的潛力，以及共情與合作探究對全球政治學(xué)未來的必要性。本文倡導(dǎo)一種具有想象力、關(guān)聯(lián)性、復(fù)雜性和脆弱性的國際關(guān)系學(xué)，并對其如何實現(xiàn)有意義且可持續(xù)的“自我解體”充滿希望。我們接受不適與失敗的可能性，希望以新興女權(quán)主義學(xué)者和充滿希望的青年教師的視角，為識別學(xué)術(shù)界不斷的“紊亂”做出貢獻。

【 原 文 】 In a recent article, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Swati Parashar1 trace the continued salienceof

Eurocentrism in critical International Relations (IR), demonstrating how the ‘master’s outlook’ continues tostifle the study of global politics; they ultimately encourage an unsettling and even implosion of thediscipline. Starting from this proposed ‘implosion’ of critical IR, this article reflects on our hopes, as twocurrent PhD candidates and one early career researcher in global politics, for teaching and learninginthisfuture world. We begin by reflecting on our own complicity in reproducing the Western-centrismof thediscipline and consider how this discomfort can be used productively. The article then considers the radical

potential of the classroom and the necessity of empathetic, collaborative inquiry to the future of thediscipline of global politics. We advocate for an IR which is imaginative, relational, messy, and vulnerable–and are hopeful about how this may animate a meaningful and sustainable implosion. Embracingour

discomfort and the possibility of failure, we hope to contribute to the ongoing ‘unsettling’ of academia fromthe standpoint of incipient feminist scholars and hopeful early-career teachers.

4. 國際政治中的種族和系統(tǒng)性危機：多元學(xué)術(shù)議程（Race and systemic crisesininternational politics: An agenda for pluralistic scholarship）Andrew S. Rosenberg，佛羅里達大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】近年來，全球政治學(xué)者表明，種族和白人至上問題在國際歷史、國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域的形成以及當(dāng)代理論中都占據(jù)核心位置。本文認為，種族問題同樣在 21 世紀(jì)當(dāng)前和未來的系統(tǒng)性危機中扮演關(guān)鍵角色：這些危機包括愈發(fā)嚴(yán)重的氣候變化、日益加深的不平等、資本主義的固有不穩(wěn)定性以及移民問題。為支撐這一觀點，本文描述了當(dāng)前危機的輪廓，并揭示了種族主義如何加劇其影響。簡而言之，資本主義的贏家和輸家以及氣候變化的影響都沿著種族界限劃分，進一步加劇對全球南部非白人移民與國家的直接和間接種族歧視。這些相互關(guān)聯(lián)的危機會深刻影響未來 50 年的國際政治，并可能永久固化全球種族不平等的惡性循環(huán)。因此，本文提出了一項研究議程，號召所有國際關(guān)系學(xué)者探討種族在國際體系中的實證影響，將全球政治中被邊緣化的歷史與當(dāng)代視角納入研究，并解決21 世紀(jì)最緊迫的政治問題。

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【原文】In recent years, scholars of global politics have shown that issues of race and white supremacylieat

the centre of international history, the birth of the field of International Relations, and contemporary theory.

In this article, I argue that race plays an equally central role in the 21st century’s current and future crises:

the set of systemic risks that includes intensifying climate change, deepening inequality, the endemicinstabilities of capitalism, and migration. To make this argument, I describe the contours of the current crisisand show how racism amplifies its effects. In short, capitalism’s winners and losers and the effects of

climate change fall along racial lines, amplifying both direct and indirect racial discrimination against

non-white migrants and states in the Global South. These interdependent crises will shape the next 50yearsof international politics and will likely perpetuate the vicious cycle of global racial inequality. Accordingly,

this article presents a research agenda for all IR scholars to explore the empirical implications of race intheinternational system, integrate marginalised perspectives on global politics from the past and present intotheir scholarship, and address the most pressing political issues of the 21st century.

5. 僑民地緣政治、崛起的大國和國際秩序的未來（Diasporic geopolitics, risingpowers,

and the future of international order）

Fiona B. Adamson，倫敦大學(xué)亞非學(xué)院教授

Enze Han，香港大學(xué)政治與公共行政學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】本文將“僑民地緣政治”（diasporic geopolitics）視為未來全球政治的重要因素。國際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域關(guān)于全球秩序的討論往往高度空間化，本文則強調(diào)世界各個地區(qū)通世界上哪些不同的地區(qū)通過正在進行的移民過程而糾纏在一起，及其以全球僑民的形式留下的遺產(chǎn)。本文通過聚焦崛起中的大國及其與現(xiàn)有國際秩序的關(guān)系，探討這些聯(lián)系的重要性。中國、印度和土耳其等主要移民輸出國如今都在國際事務(wù)中尋求施加全球影響力。在此背景下，這些國家的僑民治理政策也發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變，僑民正被視為推進輸出國地緣政治議程和大國雄心的重要資產(chǎn)。本文考察了這些國家通過其僑民參與政策在跨國上施加權(quán)力的三種機制。國家可以將其僑民視為促進貿(mào)易與外資的經(jīng)濟資產(chǎn)；作為有助于推廣“文明”政治的軟實力資產(chǎn)；以及作為可以戰(zhàn)略性動員或抑制的外交資產(chǎn)。最后，本文討論了這些機制對于未來 50 年全球秩序與強權(quán)政治性質(zhì)的啟示。

【原文】This article examines ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a significant factor in the future of global politics.

Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent towhich different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies intheform of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing onrisingpowers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states suchasChina, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international

affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, withdiasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states’ geopolitical agendas andgreat power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationallyviatheir diaspora engagement policies. States can treat ‘their’ diasporas as economic assets that facilitate tradeand foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of ‘civilisational’ politics; and

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as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussingtheimplications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years.

6. 國際關(guān)系中的后社會主義：方法與批判（Postsocialism in International Relations:Method and critique）

Claudia Aradau，倫敦國王學(xué)院國際政治系教授

【摘要】盡管國際關(guān)系的后殖民主義視角為全球政治提供了新的概念、方法和政治想象，但后社會主義（postsocialism）作為一種分析和政治方法卻一直缺席。后社會主義主要是一個描述性術(shù)語，指第二世界向自由民主和市場經(jīng)濟的時間過渡，或指東歐和前蘇聯(lián)的地緣政治空間。本文借鑒在分析與政治角度上將后社會主義和后殖民主義相結(jié)合的文獻，尤其是女權(quán)主義研究，通過重新詮釋后社會主義來理解當(dāng)代社會主義的全球遺產(chǎn)。本文建議將后社會主義的維度作為方法和批判進行剖析。在方法維度上，后社會主義關(guān)注社會主義遺產(chǎn)在當(dāng)下如何延續(xù)和轉(zhuǎn)變，同時包容矛盾與不確定性。在批判維度上，后社會主義是面向橫向團結(jié)（transversal solidarities）和可以支撐這些斗爭的認識詞匯的。本文將這些方法與批判的維度置于邊界和移民的相關(guān)辯論中進行實證分析。后社會主義并非旨在取代其他批判方法，而是為了豐富我們的詞匯并增加政治干預(yù)。

【原文】While postcolonial approaches to International Relations have offered new concepts, methods, andpolitical imaginaries of global politics, postsocialism has been absent as an analytical and political approach.

Postsocialism has been mainly a descriptive term naming the temporal transition of the Second Worldtoliberal democracy and market economy or the geopolitical space of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet

Union. Building on literature that has connected postsocialism and postcolonialismanalyticallyandpolitically, particularly feminist work that has reclaimed postsocialism to understand the global legacies of

socialism in the present, this article proposes to unpack dimensions of postsocialism as method and critique.

Postsocialism as method attends to how socialist legacies endure and are transformed in the present whileholding together contradictions and ambivalences. Postsocialism as critique is oriented to transversal

solidarities and the epistemic vocabularies that can undergird these struggles. To trace these dimensions of

method and critique, the article is situated empirically within debates about borders and migration.

Postsocialism is not intended to replace or displace other critical approaches but to pluralise our vocabulariesand multiply political interventions.

7. 從底層重構(gòu)社會生態(tài)生活：走向全球多數(shù)人的地球政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)（Reproducingsocio-ecological life from below: Towards a planetary political economy of the global

majority）

Cemal Burak Tansel，紐卡斯?fàn)柎髮W(xué)地理、政治和社會學(xué)學(xué)院國際政治經(jīng)濟和全球發(fā)展政治學(xué)高級講師Lisa Tilley，倫敦大學(xué)亞非學(xué)院發(fā)展研究系高級講師

【摘要】面對未來 50 年的危機——套用安東尼奧·葛蘭西（Antonio Gramsci）的名言——既需要批判性的悲觀主義，也需要一種任性的希望政治。本文以必要的批判性悲觀主義探討氣候危機的政治問題，

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并應(yīng)對更廣泛的社會生態(tài)危機。具體來說，我們面臨著金融資本對綠色轉(zhuǎn)型的迫切需求，以及圍繞電氣化消費社會的愿景建立新的積累結(jié)構(gòu)的令人不安的轉(zhuǎn)型方向。未來幾十年，全球資產(chǎn)階級的財富將繼續(xù)增長，以及快速侵占大氣公域。面對這種財富集中的反烏托邦圖景、企業(yè)過剩和土地危機，本文關(guān)注全球各地頑強重構(gòu)社會生態(tài)生活的實際項目，并與那些通過城市共建、糧食主權(quán)、原住民組織和照護經(jīng)濟來自下往上再現(xiàn)生活的社區(qū)合作。這些社區(qū)都在通過另類國際組織擴大其愿景。本文認為，這些項目展示了一種全球化的多層次政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)，將具體經(jīng)驗與對抗國家、企業(yè)和跨國資本主義的力量相結(jié)合。鑒于這些社區(qū)的經(jīng)驗教訓(xùn)，本文呼吁建立“全球多數(shù)人的地球政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)”，優(yōu)先考慮立足現(xiàn)實的反系統(tǒng)項目的社會生態(tài)生活再生產(chǎn)愿景。

【 原 文 】 Confronting the coming five decades from our present conjuncture demands – to paraphraseAntonio Gramsci’s famous mantra – both critical pessimism and a wilful politics of hope. In this article, weengage with the politics of climate breakdown and the responses to wider socio-ecological crises withanecessary critical pessimism. Specifically, we confront the capture of green transition imperatives by financecapital, as well as the troubling orientation of transition towards building new structures of accumulationaround the vision of an electrified consumer society. We also see the coming decades being markedbytheever-increasing wealth of global asset-owning classes – who, by definition, enclose the atmosphericcommons faster than any other community. Against this dystopian picture of increasingly concentratedwealth, corporate excess, and terrestrial crisis, we focus on the stubborn reproduction of socio-ecological lifethrough various grounded projects across the world. We engage with communities who work against

structural constraints to reproduce life from below through urban commoning, food sovereignty, Indigenousorganising, and caretaking economies – all of which are scaling out their visions through alternativeinternationals. All of these projects, we argue, present a planetary and multiscalar political economyinpractice, which connects grounded experience with resistance to the dynamics of capitalismat the state,

corporate, and transnational levels. With lessons from these communities in mind, we call for a ‘planetarypolitical economy of the global majority’, which prioritises the reproduction of socio-ecological lifeaccording to the visions of grounded anti-systemic projects.

8. 人工智能與國際關(guān)系的未來：厘清世界政治中有血有肉的、制度性的和人工合成的道德能動性（AI and the future of IR: Disentangling flesh-and-blood, institutional, andsynthetic moral agency in world politics）

Toni Erskine，澳洲國立大學(xué)珊瑚鐘亞太事務(wù)研究院，國際政治學(xué)主任兼教授。【摘要】智能機器——從自動化機器人到算法系統(tǒng)——可以創(chuàng)造圖像和詩歌、引導(dǎo)我們的偏好、輔助決策甚至殺人。我們對其能力、相對自主性和道德地位的看法，不僅將深刻影響我們?nèi)绾谓忉尯徒鉀Q未來 50 年世界政治中的實際問題，還將影響我們?nèi)绾沃贫ê驮u估個人和國家的應(yīng)對措施。本文主張必須對這一新興的合成代理展開分析，以便有效引導(dǎo)并對世界政治的未來進行理論化。首先，本文概述了國際關(guān)系學(xué)科如何對“能動性”理論化不足，并指出人工智能顛覆了現(xiàn)有觀念。其次，本文考察了人類個體和正式組織（國際關(guān)系已熟悉的有目的的行為體）如何具備作為道德行為體或義務(wù)承擔(dān)者的資格，并探討智能機器需要滿足哪些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)才能具備該資格。在證明了合成智能體目前缺乏道德能動

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性所需的“反思自主性”之后，本文轉(zhuǎn)向戰(zhàn)爭背景，說明從這種比較分析中得出的見解如何反駁我們傾向于淡化道德行為體的不同表現(xiàn)方式的做法，這種做法侵蝕了世界政治中關(guān)鍵的責(zé)任觀念?！驹摹縄ntelligent machines – from automated robots to algorithmic systems – can create images andpoetry,

steer our preferences, aid decision making, and kill. Our perception of their capacities, relative autonomy,

and moral status will profoundly affect not only how we interpret and address practical problems inworldpolitics over the next 50 years but also how we prescribe and evaluate individual and state responses. Inthisarticle, I argue that we must analyse this emerging synthetic agency in order to effectively navigate –andtheorise – the future of world politics. I begin by outlining the ways that agency has been under-theorisedwithin the discipline of International Relations (IR) and suggest that artificial intelligence (AI) disruptsprevailing conceptions. I then examine how individual human beings and formal organisations – purposiveactors with which IR is already familiar – qualify as moral agents, or bearers of duties, and explore what

criteria intelligent machines would need to meet to also qualify. After demonstrating that synthetic agentscurrently lack the ‘reflexive autonomy’ required for moral agency, I turn to the context of war to illustratehow insights drawn from this comparative analysis counter our tendency to elide different manifestations of

moral agency in ways that erode crucial notions of responsibility in world politics.

9. 控制的未來/未來的控制：2074 年全球（失序）秩序與無處不在的武器化（The futureof control/The control of the future: Global (dis)order and the weaponisationofeverywhere in 2074）

Mark Lacy，蘭卡斯特大學(xué)政治與國際關(guān)系高級講師

【摘要】本文提出，未來 50 年人類面臨的主要挑戰(zhàn)將圍繞社會與政治控制問題。這是現(xiàn)代性政治與社會問題的延續(xù)，并將在多樣的政治背景和各種技術(shù)“工具”下展開。安全技術(shù)專家將嘗試管理由“萬物武器化”和“無處不在的武器化”（借用馬克·加萊奧蒂的用語）所導(dǎo)致的混亂與不安狀態(tài)，屆時各國將努力控制新興領(lǐng)域與地域。然而，到 2074 年，各社會可能面臨現(xiàn)代政治問題日益加劇的局面，氣候緊急情況和其他生態(tài)/技術(shù)危險的影響可能導(dǎo)致全球性混亂，其程度將遠超現(xiàn)代性時期的經(jīng)驗，根本性改變（或破壞）國際政治的“物質(zhì)”基礎(chǔ)，呈現(xiàn)出前所未有的問題。在這個節(jié)點上，正如布魯諾·拉圖爾所言，為了我們自身與他人的生存，可能不得不拋棄從現(xiàn)代性“繼承”下來的政治與經(jīng)濟觀念?！?原 文 】 In this article, I am going to suggest that questions of societal and political control will befundamental to the challenges humanity faces in the next 50 years, a continuation of the political andsocial

problems of modernity but playing out in a range of political contexts and with a range of technological ‘tools’. Technicians of security will attempt to manage the disorder and insecurity that results fromthepotential weaponisation of everything, to use a phrase from Mark Galeotti, and the weaponisationof

everywhere, a condition where the state will be seeking to control a range of emerging terrains and domains.

But at the same time, while societies in 2074 might be confronting conditions that are an intensificationof

modern political problems, there is the possibility that the impact of climate emergencies andother

ecological/technological dangers might produce global disorder unlike anything experienced in modernity,

radically transforming (or mutilating) the ‘material’ foundations of international politics, presenting us with

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problems unlike anything encountered before. At this point, as Bruno Latour suggested, we might havetodepart (for our own survival and the survival of others) from the ideas about politics and economy that wehave ‘inherited’ from modernity.

10. 與自然和平共處：生態(tài)外交的愿景與挑戰(zhàn)（On making peace with nature: Visions andchallenges towards an ecological diplomacy）

Costas M. Constantinou，塞浦路斯大學(xué)國際關(guān)系學(xué)教授

Eleni Christodoulou, 塞浦路斯大學(xué)

【摘要】聯(lián)合國呼吁“與自然和平相處”應(yīng)成為 21 世紀(jì)的關(guān)鍵使命，本文對此進行了探討。文章研究了為了實現(xiàn)這種和解生態(tài)所設(shè)想的外交模式。它借鑒了聯(lián)合國系統(tǒng)中最有前景卻鮮為人知的項目之一——“與自然和諧相處”（HwN）計劃。該計劃率先倡導(dǎo)以地球為基礎(chǔ)的法理學(xué)與自然權(quán)利概念，并對這種外交轉(zhuǎn)變進行了理論化，評估了 21 世紀(jì)生態(tài)外交在政府間議程之外如何高效運行?；谕林枷牒腿f物有靈論的認識論，HwN 等項目提倡與地球建立一種新的關(guān)系，并使探索“自然”作為外交對話者成為可能。本文認為，現(xiàn)有的和平建設(shè)范式未能充分捕捉人與自然關(guān)系中的外交層面與復(fù)雜的地方動態(tài)，建議基于生態(tài)外交進行重新構(gòu)思，這種外交既具有擴張性又具變革性，并將這種關(guān)系視為一種困難的共存關(guān)系。

【原文】This article interrogates United Nations (UN) calls that ‘making peace with nature’ should becomethe crucial mission of the 21st century. It ponders the kind of diplomacy envisioned for such a reconciliationecology to be credible. Drawing on one of the most promising and less known programmes of theUNsystem – namely, Harmony with Nature (HwN), which pioneers Earth-based jurisprudence and rights of

nature – it conceptualises this diplomatic shift and assesses the conditions under which ecological diplomacycan be productively operationalised in the 21st century vis-à-vis a mere rhetorical appropriationandco-optation by intergovernmental agendas. Building on Indigenous thought and animist epistemologies,

programmes such as HwN espouse a new relationship with Planet Earth and make it possible to explore‘nature’ as diplomatic interlocutor. We argue that existing paradigms of peacebuilding fail to sufficientlycapture the diplomatic aspects and complex local dynamics of the human–nature relationship and suggest areconceptualisation based on an ecological diplomacy that is both expansive and transformative andviewsthis relationship as one of troubled coexistence.

11. 地球陷阱：地球以外的國際關(guān)系（The terrestrial trap: International Relations beyondEarth）

Enrike van Wingerden，鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大學(xué)的研究員和講師

Darshan Vigneswaran，阿姆斯特丹大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】未來 50 年，人類探索和塑造外太空的能力將顯著提升。然而，國際關(guān)系理論仍然將外太空視為一個孤立、獨特或無足輕重的政治領(lǐng)域。本文通過理論化行星政治（planetary politics），將國際關(guān)系從其“地球陷阱”中解放出來，使其與地球之外的環(huán)境與行為者建立內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。面對從太空軍事化

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到太空殖民化的深刻且令人不安的政治變革，本文對國際關(guān)系理論的兩個地球偏見提出挑戰(zhàn)。首先，質(zhì)疑國際關(guān)系的發(fā)展只發(fā)生在地球上或主要發(fā)生在地球上的假設(shè)。本文展示了歷史上形成的殖民與統(tǒng)治的意識形態(tài)和政治經(jīng)濟如何延伸到太空探索與定居，同時也在其中發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變。其次，質(zhì)疑外層空間的發(fā)展是地球上政治邏輯的直接延伸。本文超越人類棲息區(qū)，探索太空的物質(zhì)條件如何與政治治理與控制的特定歷史相互交織。通過分析地球之外的政治，本文重新調(diào)整了國際關(guān)系理論來應(yīng)對未來的太空政治。

【原文】Human capacity to explore and shape outer space will increase substantially over the next 50years.

Yet, International Relations (IR) theory still treats outer space as an isolated, unique, or inconsequential

realm of political life. This paper moves IR beyond its ‘terrestrial trap’ by theorising planetary politics asinherently embedded in relations with environments and actors that are located beyond Earth. To facethemomentous and often alarming political developments taking place in outer space, fromspace militarisationto space colonisation, we challenge two of IR’s terrestrial biases. First, we confront the assumptionthat

developments in international relations take place only or primarily on Earth. We show howthe historicallyconstituted ideologies and political economies of colonisation and domination are extended to – but alsotransformed within – outer space exploration and settlement. Second, we challenge the notionthat

developments in outer space form a logical extension of politics as it has emerged on the habitable surfaceof

our planet. We move beyond zones of human habitation and explore how the material conditions of spaceintersect with situated histories of political governance and control. By analysing politics beyond Earth, weretool IR theory to confront an extraterrestrial political future.

【編譯：楊魯華】【責(zé)任編輯：封欣怡】

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《中國國際政治季刊》（The China Journal of International Politics）The China Journal of International Politics，Vol. 17, No. 2, 2024

1. 國際關(guān)系理論中的中國學(xué)派：被忽視的過程、有爭議的進展和不確定的前景（TheChinese School of IR Theory: Ignored Process, Controversial Progress, andUncertainProspects）

魯鵬，華東政法大學(xué)政府管理學(xué)院教授

【摘要】本文綜述了國際關(guān)系理論中中國學(xué)派的相關(guān)議題。經(jīng)過 20 多年的不懈努力，中國學(xué)派取得了具體的突破，如關(guān)系理論、道義現(xiàn)實主義和共生理論的出現(xiàn)。中國學(xué)派由此進入了一個新的階段，其主要任務(wù)已從理論創(chuàng)新升級為理論發(fā)展。但要進一步發(fā)展，中國學(xué)派需要西方同行的批判性回應(yīng)。然而更多由于語言障礙、中國國際關(guān)系中非對抗性的學(xué)術(shù)傳統(tǒng)，以及雙方存在的民族中心主義，中國學(xué)派和西方理論之間為數(shù)不多的對話往往存在問題，重要議題要么被忽視，要么被歪曲。為了進一步研究中國學(xué)派與西方理論之間全面而深入的思想交流，本文將中國學(xué)派的相關(guān)議題分為三個方面：演進過程；理論研究進展；以及中國學(xué)派與其他理論（特別是全球國際關(guān)系）的未來關(guān)系。本文主要依靠對中國學(xué)派出版物的話語分析，旨在為西方理論與中國學(xué)派之間的進一步交流奠定基礎(chǔ)?！驹摹縏his article reviews issues relevant to the Chinese School of International Relations (IR) theory.

After 20 or more years of relentless effort, the Chinese School has achieved concrete breakthroughs, evident

in the emergence of Relational Theory, Moral Realism, and Symbiosis Theory. The Chinese School has thusentered a new stage, its primary task having been upgraded from theory innovation to theory development.

But to proceed further, the Chinese School needs critical responses from its Western counterparts. Owingprimarily to the language barrier, as well as to the non-confrontational academic tradition within ChineseIR,

and the ethnocentrism that both sides practice, the few dialogues that have taken place between the ChineseSchool and Western theories have tended to be problematic, with important issues either ignoredor

misrepresented. In order to further study a comprehensive and intensive exchange of ideas betweenthe《中國國際政治季刊》（The China Journal of International

Politics） 創(chuàng)刊于 2006 年，2012 年進入 SSCI，迄今仍是中國大陸主辦的唯一一份政治學(xué) SSCI 專業(yè)期刊。自創(chuàng)刊以來，CJIP 堅持發(fā)表原創(chuàng)性學(xué)術(shù)研究成果，重點推動國際關(guān)系理論創(chuàng)新和中國對外關(guān)系方面的研究，發(fā)表了諸多國內(nèi)外知名學(xué)者的文章。CJIP 發(fā)表的文章在東亞、歐洲和北美三地學(xué)者間保持了較好的平衡，在促進國際關(guān)系理論多元化發(fā)展方面發(fā)揮了獨特作用。2022 年該刊影響因子為 2.0，在96 份國際關(guān)系類 SSCI 期刊中名列第 39，是亞洲地區(qū)排名最高的國際關(guān)系類 SSCI 期刊。

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Chinese School and Western theories, this article categorises issues relevant to the Chinese School intothreeareas. They are: process of evolution; progress in theoretical studies; and the Chinese School’s futurerelationship with other theoretical entities (in particular, Global IR). Predominantly reliant uponthediscourse analysis of Chinese School publications, this contribution seeks to provide a foundation for further

exchanges between Western theories and the Chinese School.

2. “西方”與中國國際關(guān)系理論中的國家主義倫理形象：界定（并解讀）清華路徑的“道義現(xiàn)實主義”（Images of a Statist Ethic in “Western” and Chinese IRTheory:

Locating (and Deciphering) the “Moral Realism” of the Tsinghua Approach）Toni Erskine，澳大利亞國立大學(xué)珊瑚貝爾亞太事務(wù)學(xué)院國際政治學(xué)教授

Liane Hartnett，墨爾本大學(xué)政治與社會科學(xué)學(xué)院國際關(guān)系講師

【摘要】本文確定并質(zhì)疑了一條錯綜復(fù)雜地交織在古典現(xiàn)實主義、國際關(guān)系（IR）規(guī)范理論以及張鋒（2012）所稱的中國國際關(guān)系的“清華路徑”中的線索。這條線索是一個飽含爭議的概念，即國際政治的國家主義倫理，或者是一種賦予國家、同胞和國家利益優(yōu)先權(quán)的倫理觀點。這些理論傳統(tǒng)中的立場，包括我們所說的古典現(xiàn)實主義傳統(tǒng)中的“利己主義現(xiàn)實主義”和“負責(zé)任的現(xiàn)實主義”，國際關(guān)系規(guī)范理論中的“社群主義現(xiàn)實主義”和“公正主義國家主義”，以及其他人所描述的清華路徑中的“道義現(xiàn)實主義”——都致力于一種以保護和偏好國家和同胞為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的道德路徑。本文把這些豐富的立場，以及它們所提供的比較點，作為一個更好地理解國際政治中國家主義倫理的可能性和局限性的機會。具體來說，本文致力于說明四點：（1）以國家、同胞和國家利益為優(yōu)先的道德既不是不可能的，也不是矛盾的；（2）這種觀點可以構(gòu)成一個復(fù)雜的理論立場；（3）它可以以完全不同的方式來構(gòu)思，包括關(guān)于它所呼吁的價值來源和它認為重要的人；（4）這些差異具有深遠的實際影響。在促進西方和中國國際關(guān)系理論之間的對話方面，這一分析不僅有助于我們探索清華路徑的“道義現(xiàn)實主義”如何與古典現(xiàn)實主義和國際關(guān)系規(guī)范理論中的立場相關(guān)聯(lián)，而且還有助于評估其理論交匯點和分歧點的實際意義。

【原文】In this article, we identify—and interrogate—one thematic thread that is intricately woven throughprominent positions within classical realism, normative international relations (IR) theory, and what ZhangFeng (2012) has called Chinese IR’s “Tsinghua approach.” This thread is the often-controversial notionof astatist ethic for international politics or an ethical perspective that grants priority to one’s state, fellowcitizens, and the national interest. Positions within each of these theoretical traditions—what we label “egoistic realism” and “responsible realism” within the classical realist tradition, “communitarian realism”and “impartialist statism” within normative IR theory, and what others have described as “moral realism”within the Tsinghua approach—share a commitment to an ethical approach variously defined in terms of theprotection of, and preference for, one’s state and compatriots. We take this rich collection of positions, andthe points of comparison that it affords, as an opportunity to better understand the possibilities and limits of astatist ethic for international politics. Specifically, we endeavour to illustrate four points: (1) that a moralitydefined in terms of the priority of the state, one’s fellow citizens, and the national interest is neither

impossible nor a contradiction in terms; (2) that such a perspective can constitute a sophisticated theoretical

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position; (3) that it can be conceived in radically different ways, including with respect to the source of valueto which it appeals and who it deems to matter; and (4) that these differences have profound practical

consequences. In terms of contributing to a conversation between Western and Chinese IRtheory, thisanalysis helps us not only to explore how the “moral realism” of the Tsinghua approach relates to positionswithin classical realism and normative IR theory but also to evaluate the practical implications of its pointsof theoretical convergence and divergence.

3. 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力分析范式的升級（Upgrading the Paradigm of Leadership Analysis）閻學(xué)通，清華大學(xué)國際關(guān)系研究院院長。

【摘要】領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力分析一直是研究國際關(guān)系的傳統(tǒng)范式。道義現(xiàn)實主義理論在解釋大國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力與體系層面國際變化之間的關(guān)系時，提高了這一范式的科學(xué)嚴(yán)謹性。在方法上，道義現(xiàn)實主義使用道義作為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來劃分國際領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力，這也是關(guān)鍵的自變量。這一理論的發(fā)展是為了提高現(xiàn)實主義對大國興衰這一常見歷史現(xiàn)象的解釋力。這些外交政策建議并非以中國為中心，而是從道義現(xiàn)實主義理論中推斷出來的——這些建議是描述性的，而不是規(guī)范性的——并適用于中國和其他大國。由于系統(tǒng)分析理論未能解釋全球秩序從全球化到反全球化的轉(zhuǎn)變，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力分析范式值得考慮。它或許確實為探究當(dāng)前在主要大國盛行的民粹主義領(lǐng)袖與日益增長的反全球化趨勢之間的關(guān)系提供了一個線索?！驹摹縇eadership analysis has been a traditional paradigm for studying international relations. The theoryof moral realism improves this paradigm’s scientific rigour when explaining the relationship betweentheleadership of major powers and system-level international changes. Methodologically, moral realismusesmorality as the criterion to categorise international leadership, the key independent variable. The theoryisdeveloped to improve realism’s explanatory power regarding the common historical phenomenon of theriseand fall of great powers. Rather than being Sino-centric, the foreign policy recommendations extrapolatedfrom the theory of moral realism—which are descriptive rather than prescriptive—are applicable tobothChina and other major powers. Since theories of systemic analysis have failed to explain the transitionof

global order from globalisation to the counter-globalisation, the paradigm of leadership analysis is worthconsideration. It may indeed provide a vector of enquiry regarding the correlation between the current

prevalence of populist leadership in major powers and the growing counter-globalisation trend.

4. 關(guān)系主義解析：秦亞青的世界政治理論述評（Relationalism(s) Unpacked: EngagingYaqing Qin’s Theory of World Politics）

Stefano Guzzini，歐洲大學(xué)學(xué)院政治與社會科學(xué)系教授，日內(nèi)瓦研究生院國際關(guān)系與政治學(xué)系兼職教授

【摘要】本著對話的精神，本文試圖在談話中將秦亞青的世界政治關(guān)系理論與他所關(guān)注的（主要是英美）個人主義和理性主義之外的各種西方理論聯(lián)系起來。這一分析的核心部分是秦亞青的關(guān)系主義，它提供了不同層次的理論化之間的聯(lián)系:作為本體論，它允許我們接近不同的世界觀或宇宙論；作為一種理論，它旨在理解和解釋政治家的行為；作為一個闡釋性的橋梁，它讓外界理解中國外交政策行動的意義；作為一種策略，它發(fā)展了儒家啟發(fā)的實用格言，并提供了評估行為體是否遵守這些格言的

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方法。本文將在這些層面上剖析他的關(guān)系主義。本文認為，秦亞青通過試圖在所有層面上與單一理論緊密匹配（這本身就是一項令人尊敬的努力，許多學(xué)者遺憾地退縮了），使得他沒有充分利用他的本體論見解。他通過試圖提供有助于外部觀察者正確解讀中國在國際事務(wù)中的行為的潛在啟示，使得實踐被置于理論中解讀，因此他的關(guān)系主義變得不必要地以能動者為中心，最終低估了非個人及非沖突性權(quán)力（或支配）的關(guān)系。這一舉動也預(yù)示著其他理論解決方案可能更忠實于他的本體論，如可以與之對話的社會認知論。最后，在外交政策戰(zhàn)略層面，本文探討了秦亞青設(shè)想的開放外交進程與赫爾辛基進程之間的相似之處，以及（真正的）多邊主義所設(shè)想的擴散互惠體系中的信任或信心建立措施?！驹摹縄n a spirit of dialogue, this article engages Yaqing Qin’s relational theory of world politics inaconversation by trying to relate it to Western theoretical partners outside of his (mainly Anglo-American)

individualist and rationalist focus. The central piece of the analysis is Qin’s relationalism, which providesthe link between different levels of theorizing: as an ontology, it allows us to approach a different

Weltanschauung or cosmology; as a theory, it purports to understand and explain how politicians act; asahermeneutic bridge, it allows outsiders to understand the meaning of Chinese foreign policy actions; andasastrategy, it develops Confucian-inspired practical maxims and provides means to assess whether actors liveup to them. This article will unpack his relationalism at these levels. It argues that by trying to closelymatcha single theory at all levels—in itself a highly respectable endeavor from which many scholars regrettablyrecoil—Qin underutilizes his ontological insights. By trying to provide the underlying inspirations that

should help outside observers to correctly interpret Chinese conduct in world affairs, practice is readbackinto theory so that his relationalism becomes unnecessarily agency-centric and ends up underestimatingrelations of impersonal and non-conflictual power or domination. The move also forestalls other theoretical

solutions arguably more faithful to his ontology, such as social theories of recognition with which it couldbein dialogue. Finally, on the level of foreign policy strategy, the article invites exploration of the similaritiesbetween the open diplomatic process envisaged by Qin and the Helsinki process, as well as trust or

confidence building measures in a system of diffuse reciprocity, as envisaged by (true) multilateralism.

5. 中庸辯證法：通往關(guān)系世界的橋梁（The Zhongyong Dialectic: A Bridge intotheRelational World）

秦亞青，山東大學(xué)政治與公共管理學(xué)院國際政治系教授

【摘要】在我的關(guān)系理論中存在著三種張力，即本體與行為之間、結(jié)構(gòu)與過程之間、實體與程序之間。在這些緊張關(guān)系的背后是一個至關(guān)重要的問題：如何識別主體和客體，并理解其中的支配-從屬權(quán)力關(guān)系？如果從二元論的角度觀察，這些表面上的不一致會出現(xiàn)，但從中庸辯證法的角度來看，這些不一致可能會消失。中庸辯證法作為一種認識論和方法論手段，首先不假設(shè)二元二分法。它相信內(nèi)在的關(guān)系和動態(tài)的可轉(zhuǎn)化性，認為基于差異而非同質(zhì)的互動產(chǎn)生健康的生活，并認為主體與客體、結(jié)構(gòu)與過程、實質(zhì)與程序——所有這些被構(gòu)建為二元對立的范疇，實際上都是作為整體的相關(guān)部分相互轉(zhuǎn)化的。全球社會的演變，從民族國家的國際社會，到人類的全球社會，再到地球上（或更遠）所有人的行星社會，清楚地表明了跨越表面上的主客體鴻溝的關(guān)系可轉(zhuǎn)換性。權(quán)力關(guān)系是存在的，但任何單方面行使權(quán)力都是短暫的，因為強權(quán)（power over）不會持久，而賦權(quán)（power to）則可能會。

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【原文】Three tensions are said to exist in my relational theory, i.e. between ontology and behavior, betweenstructure and process, and between substance and procedure. Underlying these tensions is a crucial question:

How to identify the subject and object and understand the domination–subordination power relationshiptherein? These seeming inconsistencies appear if observed through a dualistic lens but may well disappear

when viewed from the zhongyong dialectic, which, as an epistemological and methodological device,

assumes no binary dichotomy in the first place. It believes in immanent relationality and dynamictransformability, holding that interaction based on difference rather than homogeneity generates healthylifeand arguing that subject and object, structure and process, substance and procedure—all these categoriesconstructed as dichotomous opposites are in fact mutually transformable as related parts of a whole. Theevolution of global society, from international society of nation-states, to global society of humans, andtoplanetary society of all on earth (or beyond), clearly indicates the relational transformability across theostensible subject–object divide. Power relations exist, but any unilateral exercise of power is ephemeral, for

power over will not last, while power to will.

【編譯：任雨欣】【責(zé)任編輯：封欣怡】《歐亞研究》（Europe-Asia Studies）Europe-Asia Studies，Vol. 76, No. 4, 2024

1. 解開蛛絲：克羅地亞和塞爾維亞的政策學(xué)習(xí)與非正式網(wǎng)絡(luò)（Untangling the GossamerWeb: Policy Learning and Informal Networks in Croatia and Serbia）Alexander Mesarovich，斯特靈大學(xué)歷史與政治系研究助理

【摘要】南斯拉夫解體三十年后，前加盟共和國的發(fā)展道路出現(xiàn)了分歧，斯洛文尼亞和克羅地亞加入了歐盟，而其他國家則仍對歐洲充滿希望。本文從政策學(xué)習(xí)的角度分析了這一差異，將加入歐盟的過程概念化為候選國的學(xué)習(xí)過程，并利用社會網(wǎng)絡(luò)分析克羅地亞和塞爾維亞議會中的非正式政治網(wǎng)絡(luò)對《歐亞研究》（Europe-Asia Studies）為每年出刊 10 期的學(xué)術(shù) 期刊 ， 由 Routledge 代 表格 拉 斯格 大 學(xué)中 東 歐 研究 部 門（University of Glasgow）出版。主要關(guān)注前蘇聯(lián)地區(qū)國家的政治、經(jīng)濟、社會議題及其 20 世紀(jì)的歷史。

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其入盟過程的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，克羅地亞的非正式網(wǎng)絡(luò)促進了入盟進程，塞爾維亞的非正式網(wǎng)絡(luò)則限制了入盟進程。

【原文】Thirty years on from the collapse of Yugoslavia, the paths of the former constituent republics havediverged, with Slovenia and Croatia acceding to the European Union and the rest remaining hopeful

Europeans. This article analyses this discrepancy through the lens of policy learning, conceptualisingtheprocess of accession as one of learning on the part of the candidate state, and uses social network analysis toidentify the impact of informal political networks in parliaments of Croatia and Serbia on their respectiveEUaccession processes. It finds that informal networks in Croatia enabled accession while those in Serbiaconstrained it.

2. 洛坎規(guī)則？共產(chǎn)主義精英與 1989—1990 年南斯拉夫各共和國選舉制度的選擇（Rokkan Rules? Communist Elites and the Choice of Electoral Systems in the YugoslavRepublics, 1989-1990）

Josip Glaurdi?，盧森堡大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授

Ensar Muharemovi?，盧森堡大學(xué)博士生

【摘要】本文利用之前被忽視的南斯拉夫各共和國的案例，重新審視 1989 年至1990 年“轉(zhuǎn)型時期”首次選舉的選舉制度是如何形成的問題。通過探索相關(guān)決策者創(chuàng)建的檔案和其他同期資料，本文以洛坎對選舉制度設(shè)計的解釋為基礎(chǔ)。然而，本文并不如洛坎一樣將政黨視為單一或團結(jié)的行為體，反而側(cè)重于分析執(zhí)政黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層和主導(dǎo)派系，并表明他們對選舉規(guī)則的偏好服務(wù)于其黨內(nèi)野心，是黨內(nèi)權(quán)力能力的反映。

【原文】We use the previously neglected cases of the Yugoslav republics to revisit the question of howelectoral systems were formed for the first elections during the transition from communismin 1989-1990.

By exploring archival and other sources created contemporaneously by the relevant decision-makers, webuild on Rokkanian interpretations of electoral system design. Unlike Rokkan, however, we do not seeparties as unitary or united actors. Our analysis instead focuses on the leadership and the dominant wings of

the ruling parties and shows that their preferences regarding electoral rules served their intra-party ambitionsand reflected their intra-party power capacities.

3. 羅馬尼亞平等機構(gòu)的歧視蔓延、任務(wù)擴展與政治化（Discrimination Creep, MandateExpansion and the Politicisation of Romania’s Equality Agency）Liviu Andreescu，布加勒斯特大學(xué)行政與商學(xué)院教授

Gabriel Andreescu，蒂米什瓦拉西部大學(xué)政治學(xué)博士學(xué)院教授

【摘要】在有關(guān)平等機構(gòu)和官僚擴張的文獻背景下，本文研究了羅馬尼亞反歧視機構(gòu)——國家反歧視委員會（NCCD）當(dāng)前的信任危機。本文認為，通過概念蔓延的過程，歧視被寬泛地定義，以至于越來越多的微不足道的行為現(xiàn)在也受到制裁。這導(dǎo)致了策略性和機會主義請愿的增加，帶來了兩個后果：

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一是提高了對該機構(gòu)政治控制的風(fēng)險；二是該機構(gòu)對歧視的概念管理日益困難。我們通過分析理事會關(guān)于“歧視性言論”的判例法來記錄“歧視蔓延”，然而本文重點仍集中于導(dǎo)致歧視蔓延的官僚機構(gòu)、專業(yè)知識和激進主義的相互作用。

【原文】Against the background of literature on equality bodies and bureaucratic expansion, we examinethecurrent crisis of confidence in Romania’s anti-discrimination agency, the National Council for CombatingDiscrimination (NCCD), a quasi-court. We argue that, through a process of conceptual creep, discriminationhas been defined so generously that increasingly trivial acts are now sanctioned. This has generatedincreased strategic and opportunistic petitioning, with two consequences: raising the stakes of political

control over the agency; and the agency’s increasingly difficult conceptual management of discrimination.

We document ‘discrimination creep’ by analysing the Council’s case law on ‘discriminatory speech’, thoughour focus stays on the interaction of bureaucracy, expertise and activism which has enabled creep.

4. （歷史）愛的政治：關(guān)于愛國主義、民族歷史和對克里米亞的吞并（The Politicsof(Historical) Love: On Patriotism, National History and the Annexation of Crimea）Dmitriy Skulskiy，魯賓學(xué)術(shù)中心移民與社會融合研究所研究員

【摘要】本文展示了與克里米亞“統(tǒng)一”的假定歷史重要性如何確保俄羅斯公眾支持其吞并克里米亞?；趯Χ砹_斯愛國話語的分析，本文展示了在其框架內(nèi)“人民”、“俄羅斯”和“祖國”等術(shù)語如何與神圣的“非人類”相對應(yīng)。它們與人類之間的本體論鴻溝是通過民族歷史來調(diào)節(jié)的：歷史由人類主體創(chuàng)造，但是最終屬于俄羅斯民族。在此背景下，熱愛俄羅斯就意味著確保俄羅斯歷史的偉大。吞并的歷史意義使其具有愛國主義色彩，因而是一種可取的行動。

【原文】This article shows how the presumed historical importance of ‘unification’ with Crimea ensuredRussian public support for its annexation. Based on the analysis of patriotic discourse in Russia, I showhowwithin its frame the terms ‘People’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Motherland’ correspond to sacred non-human beings. Theontological gap between them and humans is mediated by means of national history: created by humansubjects, history ultimately belongs to the Russian nation. In this context, loving Russia means ensuringthegreatness of Russian history. The historical significance of the annexation made it patriotic, and hence, adesirable course of action.

5. 勃列日涅夫時代批評信的寫作與審議（Critical Letter Writing and DeliberationDuring the Brezhnev Era）

Andrew Buck，南印第安納大學(xué)社會學(xué)副教授

【摘要】據(jù)說勃列日涅夫時代是一段政治停滯的時期，本文分析了該時期蘇聯(lián)公民寫給報紙和當(dāng)局的信件。公民們以個人或集體、署名或匿名的方式寫批評信，要求解決問題。當(dāng)局對公民關(guān)注的問題做出回應(yīng)，這些問題大多非常具體且非系統(tǒng)，當(dāng)局還利用這些信件來監(jiān)督公眾輿論。該時期蘇聯(lián)的寫信實踐，使公民能夠向當(dāng)局問責(zé)，同時也為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人提供了通過采取行動使其權(quán)力合法化的機會。

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【 原 文 】 This article analyses letters sent by Soviet citizens to newspapers and authorities duringtheBrezhnev era, supposedly a period of political stagnation. Citizens wrote critical letters, individuallyandcollectively, signed and anonymously, to have problems solved. Authorities responded to citizen concerns,

which were mostly very specific and non-systemic, and also used the letters to monitor public opinion. Thepractice of letter writing in the Soviet Union in this period enabled citizens to hold authorities to account

while also providing leaders with the opportunity to legitimise their authority by taking action.

6. 重返家鄉(xiāng)的坎坷：俄羅斯南部的敘利亞切爾克斯人（A Troubled ReturntotheHomeland: Syrian Circassians in Southern Russia）

Andrey Korotayev，俄羅斯高等經(jīng)濟大學(xué)社會政治不穩(wěn)定風(fēng)險監(jiān)測實驗室主任，教授Leonid Issaev，俄羅斯高等經(jīng)濟大學(xué)社會政治不穩(wěn)定風(fēng)險檢測實驗室副主任，副教授Yevgeniy Ivanov，俄羅斯高等經(jīng)濟大學(xué)社會政治不穩(wěn)定風(fēng)險監(jiān)測實驗室初級研究員Alisa Shishkina，俄羅斯高等經(jīng)濟大學(xué)社會政治不穩(wěn)定風(fēng)險監(jiān)測實驗室高級研究員【摘要】敘利亞人道主義危機加劇了俄羅斯的切爾克斯問題。由于祖先從北高加索前往中東，同時也為躲避戰(zhàn)爭，數(shù)以百計的敘利亞的切爾克斯人（阿迪格人）將俄羅斯作為目的地。盡管俄羅斯有能力接納大量移民，但敘利亞切爾克斯人在進入俄羅斯和在俄羅斯居留方面仍面臨重重困難。在接收敘利亞阿迪格人的問題上，俄羅斯政府在以下方面存有疑慮：（1）索契奧運會前切爾克斯激進主義日益高漲；（2）ISIS 的滲透；（3）南部地區(qū)緊張的民族關(guān)系。盡管如此，由于當(dāng)?shù)匕⒌细袢说闹С?，許多敘利亞切爾克斯人在俄羅斯定居。本文的研究結(jié)果基于 2017 年在卡拉恰伊-切爾克斯西亞和2018年在阿迪格進行的訪談與民意調(diào)查。

【原文】The humanitarian crisis in Syria has fuelled the Circassian issue in Russia. Escaping fromthe war,

hundreds of Syrian Circassians (Adyghe) chose Russia as their destination because their ancestors cametothe Middle East from the North Caucasus. Syrian Circassians have faced difficulties in entering Russiaandstaying there regardless of the state’s ability to accept a large number of immigrants. In the case of receivingSyrian Adyghe, Russian authorities were suspicious about: (1) growing Circassian activismbeforetheOlympics in Sochi; (2) ISIS infiltration; and (3) ethnic tensions in the Southern regions. Nevertheless, manySyrian Circassians settled in Russia due to the support extended by local Adyghe. Our findings are basedoninterviews and public polls conducted in Karachay-Cherkessia in 2017 and Adygea in 2018.

7. 評估變化中的中俄關(guān)系：后冷戰(zhàn)時期雙邊合作的縱向分析（Assessing the ChangingSino – Russian Relationship: A Longitudinal Analysis of Bilateral CooperationinthePost-Cold War Period）

Maria Papageorgiou，英國?？巳卮髮W(xué)政治系講師

Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira，葡萄牙米尼奧大學(xué)政治科學(xué)研究中心政治學(xué)和國際關(guān)系助理教授【摘要】中俄關(guān)系對全球秩序至關(guān)重要。圍繞中俄關(guān)系如何隨著時間推移而發(fā)展的問題——加強、削弱還是保持不變——本文對 1992 年至 2019 年間中俄關(guān)系的演變進行了定量分析。本研究開發(fā)了一個

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原創(chuàng)指數(shù)——雙邊合作強度（BCI）指數(shù)，旨在衡量雙邊（中俄）合作并考慮具體（軍事、經(jīng)濟、政治）維度。雖然研究結(jié)果證實，中國和俄羅斯確實以漸進的方式加強了合作，在2014 年俄羅斯吞并克里米亞后并沒有出現(xiàn)明顯的倒退，但其并沒有證實文獻中經(jīng)常提到的“戲劇性變化”的說法?！驹摹縏he Sino–Russian relationship is of fundamental importance to the global order. Followingthequestion of how this relationship has developed over time—whether it has strengthened, weakenedor

remained constant—we present a quantitative analysis of its evolution between 1992 and 2019. To this end,

the study develops an original index, the Bilateral Cooperation Intensity (BCI) Index, aimed at measuringbilateral (Sino–Russian) cooperation and considering specific (military, economic, political) dimensions.

While our findings verify the assumption that China and Russia have indeed strengthened their cooperationin a progressive manner, with no apparent setback following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the resultsdo not corroborate the claims of dramatic change frequently presented in the literature.

【編譯：汪平平】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】《外交政策分析》（Foreign Policy Analysis）Foreign Policy Analysis，Vol. 20, No. 2, 2024

1. 自動動機評分和國際危機行為（Automated Motive Scoring and International CrisisBehavior）

《外交政策分析》（Foreign Policy Analysis）雜志是由牛津大學(xué)出版社代表國際研究協(xié)會出版的季刊。該期刊旨在以比較或具體案例的方式研究外交政策決策的過程、效果、原因或結(jié)果。2023 年期刊影響因子為 2.2。

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Michael D Young，美國奧爾巴尼大學(xué)應(yīng)急準(zhǔn)備、國土安全和網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全學(xué)院助理教授，近期任俄亥俄州立大學(xué)教授

【摘要】盡管隱性動機已經(jīng)得到很好地證實，但隱性動機的編碼一直是一個耗時且困難的手動過程。本文首先評估成就需求（Need for Achievement）、歸屬需求（Need for Affiliation）和權(quán)力需求（Needfor Power）的自動動機編碼方案，其次評估這三種動機與危機引發(fā)之間的關(guān)系，以及評估其他心理變量對于危機行為的解釋力。研究結(jié)果通過手動編碼證實了成就需求和權(quán)力需求編碼方案的收斂效度（convergent validity），并支持了權(quán)力需要與危機行為之間的顯著關(guān)系。權(quán)力需求每增加一個單位，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者發(fā)起危機的可能性就會增加一倍。納入其他先前研究過的心理變量，能夠獲取結(jié)果更顯著的模型。數(shù)據(jù)集的范圍（來自 93 個不同國家的 154 名領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人）增強了研究結(jié)果的分量，并為進一步研究提供了機會。

【 原 文 】 Although implicit motives are well established, coding for implicit motives has beenatime-consuming and difficult manual process. This study (i) evaluates automated motive coding schemes for

Need for Achievement, Need for Affiliation, and Need for Power, (ii) assesses the relationship betweenthesethree motives and crisis initiation, and (iii) assesses the explanatory power of other psychological variablesfor crisis behavior. The results establish the convergent validity of the Need for Achievement and Needfor

Power coding schemes with hand coding and support findings of a significant relationship between Needfor

Power and crisis behavior. A unit increase in Need for Power doubles the probability that a leader will

initiate a crisis. Even stronger models were obtained by including other previously studied psychological

variables. The scope of the dataset (154 leaders across a diverse set of 93 countries) lends weight tothefindings and provides many opportunities for additional research.

2. 解讀角色理論中的角色轉(zhuǎn)換：拜登政府將德國轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閷θA關(guān)系中忠實盟友角色的政策 （ Unpacking Altercasting in Role Theory: The Biden Administration's PolicyofAltercasting Germany into a Faithful Ally Role in Relations with China）Kai Oppermann，德國開姆尼茨工業(yè)大學(xué)人文學(xué)院政治科學(xué)研究所國際關(guān)系教授【摘要】本文對外交政策分析中的象征互動角色理論做出了貢獻，重點關(guān)注角色轉(zhuǎn)換（altercasting）的概念?！敖巧Q”指的是在角色關(guān)系中，通過言語和非言語行為將另一個國家塑造成與自身角色互補的角色。本文建議更加關(guān)注“進行”角色互換的行為體的主動性，以更好地理解其運作方式。為此，本文提出一個分析框架來解析角色互換行為體的主動性。該框架涵蓋了行動體參與角色互換的前提條件、角色互換與國內(nèi)政治的相互作用以及可用的角色互換技巧。本文通過對拜登政府在2021年底新政府上臺時努力將德國塑造成針對中國的“忠實盟友”角色的案例研究來檢驗這一框架。通過對美國外交政策界的專家訪談，案例研究表明拜登政府對德國有明確的角色期望，也了解德國聯(lián)合政府各政黨之間的意見平衡。拜登政府運用了自我展示、信號承認與否認、以及提出直接行為要求等角色互換技巧。

【原文】The article contributes to scholarship on symbolic interactionist role theory in Foreign PolicyAnalysis, focusing on the concept of altercasting. Altercasting refers to verbal and non-verbal state behaviors

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in a role relationship to cast another state into roles that are complementary to its own roles. The articlesuggests putting more attention on the agency of the actor “doing” the altercasting to gain a better

understanding of how altercasting works. To this purpose, the article develops a framework to unpacktheagency of the altercasting actor. The framework addresses the preconditions for actors to engageinaltercasting, the interplay of altercasting with domestic politics, and the available altercasting techniques.

The article illustrates this framework in a case study on the efforts of the Biden administration to altercast

Germany into a “faithful ally” role vis-à-vis China when the new German government transitionedintooffice in late 2021. Building on evidence from expert interviews among the U.S. foreign policy community,

the case study demonstrates that the Biden administration had clear role expectations of Germanyandunderstood the balance of opinion between the German coalition parties. The Biden administration usedthealtercasting techniques of self-presentation, signaling approval, and disapproval and making direct

behavioral demands.

3. 外國援助在爭取內(nèi)戰(zhàn)各方同意維持和平方面的作用（The Role of ForeignAidinProcuring Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping）

Johannes Karreth，美國烏西努斯學(xué)院政治與國際關(guān)系系副教授

Timothy J A Passmore，少校，美國弗吉尼亞軍事學(xué)院助理教授

Jaroslav Tir，美國科羅拉多大學(xué)博爾德分校政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】成功的維和行動在很大程度上取決于沖突各方對干預(yù)行動的無限制同意。然而，同意常常被一方或多方拒絕或限制，他們認為和平的代價高于繼續(xù)戰(zhàn)斗的代價。本文強調(diào)以外國發(fā)展援助形式提供的國際經(jīng)濟獎勵在克服取得同意的障礙方面的作用。本文認為，過去的援助發(fā)出了一個可信的信號，即如果交戰(zhàn)各方朝著和平的方向努力，未來將獲得沖突后的物質(zhì)利益。這種對未來利益的附加條件因此激勵交戰(zhàn)各方為和平與穩(wěn)定而努力，包括不受限制地同意維持和平特派團。對冷戰(zhàn)后的119 次內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的分析和對東帝汶的簡要敘述表明，外國援助大大增加了無限制同意的可能性。本文研究結(jié)果對國際影響國內(nèi)政治爭端的文獻研究和維和行動有效性的研究具有啟示意義。

【原文】Successful peacekeeping depends heavily on the conflict parties providing unrestricted consent tothe intervention. Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or more parties who calculateahigher cost to peace than to continued fighting. We highlight the role of international economic incentives inthe form of foreign development aid in overcoming hurdles to obtaining consent. We argue that past aidsends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits if the belligerents work toward peace. Thisconditionality of future benefits thereby incentivizes the belligerents to work toward peace and stability,

including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of 119 post-Cold War civil

wars and a brief narrative of East Timor demonstrate that foreign aid significantly and substantially increasesthe likelihood of unrestricted consent. The findings have implications for the literature on international

influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the effectiveness of peacekeepingoperations.

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4. 禁運、武器和暴力：武器禁運對平民目標(biāo)的有條件影響（Embargoes, Weapons, andViolence: The Conditional Effects of Arms Embargoes on Civilian Targeting）Amira Jadoon，美國克萊姆森大學(xué)政治學(xué)系助理教授

Bryan R Early，美國紐約州立大學(xué)奧爾巴尼分洛克菲勒公共事務(wù)政策學(xué)院的政治學(xué)教授兼研究副院長【摘要】武器禁運的一個主要目標(biāo)是通過限制獲得外國武器來減輕目標(biāo)國內(nèi)沖突的人道主義影響。本文調(diào)查了禁運政府如何調(diào)整其暴力策略以應(yīng)對武器進口限制。本文的理論是，削弱政府軍事實力的武器禁運可能會無意中增加它們對平民鎮(zhèn)壓的依賴，以此作為應(yīng)對國內(nèi)威脅的另一種方法。然而，本文預(yù)計目標(biāo)政府或者從那些不參與的行為體、或者從那些不合規(guī)的供應(yīng)商那里獲得武器的能力將起到緩解作用。針對 1989 年至 2004 年間武器禁運影響的一項全球研究支持了本文論點，同時證明接受的武器數(shù)量和提供武器的人都很重要。本文研究結(jié)果表明，實施武器禁運的政策制定者應(yīng)該考慮到針對平民的暴力增加是一種潛在的意想不到的后果，并密切監(jiān)測目標(biāo)政府對鎮(zhèn)壓的使用。【原文】A primary goal of arms embargoes is to mitigate the humanitarian effects of conflict withintarget

states by restricting access to foreign weaponry. Within this study, we investigate howembargoedgovernments adapt their violent strategies in response to restrictions on arms imports. We theorize that armsembargoes that undermine governments’ military strength may inadvertently increase their relianceoncivilian repression as an alternative approach to countering domestic threats. However, we expect that

targeted governments’ ability to acquire weapons from non-participating or non-compliant suppliers will

have a mitigating effect. A global examination of the effects of arms embargoes between 1989 and2004supports our argument and also suggests that both the levels of arms received and who supplies themmatter.

Our findings suggest that policymakers who employ arms embargoes should consider increased violenceagainst civilians as a potential unintended consequence and closely monitor target governments’ useof

repression.

5. 政黨重要嗎？政黨立場和歐洲選民對經(jīng)濟和政治全球化的態(tài)度（Do Parties Matter?Party Positions and European Voters’ Attitudes toward Economic andPolitical

Globalization）

Alex Honeker，美國德克薩斯農(nóng)工大學(xué)卡塔爾分校政治學(xué)系教學(xué)助理教授【摘要】政黨立場在多大程度上影響選民對全球化的經(jīng)濟和政治方面的態(tài)度？全球化最初是一個伴隨著左右沖突維度的問題，但它日益將主流政黨與非主流政黨區(qū)分開來。本文認為政黨幫助公民形成對全球化問題的看法。本文使用選民對全球化的態(tài)度和政黨立場的數(shù)據(jù)，從經(jīng)濟和政治兩個方面檢驗全球化態(tài)度的供給側(cè)理論。保持需求側(cè)因素（如經(jīng)濟自身利益和傾向/價值觀）不變，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)政黨立場強烈影響選民對經(jīng)濟和政治全球化的看法，其效果與教育相似。此外，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)來自左翼和右翼民粹主義政黨特征的影響比主流政黨的影響要負面得多，這與之前精英階層對這些政黨家族定位的研究結(jié)果如出一轍。最后，綠色政黨特征在經(jīng)濟和政治維度上顯示出相互矛盾的結(jié)果，綠黨特征對選民的經(jīng)濟全球化產(chǎn)生負面影響，而對政治全球化產(chǎn)生積極影響。本文的發(fā)現(xiàn)要求對全球化態(tài)度的供給側(cè)決定因素進行更深入的探索。

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【原文】To what extent do party positions influence voters’ attitudes toward the economic and political

aspects of globalization? Initially an issue following a left-right dimension of conflict, globalizationincreasingly divides mainstream from nonmainstream parties. In this study, I argue that parties help citizensform opinions on globalization issues. I then use data on voters’ attitudes and party positions onglobalization to test this supply-side theory of globalization attitudes on both economic and political

dimensions. Holding demand-side factors such as economic self-interest and predispositions/values constant,

I find that party positions strongly affect voters’ views on economic and political globalization, withtheeffect being similar to that of education. Moreover, I find that the effect of cues from left- and right-populist

parties is much more negative than that of mainstream parties, replicating previous elite-level findings onthepositioning of these party families. Finally, green party cues show conflicting results for the economicandpolitical dimensions, with green cues affecting voters negatively on economic globalization but positivelyonpolitical globalization. The findings in this study call for a deeper exploration of the supply-sidedeterminants of globalization attitudes.

6. 歐盟成員國對烏克蘭的支持（EU Member State Support to Ukraine）Tim Haesebrouck，比利時根特大學(xué)國際和歐洲研究所助理教授

【摘要】2022 年 2 月 24 日俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭之后，歐盟及其成員國向烏克蘭提供了前所未有的軍事、人道主義和財政援助。然而，盡管一些歐盟成員國向烏克蘭提供了不成比例的高水平支持，但其他成員國承諾的援助水平卻出乎意料地低。本文旨在以軍事負擔(dān)分擔(dān)理論為基礎(chǔ)，解釋歐盟成員國對烏克蘭支持程度的差異。本文采用了共存分析（Coincidence Analysis）的創(chuàng)新擬合穩(wěn)健性程序。分析結(jié)果表明，由軍事負擔(dān)分擔(dān)理論導(dǎo)出的條件可以解釋對烏克蘭的支持。更具體地說，支持的模式（主要）由每個成員國面臨的來自俄羅斯的威脅程度、過去的軍事投資和公眾輿論來解釋。相反，與經(jīng)常被檢驗和證實的剝削假說（exploitation hypothesis）相左，成員國的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模對它們對烏克蘭的支持沒有影響。

【原文】The EU and its member states have provided an unprecedented amount of military, humanitarianand financial aid to Ukraine after Russia's attack on February 24, 2022. However, while some EUmember

states have provided a disproportionately high level of support to Ukraine, other member states committedan unexpectedly low level of aid. This article aims to explain the diverging levels of EUmember statesupport to Ukraine by building on theories of military burden-sharing. Methodologically, it applies theinnovative fit robustness procedure of Coincidence Analysis (CNA). The results of the analysis indicatethat

conditions derived from theories of military burden-sharing can explain support to Ukraine. Morespecifically, the pattern of support was (mainly) explained by the level of threat that each member state facedfrom Russia, past military investments and public opinion. Conversely, in contrast to the frequentlytestedand confirmed exploitation hypothesis, the economic size of the member states did not have an impact ontheir support to Ukraine.

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7. 什么是愛國者？針對中國和美國的跨國研究（What is a Patriot? ACross-National

Study in China and the United State）

Eddy S. F. Yeung，美國埃默里大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士生

王夢橋，中國對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)國際發(fā)展政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)系講師

【摘要】愛國主義是一股無處不在的政治力量。然而，我們卻對大眾最初如何理解“愛國”的含義所知甚少。本文在全國范圍內(nèi)開展了群眾對愛國主義認識的調(diào)查。通過對兩個全球超級大國——中國和美國——的平行全國調(diào)查，本文揭示了國家之間和國家內(nèi)部對“愛國”的理解存在本質(zhì)上的差異，以及不同的理解如何映射到不同的政策偏好。特別是，雖然文獻對（良性的）愛國主義和（惡性的）民族主義進行了區(qū)分，但本文發(fā)現(xiàn)大多數(shù)中國受訪者——以及大約三分之一的美國受訪者——將愛國主義理解為民族主義。對愛國主義的民族主義理解反過來又與更強硬的外交政策傾向相對應(yīng)。通過分析民間對愛國主義的直覺，并將其定位到現(xiàn)有的學(xué)術(shù)辯論中，本文在學(xué)術(shù)文獻及其試圖解釋的大眾政治行為之間創(chuàng)建了關(guān)聯(lián)。

【原文】Patriotism is a pervasive political force. However, not much is known about how people understandwhat it means to be “patriotic” in the first place. We conduct a cross-country study of mass understandingsof patriotism. Through parallel national surveys in two global superpowers—China and the UnitedStates—we uncover the substantively different understandings of what it means to be “patriotic” betweenand within countries, and how the different understandings may map onto different policy preferences. Inparticular, while the literature draws a distinction between (benign) patriotism and (malign) nationalism, wefind that most Chinese respondents—and about a third of American respondents—understand patriotismasnationalism. The nationalistic understanding of patriotism, in turn, corresponds to more hawkish foreignpolicy preferences. By unpacking folk intuitions about patriotism and mapping them onto existing scholarlydebates, we bridge the distance between the academic literature and the mass political behavior it seeks toexplain.

8. 國際關(guān)系定序變量結(jié)果中的最高項膨脹現(xiàn)象（Top-Category Inflation inOrderedInternational Relations Outcomes）

Benjamin E Bagozzi，美國特拉華大學(xué)政治科學(xué)與國際關(guān)系系副教授

Minnie M Joo，美國馬薩諸塞大學(xué)洛厄爾分校政治學(xué)系助理教授

umba Mukherjee，美國賓夕法尼亞州立大學(xué)政治學(xué)系教授

【摘要】定序因變量廣泛應(yīng)用于國際關(guān)系中。由于不同的過程，這些定序因變量經(jīng)常會在其最高結(jié)果類別中受觀察值膨脹的影響。將標(biāo)準(zhǔn)定序概率（standard ordered probit）和定序logit 模型應(yīng)用于此類定序度量將無法捕獲這些不同的過程，因此通常會產(chǎn)生有偏差的推論。然而，國際關(guān)系研究人員忽略了定序結(jié)果變量中高類別變量中觀測值膨脹的可能性。本文旨在讓研究人員對國際關(guān)系中定序結(jié)果的高膨脹更加敏感。然后，本文直觀地將廣泛使用的零膨脹定序概率模型（zero-inflated orderedprobit

model）擴展到最高項膨脹（top-category inflated）背景，提供方式以促進定序結(jié)果中最高項膨脹的正確建模。最后，本文提供了在貿(mào)易政治和政治鎮(zhèn)壓相關(guān)的已發(fā)表研究的兩項應(yīng)用。這些應(yīng)用共同驗證了本文所提出的工具在診斷和建模國際關(guān)系結(jié)果中高類別膨脹值方面的實效和方法論潛力。

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【原文】Ordered dependent variables are widely employed in international relations (IR). These ordereddependent variables often suffer from inflated observations in their highest outcome category due to distinct

processes. The application of standard ordered probit and ordered logit models to such ordinal measures will

fail to capture these distinct processes, often producing biased inferences as a result. Yet IR researchers havethus far ignored the potential for top-category inflation in ordered outcome variables. We sensitizeresearchers to top-category inflation in ordered IR outcomes. We then intuitively extend the widelyusedzero-inflated ordered probit model to the top-category inflated setting, providing resources to facilitatetheproper modeling of top-category inflation in ordered outcomes. Finally, we provide two applications topublished IR research related to trade politics and political repression. Together, these applications illustratethe substantive and methodological potentials of our proposed tools for diagnosing and modelingtop-category inflation in IR outcomes.

【編譯：林怡娉】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】《華盛頓季刊》（The Washington Quarterly）The Washington Quarterly，Vol.47, No.1, 2024

1. 以色列在加沙的六種選擇（Six Options for Israel in Gaza）Daniel Byman，喬治敦大學(xué)外交學(xué)院教授

Riley McCabe，戰(zhàn)略與國際研究中心（CSIS）的項目經(jīng)理和研究助理

Alexander Palmer，戰(zhàn)略與國際研究中心（CSIS）的副研究員

【摘要】作為對 2023 年 10 月 7 日毀滅性襲擊的回應(yīng)，以色列領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人聲稱他們尋求“摧毀”哈馬斯——這個目標(biāo)說起來容易，做起來難。以色列的行動——轟炸加沙、派兵殺害哈馬斯戰(zhàn)士和摧毀哈馬斯的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、襲擊加沙和該地區(qū)的哈馬斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人——已在加沙殺害了 3 萬多名巴勒斯坦人，其中包括《華盛頓季刊》（The Washington Quarterly）由喬治·華盛頓 大 學(xué) 的 埃 利 奧 特 國 際 事 務(wù) 學(xué) 院 主 辦 ， 并 由 Taylor &

Francis 出版，是一本全球安全事務(wù)期刊，提供關(guān)于全球戰(zhàn)略變化、趨勢和關(guān)系及其公共政策影響的不同觀點。其撰稿人來自全球，反映了不同的政治、地區(qū)和專業(yè)觀點。其2021 年的影響因子為 2.013，在 96 種國際關(guān)系期刊中排名第 47。

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許多兒童。為了聲援哈馬斯，伊朗支持的組織對以色列和美國在該地區(qū)的目標(biāo)發(fā)動了襲擊?？梢岳斫猓绻陨胁辉缸尮R斯取得勝利，并尋求確保自身安全，那么它還有什么選擇呢？【原文】In response to its devastating October 7, 2023 attack, Israeli leaders have stated that they seekto“destroy” Hamas—a goal easier in rhetoric than in reality. Israel's actions—bombing Gaza, sending introopsto kill Hamas fighters and destroy Hamas’ infrastructure, and targeting Hamas leaders in Gaza and aroundthe region—have killed over 30,000 Palestinians in Gaza, including many children. In solidarity with Hamas,

Iranian-backed groups have conducted attacks against Israeli and US targets around the region. If,

understandably, Israel is loath to allow Hamas a victory and seeks to ensure its security，what options doesit

have?

2. 大國沖突不斷，核風(fēng)險上升（Nuclear Risks Rise as Great-Power Conflict Goes On）Adam T. Biggs，美國海軍心理學(xué)家

【摘要】歷史上，當(dāng)強國之間尋求武裝沖突時，大國競爭會帶來毀滅性的后果。在現(xiàn)代，大國還擁有核武器，這加劇了大國間戰(zhàn)爭的潛在破壞力。盡管可以事后解釋起因，并將其應(yīng)用于當(dāng)前的國際關(guān)系，但使用核武器的決定往往與高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的心理有關(guān)，也與當(dāng)代地緣政治條件有關(guān)。在考慮這些決定時，必須考慮到長期戰(zhàn)爭是如何導(dǎo)致參與者的道德操守下降的。隨著報復(fù)和支配的主題日益突出，道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的下降會使決策出現(xiàn)偏差。

【原文】Great-power competition has historically imposed devastating consequences when powerful nationsseek armed conflict with one another. In the modern era, great powers also possess nuclear weapons, whichexacerbates the potential destruction of any war among them. Although causes can be interpretedinhindsight and applied to current international relations，the decision to use nuclear weapons is oftenabout

the psychology of the senior leadership as much as it is contemporary geopolitical conditions. Thesedecisions must be considered within the context of how protracted warfare produces declining ethical

conduct among its participants. Deteriorating ethical standards can in tum bias decision-making, as themesof revenge and domination become prominent. The practical consequence is that previously irrational or

unthinkable courses of action could seem more reasonable as war progresses.

3. 處理聯(lián)盟分擔(dān)負擔(dān)的困境（Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance Burden Sharing）Brian Blankenship，邁阿密大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】與冷戰(zhàn)后的大部分時期相比，鼓勵盟國承擔(dān)更多的自衛(wèi)責(zé)任變得更加重要。蘇聯(lián)集團的解體最初釋放了美國大量的軍事力量，使美國失去了同類競爭對手，似乎降低了美國盟國卷入戰(zhàn)爭的風(fēng)險。結(jié)果，特別是在歐洲，盟國的能力萎縮了，而美國則集中精力在中東和非洲大部分地區(qū)發(fā)動大規(guī)模的反恐戰(zhàn)爭。但在過去十年中，隨著俄羅斯的復(fù)蘇、中國的崛起以及美國外交政策圍繞“大國競爭”的重新定位，為常規(guī)大國戰(zhàn)爭做準(zhǔn)備又重新成為美國的議題。隨之而來的是對美國稀缺軍事資源進行投資和部署的權(quán)衡。與此同時，加沙、也門和中東其他地區(qū)的沖突仍在繼續(xù)對美國的資源和注意力提出

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要求。如果美國不愿意或無法獨自投入足夠的資源來威懾和擊敗某個地區(qū)的對手，那么盟國的能力將需要填補這一缺口。

【原文】Encouraging allies to shoulder more of the burden of defending themselves has become moreimportant than it was for most of the post-Cold War period. The collapse of the Soviet bloc initially freedupsubstantial amounts of US military power, left the United States without a peer competitor, and seemedtoreduce the risk of war involving American allies. As a result, particularly in Europe, allied capabilities haveatrophied, while the United States focused on waging an expansive war on terrorism in much of the MiddleEast and Africa. But over the last ten years, with the resurgence of Russian expansionism, the rise of China,

and the reorientation of US foreign policy around “great power competition,” preparing for conventional

major-power war is back on the menu. With it come painful tradeoffs about where to invest and deployscarce US military resources. All the while, conflicts in Gaza, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Middle East

continue to make claims on US assets and attention. To the extent that the United States is unwillingor

unable to devote sufficient resources for deterring and defeating adversaries in one region or another onitsown, allied capabilities will need to fill the gap.

4. 歐洲戰(zhàn)略自主：歐洲地緣政治之路（European Strategic Autonomy: The PathtoaGeopolitical Europe）

Tara Varma，布魯金斯學(xué)會美國和歐洲中心客座研究員

【摘要】在歐洲,“戰(zhàn)略自主”是一個充滿爭議的詞語，無論是反對者還是擁護者都對其反應(yīng)劇烈。本文闡述了這一表述的細微差別以及它成為歐洲人口頭禪的原因，旨在說明戰(zhàn)略自主的爭議性并沒有許多人想象的那么大。

【原文】Strategic autonomy is a loaded expression in Europe, one which inspires strong feelings frombothits detractors and its advocates. By laying out the nuances of the phrase and the reasons it has enteredEuropean parlance, this paper aims to show that strategic autonomy is less controversial than many presume.

5. 預(yù)測歐洲的核未來（Anticipating Europe’ s Nuclear Futures）Wannes Verstraete，布魯塞爾自由大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士研究員和助教，研究興趣為威懾和軍備控制【摘要】近年來，隨著國內(nèi)政治和意識形態(tài)成為美國外交政策決策的動機，美國作為歐洲大陸和平與穩(wěn)定“最終保障者”的信譽受到了質(zhì)疑。雖然拜登政府目前正在北約框架下支持烏克蘭并加強美國在歐洲的駐軍，但其主要戰(zhàn)略重點仍然是中國。與此同時，共和黨內(nèi)部有一個強大的派系，他們寧愿看到美國遠離或完全退出北約。例如：特朗普在其第一任期內(nèi)曾質(zhì)疑北約的價值，并差點退出北約。此外，隨著下屆總統(tǒng)大選的臨近，對飽受戰(zhàn)爭蹂躪的烏克蘭的援助在美國國會已成為政治爭議的焦點。據(jù)美國眾議院共和黨議長邁克·約翰遜稱，對烏克蘭、以色列和臺灣擬議的950 億美元援助計劃進行表決并不迫切。此外，2 月 10 日，特朗普在競選集會上表示，他將 “鼓勵”俄羅斯人對軍事開支不足的北約盟國“為所欲為”。

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【 原 文】 The credibility of the United States as the “ultimate guarantor” of peace and stability ontheEuropean continent has come under question in recent years as domestic politics and ideologyhavemotivated US foreign policy decisions. While the Biden administration is currently supporting Ukraineandbolstering the US troop presence in Europe under NATO's framework, the administration's primary strategicfocus remains on China. Meanwhile, there is a powerful faction within the Republican Party that wouldrather see the US distance itself or withdraw entirely from NATO. Case in point: during his first term,

Trump questioned the value of the alliance and almost withdrew from it. Moreover, as the next presidential

election looms, assistance to war-torn Ukraine has become politically contested in the US Congress.

According to Republican US House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson, voting on the proposed$95billion aid package to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan was not urgent. Furthermore, on February 10, Trumpsaidat a campaign rally that he would “encourage” the Russians to do “whatever the hell they want” with NATOallies that did not spend enough on their military.

6. 難以捉摸的印度洋-太平洋聯(lián)盟：地理位置為何重要（The Elusive Indo-PacificCoalition: Why Geography Matters）

Kelly A. Grieco，史汀生中心“重新構(gòu)想美國大戰(zhàn)略”項目高級研究員

Jennifer Kavanagh，卡內(nèi)基國際和平基金會美國國策項目高級研究員

【摘要】作為 2020 年的總統(tǒng)候選人，喬·拜登誓言他的政府將“讓美國回到談判桌的首位”，準(zhǔn)備“與盟友和伙伴合作，動員集體行動應(yīng)對全球威脅”。在對抗中國的問題上，這一承諾不僅僅是說說而已：拜登政府進行了大量投資，以重申美國在印度洋-太平洋地區(qū)的軍事優(yōu)勢，加強并擴大與地區(qū)盟國和伙伴的安全關(guān)系，但同時也使美國堅定而果斷地處于主導(dǎo)地位。正如作者今年早些時候所論述的，拜登政府與之前的政府一樣，仍然致力于維護美國在印太地區(qū)的主導(dǎo)地位。但與其前任美國優(yōu)先、單打獨斗的方針不同，拜登默認單極時代已經(jīng)結(jié)束，維持美國主導(dǎo)地位的代價比過去更高，因此他把加強地區(qū)聯(lián)盟和伙伴關(guān)系作為其方針的基石。美國政府的對華戰(zhàn)略旨在積極領(lǐng)導(dǎo)一批愿意幫助承擔(dān)維持美國在印太地區(qū)軍事主導(dǎo)地位成本的盟友和伙伴，通過聯(lián)盟支持人為地支撐美國的地區(qū)主導(dǎo)地位?！驹摹縒riting as a presidential candidate in 2020, Joe Biden vowed that his administration would“placethe United States back at the head of the table,” ready to “work with its allies and partners to mobilizecollective action on global threats.” When it came to confronting China, this promise was more thanmerewords: his administration has invested extensively to reassert US military supremacy in the Indo-Pacific,

strengthening and expanding security ties with regional allies and partners but also keeping the UnitedStatesfirmly and decisively in the lead. As we argued earlier this year, the Biden administration, like those beforeit, remains committed to US primacy in the Indo-Pacific. But unlike his predecessor’s America-First,

go-it-alone approach, in a tacit acknowledgement that the unipolar moment has ended and that sustainingUSprimacy is costlier than in the past, Biden has made strengthening regional alliances and partnershipsacornerstone of his approach. The administration’s China strategy aims to actively lead a group of allies andpartners willing to help underwrite the costs of maintaining US military dominance in the Indo-Pacific,

artificially propping up US regional primacy with coalition support.

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7. 印太地區(qū)的拜登經(jīng)濟學(xué)：戰(zhàn)略意義（Bidenomics in the Indo-Pacific: StrategicImplications）

Jeffrey Reeves，美國和平外交研究所華盛頓高級研究員、海軍研究生院海軍戰(zhàn)爭學(xué)院國家安全副教授【摘要】拜登政府經(jīng)常被指責(zé)在其印太戰(zhàn)略中缺乏一個完善的經(jīng)濟組成部分，這一缺陷迫使其過度依賴軍事活動、伙伴關(guān)系和接觸來實施其地區(qū)外交政策。這種對美國戰(zhàn)略的批評至少可以追溯到對奧巴馬政府“亞洲支點”的爭論，而在特朗普政府 2017 年決定讓美國退出跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定（TPP）之后，這種批評的勢頭更加猛烈。特別是自 2016 年以來，華盛頓在經(jīng)濟上“缺席”亞洲是一種戰(zhàn)略上的不利之處的觀點已成為美國政策和學(xué)術(shù)界有關(guān)該地區(qū)文章中無可爭議的自明之理?！驹摹縏he Biden administration is often accused of lacking a well-formulated economic component toitsIndo-Pacific strategy, a deficiency that forces it to rely disproportionately on military activities, partnershipsand engagements to implement its regional foreign policy. Traceable to at least debates over the Obamaadministration’s “pivot to Asia,” this criticism of US strategy gathered steam following the Trumpadministration’s 2017 decision to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.

Since 2016 in particular, the idea that Washington’s economic “absence” from Asia is a strategic liabilityhasbecome an undisputed truism in American policy and academic writing on the region.

8. 有限的杠桿作用：韓國聯(lián)盟談判中的核潛伏期（Limited Leverage: Nuclear LatencyinSouth Korea’s Alliance Bargaining）

Ankit Panda，卡內(nèi)基國際和平基金會核政策項目斯坦頓高級研究員

Tristan A. Volpe，美國海軍研究生院國防分析助理教授、卡內(nèi)基國際和平基金會非常駐研究員【摘要】2023 年春，韓國似乎在利用獲取原子武器的威脅來支持美國的國防承諾。這一討價還價策略在華盛頓和首爾準(zhǔn)備進行高級別國事訪問時凸顯出來。2023 年 1 月 11 日，韓國總統(tǒng)尹錫悅公開表示，首爾可能會獲得自己的核武庫，以對抗朝鮮的戰(zhàn)略力量，成為自 20 世紀(jì)80 年代末韓國向民主過渡以來第一位公開考慮獲取核武器的韓國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。尹錫悅提到了首爾的“先進科學(xué)技術(shù)”，暗示獲取核武器并非癡人說夢，而是一個可信的選擇。但尹錫悅也表示，這一前景取決于即將到來的聯(lián)盟談判結(jié)果，包括 2023 年 4 月的雙邊峰會，并指出“目前”首爾滿足于依靠美國的延伸威懾保證。換句話說，他暗示除非華盛頓認真對待首爾提出的額外安全保證要求，否則韓國可能別無選擇，只能制造原子彈。

【原文】In the spring of 2023, South Korea appeared to use the threat of acquiring atomic weapons toshoreup defense commitments from the United States. This bargaining strategy came to the fore as Washingtonand Seoul prepared for a high-level state visit. On January 11, 2023, President Yoon Suk-yeol publiclymused that Seoul might acquire its own nuclear arsenal to counter North Korea’s strategic forces, becomingthe first South Korean leader to openly contemplate nuclear weapons acquisition since the country’stransition to democracy in the late 1980s. In doing so, Yoon referenced Seoul’s “advanced scienceandtechnology,” implying that nuclear weapons acquisition was not a pipe dream but a credible option. But

Yoon also made this prospect conditional on the outcome of upcoming alliance negotiations, includingan

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April 2023 bilateral summit, noting that “for now” Seoul was content to rely on US extended deterrenceassurances. In other words, unless Washington took Seoul's demands for additional security assurancesseriously, he implied, South Korea might be left with no option but to build the bomb.

9. 言行一致：日本國家安全戰(zhàn)略一周年（When Actions Match Words: Japan’s National

Security Strategy at One Year）

Christopher B. Johnstone，戰(zhàn)略與國際研究中心（CSIS）高級顧問和日本問題主席【摘要】2022 年 12 月，日本發(fā)布了新的國家安全和防衛(wèi)戰(zhàn)略，在紙面上承諾進行前所未有的變革。這些戰(zhàn)略強調(diào)，日本的安全環(huán)境“自二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來前所未有的嚴(yán)峻和復(fù)雜”，計劃到2027 年將待防御能力提高 60%以上；投資于力量投射能力，如遠程精確巡航導(dǎo)彈和“積極的網(wǎng)絡(luò)防御”；大力加強日本國內(nèi)的國防工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)，使其“實際上本身就是一種防御能力”。新的國防戰(zhàn)略包括加強自衛(wèi)隊能力的計劃，以實現(xiàn)“高度戰(zhàn)備和反應(yīng)能力......能夠適應(yīng)新的戰(zhàn)爭方式”?？傮w而言，這些公告似乎打破了日本在二戰(zhàn)后的大部分時間里一直實行的政策規(guī)范，包括將國防開支非正式地限制在國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的 1%，長期以來對遠程導(dǎo)彈和轟炸機等投射能力的限制，以及對向海外轉(zhuǎn)讓防衛(wèi)裝備的嚴(yán)格限制。這些聲明共同反映了日本戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃者的判斷，即當(dāng)今的安全威脅需要一種根本不同的國防態(tài)勢——“今天的烏克蘭可能就是明天的東亞”。

【 原 文 】 In December 2022, Japan issued new national security and defense strategies that onpaper

promised unprecedented change. Emphasizing that Japan’s security environment is “as severe and complexas it has ever been since the end of World War II,” the strategies set out plans to increase defenses pendingby more than 60 percent by 2027; invest in power projection capabilities such as long-range precisioncruisemissiles and “active cyber defense”; and significantly strengthen Japan's domestic defense industrial baseas ”virtually a defense capability itself.” The new National Defense Strategy included plans to strengthenthecapacity of the Self Defense Forces to achieve a “high readiness and response capability... able to adapt tonew ways of warfare.” Collectively these announcements appeared to shatter numerous policy norms that

had been in place for much of Japan’s post-World War II history, including the informal cap on defensespending at 1 percent of GDP, longstanding limits on power-projection capabilities such as long-rangemissiles and bombers, and tight constraints on the transfer of defense equipment overseas. Theseannouncements collectively reflected the judgement of Japanese strategic planners that today’s securitythreats demanded a fundamentally different defense posture—that “Ukraine today could be East Asiatomorrow”. 【編譯：宋欣蔚】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】

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《太平洋評論》（The Pacific Review）The Pacific Review，Vol. 37, No. 3, 2024

1. 英國在亞太地區(qū)的新自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定：英國在多大程度上采納了美國的貿(mào)易法規(guī)？（The UK’s new free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific: how closely is it adoptingUStrade regulation?）

Christopher M. Dent，英國奧姆斯柯克邊山大學(xué)商學(xué)院國際商務(wù)系教授

【摘要】在一個日益被貿(mào)易的新發(fā)展和復(fù)雜性所定義的全球經(jīng)濟和體系中，由誰制定規(guī)則和法規(guī)至關(guān)重要。英國已開始實施新的脫歐后貿(mào)易政策，與澳大利亞和新西蘭簽署了首個全新的自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定（FTA）。英國還正在就加入《全面與進步跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》（CPTPP）進行談判，這部分上是英國希望成為亞太貿(mào)易共同體不可分割的一部分的愿望。本文對英國與澳大利亞和新西蘭簽訂的雙邊自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定進行研究和文本分析，結(jié)果表明，這兩項協(xié)定與深受美國貿(mào)易監(jiān)管規(guī)范影響的兩項大型區(qū)域性協(xié)定，即 CPTPP 本身和《美國-墨西哥-加拿大協(xié)定》（USMCA）高度相似。英國所表現(xiàn)出的與美國貿(mào)易監(jiān)管規(guī)范保持高度一致的意愿對亞太地區(qū)有重要影響。這也提出了一些關(guān)鍵問題，即英國脫歐后的“全球英國”可能會成為亞太地區(qū)怎樣的貿(mào)易伙伴，以及英國與亞太地區(qū)更深入的接觸計劃會如何影響其戰(zhàn)略動態(tài)。這在很大程度上取決于隨著時間的推移，英國在多大程度上被拉入美國的貿(mào)易監(jiān)管軌道。

【原文】In a global economy and system increasingly defined by new developments and complexities intrade, whose rules and regulations govern that trade matter. The UK has embarked on a newpost-Brexit

trade policy, signing its first wholly new free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia and NewZealand. It isalso in negotiations to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) as part of

the UK’s aspirations to become an integral part of the Asia-Pacific trading community. This study’s research《太平洋評論》（The Pacific Review）是太平洋地區(qū)研究的主要平臺，作為跨學(xué)科期刊，其宗旨和目標(biāo)為打破研究領(lǐng)域之間以及學(xué)術(shù)界、新聞界、政府和商界之間的壁壘，重點關(guān)注政策問題。根據(jù) Journal Citation Reports 顯示，2021

年該刊的影響因子為 2.074。

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and text analysis on the UK’s bilateral FTAs with Australia and New Zealand reveals high levels of

similarity with two larger regional agreements heavily imprinted with US trade regulatory norms—this beingthe CPTPP itself and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). The UK’s revealedwillingness to strongly align itself with US trade regulatory norms has important implications for theAsia-Pacific. It also raises some key issues on what kind of trade partner the region might expect apost-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ to become, and how the UK’s deeper planned engagement with the Asia-Pacificcould affect its strategic dynamics. This could significantly depend on how closely the UKis pulledover

time into the US’ trade regulatory orbit.

2. 國家為何進行網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全能力建設(shè)援助？——來自日本的證據(jù)（Why do states engagein cybersecurity capacity-building assistance? Evidence from Japan）Benjamin Bartlett，美國俄亥俄州牛津邁阿密大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】2009 年，日本開始對東南亞進行網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全能力建設(shè)援助。根據(jù)現(xiàn)有文獻，日本這樣做可能有三個動機。一是加強其經(jīng)濟安全，即或通過推廣本國網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全公司，或通過降低其供應(yīng)鏈和其公司所依賴的區(qū)域基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的風(fēng)險。二是面對崛起的中國，加強與東南亞的外交和安全關(guān)系。三是根據(jù)其新宣布的“價值觀導(dǎo)向外交”，推廣網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間使用規(guī)范。通過研究最初幾年日本提供的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全能力建設(shè)援助的性質(zhì)，以及相關(guān)的政府聲明和文件，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，日本與東盟成員國開展網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全能力建設(shè)援助的主要目的是為其企業(yè)維持穩(wěn)定的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境。這證明，盡管日本在 2000 年代進行了旨在鼓勵利用外援來實現(xiàn)更廣泛的地緣政治目標(biāo)的改革，但在某些領(lǐng)域，經(jīng)濟安全仍是日本對外援助的主要驅(qū)動力。研究還表明，雖然網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全能力建設(shè)援助是一種安全合作形式，但不能認為傳統(tǒng)的安全關(guān)切是其驅(qū)動力。

【原文】In 2009, Japan began to engage in cybersecurity capacity-building assistance in Southeast Asia.

Based on existing literature, there are three plausible motives for Japan to have done so. The first was tostrengthen its economic security, either by promoting its own cybersecurity firms or by reducing risks toitssupply chain and the regional infrastructure upon which its firms relied. The second was to strengthendiplomatic and security ties with Southeast Asia in the face of a rising China. The third was to promotenorms regarding the use of cyberspace in line with its newly-declared “values oriented diplomacy”. Byexamining both the nature of the assistance given in the first few years and government statements anddocuments surrounding the decision to provide assistance, this article finds that Japan engagedincybersecurity capacity-building assistance with ASEAN member-states primarily to maintain a stableeconomic environment for its firms. This is evidence that, despite reforms made in Japan during the 2000smeant to encourage the use of foreign aid to pursue wider geopolitical goals, in some areas economicsecurity continued to be a major driver of Japanese foreign aid. These findings also highlight that whilecybersecurity capacity-building assistance is a form of security cooperation, it cannot be assumedthat

traditional security concerns are what is driving it.

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3. 蒙古成為永久中立國？聚焦永久中立國政策的辯論與挑戰(zhàn)（Mongolia becomingapermanent neutral nation? Focusing on the debate and challenges of the permanentneutral nation policy）

Jaehyuk Jang，韓國外國語大學(xué)（HUFS）蒙古語系

Kisun Kim，韓國外國語大學(xué)（HUFS）蒙古語系

【摘要】蒙古發(fā)現(xiàn)自己逐漸面臨在烏克蘭問題上支持俄羅斯的壓力，以及在中日南海爭端中支持中國的壓力。在這種情況下，對于一個小國而言，選邊站隊的代價將及其高昂。偏袒任何一方都會讓一個小國付出巨大代價。然而，自 2015 年 9 月蒙古國總統(tǒng)額勒貝格道爾吉及其外交政策團隊在國內(nèi)外發(fā)起將“永久中立”地位制度化的運動以來，烏蘭巴托的外交政策專家們一直在激烈爭論蒙古國是否應(yīng)該制定這一政策。最終，2020 年 5 月 6 日，蒙古政府通過第 162 號決議，決定“2015 年9 月批準(zhǔn)的第 375 號決議無效，我們將采取措施不推進蒙古國有關(guān)永久中立國的政策”。由于擔(dān)心蒙古國推行永久中立國政策最終會大幅降低其多支柱外交政策的靈活性，蒙古國政府宣布其永久中立國政策無效。【原文】Mongolia found itself increasingly under pressure to back Russia over Ukraine and China initsdisputes with Japan and in the South China Sea. In this emerging scenario, taking sides would be extremelycostly for a small state. However, since September 2015, when Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj

and his foreign policy team launched a campaign both domestically and abroad to institutionalizea‘permanent neutrality’ status, foreign policy pundits in Ulaanbaatar had been intensively debating whether or

not Mongolia should enact such a policy. But finally, on May 6, 2020, the Mongolian government decidedthat ‘Resolution No. 375 ratified in September 2015 will be nullified, and we will take measures not topromote Mongolia’s policies related to a permanent neutral nation’ through resolution No. 162. As theconcern that Mongolia's promotion of the permanent neutral nation policy could eventually significantlyreduce the flexibility of its multi-pillar foreign policy, the Mongolian government nullified its permanent

neutral nation policy.

4. 領(lǐng)土爭端、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人角色和“四方安全對話”的影響：中印邊界沖突升級的三角解釋（ Territorial disputes, the role of leaders and the impact of Quad: a triangularexplanation of China-India border escalations）

Ghulam Ali，四川輕化工大學(xué)馬克思主義學(xué)院政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】本文對近期中印邊境沖突升級的三方原因進行了解釋。文章認為，雖然沖突升級源于邊界爭議（第一個因素），但另外兩個因素，即中印兩國的政策以及“四方安全對話”（Quad）的國際政治影響，也引發(fā)了局勢升級。在過去幾十年中，這三個因素并非同時發(fā)揮作用。各種事件的巨大推動力將三者聯(lián)系在一起，一方的發(fā)展影響著另外兩方。文章解釋了不同因素和子因素之間的聯(lián)系及其相互促進的作用。邊界不明確為沖突提供了基礎(chǔ)。中印雙方的強硬政策從五個方面挑起了競爭：影響力競爭、地位競爭、軍事化、實際控制線（LAC）的變化以及援引“四方安全對話”。文章隨后闡述了印度在制衡中國方面的超強戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢，以及“中國因素”在雙邊和四方機制下加強印度與美國、日本和澳大利亞的關(guān)系。當(dāng)代中印競爭已超越了有爭議的邊界。國內(nèi)和國際政治已開始對其產(chǎn)生影響，使其成為亞洲最重要的地緣政治挑戰(zhàn)。

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【原文】This article provides a triangular explanation of the recent surge in China-Indian border escalations.

It argues that although escalations stemmed from the disputed borders (the first factor), two additional

factors, the policies of new nationalist leaders Xi and Modi and the impact of international politics withtheQuadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as a case study, also triggered them. In the preceding decades, thesethree factors were not operational simultaneously. A grand push of events connected themin a waythat

developments on one side affected the other two. The article explained the linkages between different factorsand subfactors and their reinforcing interplay. The ill-defined boundary provided a foundation for theconflict. The assertive policies of Xi and Modi provoked the rivalry in five ways: competition for influence,

status, militarisation, changes in the line of actual control (LAC), and invocation of the Quad. The articlethen elaborated India’s unrivalled strategic advantages in balancing China and how the ‘China factor’ strengthened India’s ties with the US, Japan and Australia bilaterally and under the Quad. The contemporarySino-Indian rivalry has expanded beyond disputed borders. Domestic and international politics have startedinfluencing it, making it Asia’s foremost geopolitical challenge.

5. 臺美防擴散合作：朝鮮案例與受影響產(chǎn)業(yè)的影響（Taiwan–US nonproliferationcooperation: the case of North Korea and the influence of affected industrie）Yi-hao Su，國立臺灣大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】為什么美國發(fā)現(xiàn)很難獲得第三方對其防擴散政策的承諾？雖然美國的壓力是促使政策實施的必要條件，但本文認為，當(dāng)受影響的行業(yè)預(yù)見到目標(biāo)收益不斷增加并對執(zhí)政黨顯示出強大的影響力時，行為體的反應(yīng)就會減弱。作者通過對 1992 年以來美臺在朝鮮問題上的防擴散合作進行個案內(nèi)部研究來檢驗這一論點。根據(jù)訪談、官方統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)和維基解密文件，本研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于機械行業(yè)對朝鮮的出口量不斷增加，加之強大的政治影響力，中國臺灣當(dāng)局將美國要求的針對機械行業(yè)違規(guī)者的執(zhí)法行動推遲到了 2006 年。相比之下，由于與朝鮮的能源貿(mào)易和金融交易極少，中國臺灣當(dāng)局在1997 年迅速停止了核廢料處理計劃，并在 21 世紀(jì)加強了金融制裁。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)填補了關(guān)于對第三方實施制裁的政治成本的理論空白，并豐富了防擴散承諾的學(xué)術(shù)研究。當(dāng)前的政策含義是，中國臺灣的高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)可能會更強烈地反對美國要求管制與中國的半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易。

【 原 文 】 Why does the United States find it challenging to obtain third-party commitment toitsnonproliferation policies? Although US pressure is necessary to trigger implementation, I contend that statesare less responsive when the affected industries foresee growing gains from targets and displaystrongleverage on the ruling parties. I tested this argument by conducting a within-case study on US–Taiwanesenonproliferation cooperation concerning North Korea since 1992. On the basis of interviews, official

statistics, and Wikileaks documents, this study revealed that because of the machinery industry’s increasingexport volume to North Korea and strong political influence, Taiwan delayed United States–requestedenforcement actions against the machinery industry’s violators until 2006. By contrast, because of minimal

energy trade and financial transactions with North Korea, Taiwan swiftly halted a nuclear waste disposal

plan in 1997 and improved financial sanctions in the 21st century. These findings fill the theoretical gapregarding the political costs of sanction enforcement on third-party states and add to the scholarshipon